MUSEOLOGY
AND ITS THEORY

JAN DOLÁK
MUSEOLOGY AND ITS THEORY

Jan Dolák

Professional peer-reviewed monograph

Published with support

Reviewed by PaeDr. Tibor Dite
Doc. Mgr. Petra Šobáňová, Ph.D.

Published by Technical Museum in Brno, 2022
Purkyňova 105/612 00 Brno
www.tmbrno.cz

Pre-print preparation: Mgr. Miroslav Kubiš

Tisk: Repropress

Translation: Stuart Roberts
Translations of abstracts: PhDr. Pavla Seitlová
PhDr. Vitaly Gennadievich Ananjev, DrSc.

E-book in PDF format can be ordered via

© Technické muzeum v Brně, 2022
Author © Jan Dolák

ISBN 978-80-7685-007-1 (print)
CONTENT

1. INTRODUCTION 5

2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUSEOLOGICAL THOUGHT 7
   2.1. A brief history of pre-museological thinking 7
   2.2. Museography 10
   2.3. Museology 13

3. THE SHAPING OF MUSEOLOGY AND ITS TEACHING AT UNIVERSITIES 19
   3.2. Zbyněk Zbyslav Stránský 35
   3.2.1. Metamuseology 40
   3.3. Wojciech Gluziński 40

4. MUSEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 55
   4.1. Phenomenology and other directions 57
   4.2. Karl Popper 63
   4.3. Postmodernism 69
   4.3.1. Michel Foucault 73
   4.3.2. Jacques Derrida 77
   4.3.3. Jean Baudrillard 79
   4.4. Museology, nature and universum 82

5. MUSEUMS AND SOCIETY 89
   5.1. Identity 93

6. MUSEUM, MONUMENTS, HERITAGE, MEMORY 95
   6.1. Is heritage to be chosen by the professional or the public? 105
   6.2. Intangible heritage 106
   6.3. Digital heritage 108
   6.4. Universal values 100

7. THE MUSEUM COLLECTION AS A STRUCTURE 111
   7.1. The thing as a philosophical problem 111
   7.2. Structure 111
   7.3. The museum item and its museality 113
   7.4. Musealization 116
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. MUSEUM COMMUNICATION</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. MUSEUM CULTURE OR MUSEUM MULTICULTURE?</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF MUSEOLOGY</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1. New museology and ecomuseology</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2. Critical museology</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3. Reflexive museology</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.4. The museum as predator</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5. Neuromuseology?</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. SO MUSEOLOGY IS...</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1. Methodology and methods</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.2. Terminology</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.3. An explanation of certain terms</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. MUSEOLOGY IN MUSEUM PRACTICE</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. MUSEUMS AND TECHNOLOGY. EPILOGUE</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstracts</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name Index</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. INTRODUCTION

Museology as a university discipline has been cultivated for almost sixty years. During that time, it has taken a great step forward, not least in quantitative terms. There are hundreds of university departments named museology or museum studies all over the world. The book, magazine and internet output dealing with museology is enormous. However, we are witnessing a certain loosening up of the whole discipline. There is therefore a need to examine its theoretical basis, the terminology it uses and its research methods, to examine how and in what direction museology is developing and to subject its development to critical analysis. This book seeks to critically summarize the current trends in theoretical research in the field of museology, including the latest trends, to take from both older and newer approaches that which is truly alive and to say goodbye to development dead ends. The book reacts to both earlier and contemporary philosophy and could not therefore avoid many concepts from philosophy, sociology, culture studies, etc.; its aim however is not to explain, or directly define them. We attempt to clarify individual concepts only where it is essential in order to explain museological approaches. The work tries to capture perhaps all the decisive directions in contemporary museological thinking and has the ambition to become a guide to current methodology in the field. At the general level the monograph is based on the thinking in central European museology of the 1970s and 1980s, represented primarily by the theoretical system of Czech associate professor Zbyněk Zbyslav Stránský. It is thus partly an adoption and confirmation of his ideas, but also a debate with this world-renowned museologist and a rejection of some of his approaches. The book is an elaboration of basic museological knowledge in the light of modern philosophy, the contemporary development of society, modern trends in museology and museum practice; it tries to bring forward new perspectives on the intrinsic essence of the field, but on the other hand it has to deal with many mistakes that have built up in our understanding of museology. Where possible or indeed necessary, we rely on the opinions of authorities in related fields (e.g. culturology, archaeology, pedagogy, etc.). Although the application examples used are mostly from the Slovak milieu, the book may also be used anywhere in the world, since the general problems of museology are extremely similar, if not identical. This work may help not only museologists, but also experts in related fields, students of museology and related fields (e.g., culturology, aesthetics, etc.), or be a guide to the difficulties of museum practice. The book was first published in 2019, but due to great interest, a slightly modified version had to be published again a year later. For publication in English, the book has been slightly amended. Special thanks go to both reviewers, Tibor Dite and Petra Šobáňová for their valuable comments when finalizing the text and to the Technical Museum in Brno, namely Ivo Štěpánek and Josef Večeřa and the editor Pavla Stöhrová, without whom this work could not have arisen. I thank Miroslav Kubiš for his careful pre-press preparation and Stuart Roberts for the careful translation. The book is based on the monograph Theoretical Foundation of Museology, which was published in Brno in 2019, with the second edition a year later. However, the text has been amended.
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUSEOLOGICAL THOUGHT

**Motto:** There can be no [living] science, unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in [the existence of] an order of things, and in particular, of an order of Nature. Science could only have been created by men who already had this belief, and therefore the original source of the belief must have been pre-scientific.

*Alfred North Whitehead* (according to Bernard Russell 1993, 128)

2.1 A brief history of pre-museological thinking

People and things

From the very beginning, man was accompanied by things. It was the use of objects, and subsequently their targeted production, that gradually distinguished him from the animal kingdom. Man began to make tools, weapons, clothing, etc., for completely utilitarian reasons, in order to survive. Already in prehistoric times, one may assume the existence of personal property – such as clothing, hunting trophies, jewellery – in the quantity and quality of which the skill and success of individuals was reflected and this otherness could be demonstrated to those around them. Essentially connected with his surroundings, man tried to somehow understand and influence nature; hunting magic is followed by fertility magic. Man accumulates hunting trophies and starts to make things (various talismans, fetishes, amulets, whistles, drums, etc.). This undoubtedly led to the creation and transmission of what we now call intangible heritage, i.e., customs, dances, singing, habits, etc. These are attempts to incline nature to one’s will through the cultivation of cult. Again, we understand these more as utilitarian approaches, as a means of survival. So the prehistoric shaman was not a “whistle collector.” When a musical instrument he needed was damaged, he simply made another one. This apparent detail pays off for us today, when there is a tendency, especially abroad, to consider as a museum everything that has some cultural value, such as religious shrines. There is no doubt that these objects constitute heritage, we find in them a considerable number of objects of a cultural nature. However, a church is not a museum, and the relevant church administrator is not a collector. From a doctrinal point of view, the believer does not care whether the Stations of the Cross, in front of which he kneels and performs his religious observances, is an outstanding work of art or the work of a regional amateur (for more, see Dolák 2018). According to the Czech philosopher Josef Šmajs, it was the level of macroscopic things that was the determining model for the content of initial cultural information and thus for the means of establishing human culture as a new non-biotic reality, recalling the well-known statement of the Austrian zoologist Konrad Sebastian Lorenz (1903–1989): “Man can afford to carry about more useless ballast than any animal living in the wild.” (Šmajs, Krob 1994, 160).
Gradually, even in prehistoric times, Man begins to express himself artistically, to surround himself with things he does not immediately „need“ and wants and needs to demonstrate show his otherness and difference to others. Here begins what we can call proto-collecting, the cultivation of what I call a museum culture. There are also attempts to record specific events, i.e. the preservation of memory, which we can safely document at the latest for antiquity (e.g. Mesopotamia, China). In antiquity, there were already a number of collections, even collectors, the Roman legions displayed on special stretchers objects obtained from the conquered territories. The ancient Greeks used specific terms to describe their collections. No later than from Aristotle, the effort to sort and classify things in some manner gradually intensifies, including the collection of, for example, samples of plants and animals, including the creation of a hierarchical system, through the development of the syllogism, etc.

In the following period, characterized in Europe by the cultivation of the Christian universe, collections of an ecclesiastical nature are typically built up by both secular and ecclesiastical figures. Church treasures at cathedrals and monasteries (e.g. Aachen and Esztergom) were displayed at important events, so their holders had to deal with the basic principles of conservation. Priests deepened the quality of descriptions of church and monastic collections. This is reflected in the inventories of church and monastery chambers, which also included depictions of individual objects. That this was not just a question of registering the church's assets is shown by their later publication, which pursued religious and propaganda goals. There are also descriptions and depictions of holy tables and processions. Similar inventories also appeared in secular collections. It is these thesauri that may be considered collections, or even protomuseums, because they collect „extra things,“ something that the believer does not immediately need in order to perform a religious ceremony. These collections, of course, supported faith, the Christian universe, but in many cases contained entirely non-religious objects, for example the bones of a mammoth allegedly hung above the portal of St. Stephen's Cathedral in Vienna and similarly a bridle from El Cid's Horse in the Cathedral at Seville.

Collecting during the Renaissance and Mannerism has a significantly different focus, with an emphasis on worldliness; in addition to art, the products of nature etc. are collected. Although man approaches collecting with a return to ancient rationality, he also expresses his disorientation from the new knowledge about the organization of the world, from the discovery of new continents, the transformation of the Earth into a mere point in space, etc. Perhaps we might use the term Mannerist cabinet rather than Renaissance cabinet, especially from the positions of the fine arts (for more see Dolák 2018). Typical examples are art chambers, nature chambers, such as the extensive collection of Rudolf II in Prague, etc. From that time date the first works defining not only the basic concepts and missions of chambers, but also the methodology for their creation. Based on the idea of theatrum mundi, brought forward by Guilio Camillo, the concept of chambers was defined in theory by Samuel von Quiccheberg, a native of Antwerp, a physician at the Bavarian
court of Albrecht V in Munich. His work *Inscriptiones, vel titi theatri amplissimi compleetectentis*, was published in 1565. Here we find not only a definition of the mission of chambers, but also a methodology for their construction and especially, a general systematics of collections oriented towards the present.⁰⁰

According to this author systematics consist of the following breakdown:

1. estates representation,
2. arts and crafts items,
3. the products of nature,
4. technical instruments, tools and weapons.

Artistic and beautiful objects were to be part of the universal museum he proposed. According to him, a collection structured in detail of the products of nature and artefacts was the ideal place for education, and his concept influenced museum theory and collection practice until at least the 18th century. Related to this approach is the programmatic concept of chambers, as defined by Francis Bacon, a pioneer of the advancement of science, in his *Gesta Grayorum* (1594). Bacon promoted the museum’s exemplary, utilitarian, and usable nature. In science he emphasized experimentation. This trend intensified further during the 17th century. In 1666, in Schleswig, Adam Olearius published a handbook explaining the mission and function of chambers and recommending what to collect and how. However, we cannot remain just in Europe. At the beginning of the 17th century, the noble Chinese researcher Wen Zhen-heng wrote his *Treatise on Superfluous Things*, which later became the basis of the book entitled *Superfluous Things* by Craig Clunas. The central idea is that the interest in superfluous things is a sign that one can be concerned with what is not essential, i.e. one belongs to the elite, to the class that has free time (Burke 2011, 81). We believe that this is a narrowing down of the issue we are looking at. Collecting is not and never has been a manifestation only of the elites, although in truth collections did support their self-presentation (Drobný 2016). The effort to materialize the world is far more widespread, we might say ubiquitous. We could find an inexhaustible number of examples where people took with them, for example, on a journey, some „unnecessary“ trifle, souvenir, personal momento, etc. This was not at all related to their social status, nor to any need to parade these items (ostentation).

In the 17th century, Johann Daniel Major also lived in Schleswig-Holstein; in addition to placement of the sciences, he also defined a place for cabinets and museums. He characterizes museum objects in turn as essential, true, original, material and permanent, today we would say “genuinely existing and preservable” objects. He often referred to chambers as *Vernunftkammern* (Chambers of Reason). He conceived collection objects as sources of knowledge, thereby significantly

---

⁰⁰ Passages on the development of museological thinking from the Renaissance to the 20th century are taken in part from the monograph by Z.Z. Stránský entitled *Archaeology and museology*, published under the auspices of the UNESCO Chair of Museology and World Heritage in Brno in 2005. However, some parts have been omitted, the text is extended by some passages. Briefly on the history of museology, with links to original sources also: Šopák 2012, 13–15.
shifting the point of view of selection. However, Cartesian thought also led him to classify collections. In his day, the tree scheme was promoted, as we encounter with Leibniz, for example. Major, on the other hand, worked from a knowledge of the nature of the collection items. Therefore, he made a fundamental distinction between two groups: res naturalia and res artificialia. He also distinguished between real and fictional objects, between simple and compound, between living and non-living. He then further subdivided these basic groups. This reflected an effort to invoke a global classification of collections. Doctor, botanist and collector J. Major was a promoter of the public museum (Stránský 2005, 88–89). „Major himself thought that his work was the first of its kind in this regard. He was wrong in this, because he did not know of Quiccheberg, but he was the first to realize the need for an investigative, theoretical approach to this phenomenon, and he introduced the term tactica conclavium for this „science“: Tactica Conclavium. This is the science of how the Kunst und Naturalienkammern are to be properly organized. I was probably the first to try to create a new and special discipline in the form of published writings.“ (Stránský 2005, 89). Major not only completed the separating off of theoretical museum thinking, but also created his own base for this field. He was the first to outline the history of the museum phenomenon, the origins of which he linked with Noah’s Ark, but in particular he presented a generalization of collecting, culminating in the form of chambers. The Museum Museorum treatise (Frankfurt am Main 1704) by Michael Bernhard Valentini is also part of these beginnings of museological thinking. Valentini was a German doctor and collector dealing with, for example, vertebrate anatomy.

In the 18th century, neutral summarising terms are used: things, objects, Sachen, Dinge (Ennenbach 1981). However, other tendencies are beginning to assert themselves in the professional literature. Initially, things in a museum were judged in terms of curiosity (the thirst for knowledge) and rarity; around 1700 both concepts were understood quite positively: Major, Valentini, the architect and mathematician L.C. Sturm, Leibnitz, Neickelius (Ennenbach 1981). With the increasing specialization of the sciences, this could no longer be enough and the names used in individual professional disciplines were preferred and the overriding term was the collection item.2

2.2 Museography

But nor was Major alone in his thinking. This is demonstrated by the projects that Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz came up with at the same time as part of his efforts to promote science. In his projects to establish scientific academies, which he worked on, for example, for Berlin, Paris, St Petersburg and Dresden, he placed great emphasis on the formation of collections representing contemporary science and technology. At the same time, he emphasized the need not only to deposit and register them, but also to display them. These concepts were most pronounced

2) Now, according to Ennebach, we are witnessing the opposite trend, i.e. building an albeit differentiated but nevertheless integrated contemporary museum sphere.
in his 1675 project Drôl de Pensée (Strange Thinking) for Paris. His intention was to establish a distinctive facility that would collect the objects of science and technology, store them, record them, but above all show them in their various forms. The aim was not only to contribute in this way to education, but also to involve professional circles in the application of scientific and technical knowledge in practice and thus influence the development of society. Even if this remained at the level of intentions, it was a pioneering idea for its time, which came to fruition much later. We can see clearly that the ideas for the first museums were not guided by “remembering the good old days” but were formulated from the true needs of the day; the science and technology of that time could not be anything other than “documenting the present”.

Leibniz thus foreshadowed a broad quantitative increase in cabinets, or rather, early museums on an international scale, which played an increasingly important investigative and educational role. This was reflected in the publication Museographia, which was published in Leipzig in 1727 under the pseudonym Caspar Friedrich Neickelius (real name Jenckel). This is already a reflection on the typology of museum collections and a comparison of various collecting strategies. For Neickelius, the museum is an image of the world and a picture of its current knowledge. The author characterized the terminology, covered the history of various forms of the museum phenomenon, not only in Europe but also on other continents, and gave a detailed description of existing museums and cabinets and a comprehensive view of the museum and its mission. „If there is something in the world that can arouse the interest of even high-ranking and powerful personalities – we read here – and attract them from distant places, then it is museums. Visiting and viewing museums brings many benefits… and all people can benefit from a visit to a museum, scientists to multiply their knowledge, the unlearned to learn the sciences, rich and poor, young and old.” (Neickelius, 1727 – taken from Stránský 2005, 90).

This work opened up another new phase of museum theoretical thinking. This is also expressed by a new term that we first encounter here: museography. The subject of the learning intention is the cabinet or museum itself in its entire profile, but also in the social context. This dominating descriptive approach, often with an encyclopaedic focus, became characteristic of further development. It was also reflected in guides of the period, which served as an orientation for researchers, but were also evidence of the growing interest in science and knowledge in general. This descriptive orientation leads to the identification of objects and the revelation of their relationships. As a result, collections became a very important object for science and also motivated the separating-off of individual disciplines. This was also reflected in the scientific, but also the museographic, thinking of Carl von Linnaeus. In his judgement, it is difficult for the natural sciences to find a direction within the inexhaustible number of natural phenomena. This is why scientists needed to build their own collections. However, these have not only a research significance, but are also an important educational tool, as Linnaeus himself verified during his
work at the University of Uppsala. He was also the author of the title Instruction musei rerum naturalium (1764), in which he defined the principles for building scientific collections. He thus laid the foundations for a historically significant phase of scientific systematics, which – albeit in a modified way – still plays a significant role in the organization of collections. Linnaeus worked from the link between science and collections, so he promoted methodicalness and method.

Ever-wider circles became aware of the need for museums, both in terms of science, nascent technology, the economy, and the growing demands of education, but also of political objectives. As a consequence, at this time we meet many researchers, teachers, writers, but also politicians with opinions shaping the concepts for modern museums.

Probably the first to use the name museum for his group of collections was P. Giovio of Como (Štěpánek 2002, 22), but for the most part the origin of the modern museum in today’s sense dates to the first half of the 18th century – 1734: the Museo Capitolino in Rome, 1739: Florence (the Medici collections), 1750: Paris (part of the royal property) and others.

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) was also aware not only of the importance of collections, he also advocated the construction of museums. He was of the opinion that “once man becomes aware of the things around him, he evaluates them — and rightly so — always in relation to himself. For his whole destiny depends on whether he likes them or not, whether they attract or repel him, whether they benefit or harm him. This completely natural way of looking at and judging things seems to be as simple as it is necessary; nevertheless, man is exposed to thousands of mistakes that embarrass him and make his life miserable.” (Stránský 2005, 90–91).

Georg Wilhelm F. Hegel (1770–1831) also influenced museum thinking. „In this context Beat Wyss writes that we must here seek the origin of „philosophical museology‘ and that the concept of museology is, immanent to Hegel’s philosophy.’ Although the use of the term museology has a rather comparative role in this case, the connection between Hegel’s absolute spirit and the idea of a „museum of the world“ is convincing. For Hegel, this museum is also a global cemetery, which, however, also accepts living things. However, the spirit feels good in it, because every grave offers the experience of possibilities, and every bone represents an experience. And an exhibit – is the ultimate truth. At the heart of Hegel’s „historical museology“ is appropriation. Anyone who walks through a museum walks through national and global history, and does so in order to become an owner of the world and of himself. A museum should present the past as a manifestation of its own being. Even the strange is special in this respect, even though it appears as incognito at first, it soon reveals itself.“ (Stránský 2005, 91).

The Enlightenment then brings with it the need to cultivate science, to explore the conditions for agriculture, water and other natural resources.3 Elsewhere,

---

3) This was one of the reasons for the establishment of the Moravian Provincial Museum in Brno in 1817.
museums were established as evidence of the successful development of an empire (e.g. the British Museum in London in 1756). The existence of collections, the need to display them and their use in education then led to the establishment of the first real museums as purely practical establishments.

Museographic thinking expanded and deepened its historical orientation. An important contribution is the work published in 1837 by Gustav Klemm (1802–1867) and entitled Zur Geschichte der Sammlungen für Wissenschaft und Kunst in Deutschland. We can state that this is the first real history of the museum phenomenon, although the first part is devoted to libraries and only the second to museums, but this relationship also is important. Klemm was the first to suggest a particular dividing up of history and pointed out the importance of such personalities as Quiccheberg. Gustav Klemm is the founder of the history of culture, or more exactly, culturology, understood as the philosophy of the history of culture, and this was reflected in his approach to the museum phenomenon. Therefore, it is also natural that he put museums in the context of culture. Klemm worked most of his life in Dresden and his work (including his erroneous division of races into active and passive) influenced subsequent research, e.g. in ethnology and cultural anthropology. It is no coincidence that both culturologists and museologists consider Klemm to be one of the greats, indeed one of the founders of their disciplines.

The museographic approach became dominant for the entire course of the 19th century. This is already shown by the scope⁴ we encounter in 1832 in the Dictionnaire de l’Académie, where it states: „Museography: discussion of museums, description of the museum. “ Similarly, we can also read in 1866 in the Czech Encyclopaedic Dictionary by František L. Rieger (1818–1903): „Museography the description of museums and their rarities“ (Stránský 2005, 91).

2.3 Museology

Motto: There is nothing more practical than a good theory. Kurt Lewin

There is some debate over the first use of the term museology. Probably the first to use it was the German ornithologist and museum taxidermist, Silesian native Phillip Leopold Martin (1815–1885), active in the Zoological Museum in Berlin, in his principle work The Practice of Natural Science (Weimar 1869), where the second chapter is entitled Dermoplasty and Museology (Šopák 2012, 13).

1877 saw the first appearance of a periodical entitled Zeitschrift für Museologie und Antiquitätenkunde, published by Johann Georg Theodor Graesse (1814–1885). In 1883, his contribution entitled Die Museologie als Fachwissenschaft was published anonymously. The introductory paragraph is already characteristic: „If someone had spoken or written about museology as a science thirty, even twenty years ago, they would have met with a condescending and contemptuous laugh from many people. Today, it is of course different“ (Stránský 2005, 91–92).

⁴) Original expression from Stránský’s text.
However, Graesse understood the new term of museology very specifically: he associated it with a requirement for study and with the corresponding qualifications of museum work adepts. Graesse was probably the first to imagine museology as a science in the sense of the projection of a complex of various disciplines, that is, in a concept not unlike the auxiliary historical sciences. He rightly felt that in some things museology seemed to somehow be above the standard sciences cultivated in a museum, but in some way subordinate to them. „If you want to pursue such a profession, you must, of course, prepare for it at university. Therefore, in addition to the study of ancient and modern languages, the student will focus on the historical sciences, especially cultural history and art history, will deal with archaeology in the broadest sense, while not neglecting the history of literature, and will try to become acquainted with the latest in scientific knowledge.“ (Graesse, 1883, according to Stránský 2005, 92). Although the content of museology connects only with multi-facetted education and does not define the specificity of this approach consists of, its postulate of a connection between the museum phenomenon and science and the scientific disciplines indicates the beginning of a new phase of this development, which we could take to be the beginning of the formation of our own field of museology.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian thinker Nikolai Fyodorovich Fedorov (1829–1903) presented an original philosophy of the museum. 5” In relation to the 19th century, in his judgement, the existence of museums was a paradox. A century that does only what is useful still has people who collect and store the useless. This is contrary to the ruling idea of progress. Progress is the non-negotiable replacement of the old with the new; progress generates dead things. It is not interested in memory, it opposes it. In contrast, Fedorov sees the existence of museums as proof that, despite the ruling idea of progress, not all humanity has been lost. The museum therefore seems to him to be the last place of the cult of remembrance. If through the preservation of things museums motivate the remembrance of past generations, this is related to the fact that „for a museum, death is not the end, but a beginning.” The realm of death, like hell, is created by special museum departments. For the museum, there is nothing hopeless or lost, i.e. nothing that cannot be revived and reawakened; for the museum the dead, even the prehistoric dead, are present in the cemetery; in the museum there is not only singing and prayer, as in a church, but „there is also work here for all the suffering and the dead.“ From Fedorov’s point of view, the museum strives to resurrect the fathers with its work, by preserving and organizing relics of material culture and deepening the memory of humanity. All museum work 6 is in fact a fight against the absence of memory “(Stránský 2005, 92).

In output from the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, there was also a growing interest in historical explication. Adolf Furtwangler, David Murray with their three-­

5) The first volume of his book Outline of General Work was published in 1906, the second in 1913. Fedorov’s collected writings were then published in Moscow in 1995 (taken from Sapanža 2011, 6).
6) This is the original concept of ‘patrification’(Majorov 2005, 13.)
In connection with the deepening social issues, but especially in connection with the fact that science disengaged from museums at the end of the 19th century and confined itself within the walls of laboratories, efforts arose to direct museum work primarily towards education. If, for example, the National Museum in Prague was a leading scientific institute and a crucial publishing institution in the first half of the 19th century, and if somewhat later J. E. Purkyně (1787–1869) proposed to establish a kind of academy of sciences headed up by the National Museum, in the second half of the 19th century the museum’s scientific scope was insufficient for the universities. Museums in western Europe also underwent something similar, and a new focus for museums was sought. Alfred Lichtwark (1852–1914) in particular was the promoter of the „educational“ direction for the museum’s focus. In 1902, he expressed a critical but at the same time inspiring idea when he wrote: “... the history of the idea of the museum, which is something completely different from its manifestation in the form of a museum, has not yet been clarified by any detailed research” (Stránský 2005, 93). In 1904, Lichtwark pointed out that all kinds of museums lead to, or work from, things. He was the main representative of the nascent idea of the „Museen als Bildungsstäten“.

One of the first Czech works on museology was written by the originally museum worker, then académician, archaeologist and anthropologist Lubor Niederle (1865–1944), who in 1894 published his work entitled Instructions for Collecting and Saving Prehistoric Monuments. It is an interesting work for its time, appealing for the prevention of fragmentation of collections, and emphasizing the value of sources for science, the principle of provenance, etc. (according to Šopák 2012, 22).

But what about education itself in museology? Even in the more distant past we encounter awareness of the need and importance of special training for staff engaged in museum facilities. In 1704, the librarian Daniel Wilhelm Moller (1642–1712) formulated the requirement for an appropriate qualification in his Disertatio de technophysiotameis and pointed out the changing significance of things. Graesse dealt even more broadly with the question of qualification in his aforementioned work from 1883. The Ecole du Louvre opened in Paris a year before that, and still operates today. From the circle of Czech thinkers we can rank highly Kliment Čermák from Čáslav (1852–1917), who published the article Education in Museology in 1901. Here he emphasized the need to acquire specific knowledge related to museum work as a prerequisite for successful work in these facilities. His appeals for specialization in regional museums (in Mělník to document the Burgundy vine, in Třeboň the local fauna) remain valid to this day. Čermák was well aware that the already relatively dense network of regional museums in a relatively small area of the Czech Lands concealed the danger of duplication and sameness, and thus a certain tedium and even superfluousness.
From the Slovak milieu, one should mention the polymath, collector and author of a number of articles Andrej Kmeť (1841–1908), the first chairman of the Slovak Museum Society, which began its activities in 1895.

In Kiev, in 1917 before the end of the First World War, the Polish author Mieczysław Treter (1883–1943) published the title Muzea współczesne Studium muzeologiczne in two parts in Muzeum Polskie, writing: „Museums cannot be a goal in themselves – they are only a means to higher goals, idealistic ones…“ (Treter 1917, according to Stránský 2005, 93).

At the beginning of the 20th century, two museum-oriented journals saw the light of day, in 1901 the American Museum Journal and in 1905 the German Museumskunde.

At least two personalities from the German milieu in this period are worth mentioning. Theodor Vollbehr from Magdeburg, author of a treatise entitled The Future of German Museums (1909). But above all, Karl Koetschau, publisher of the Museumskunde journal, who came out directly with the demand to develop the Museumskunde field as an independent branch and also saw in its promotion the mission of his journal. Among the authors publishing in the Museumskunde, one should mention at least the Brno director Julius Leisching (1865–1933), who was already working with ideas for a professional organization of museum workers, calling for an openness of museums to the public, similarly to Lichtwark. The activities of this representative of the German-Moravian museum sphere have been mainly dealt with by the Brno museologist Oto Kirsch (Kirsch 2010).

In the first issue of the Museumskunde journal from 1905, Leisching drew attention to the insufficient qualifications of museum staff, for whom the only school so far is the „museum itself“. They should be trained „in der Museumswissenschaft“. After the First World War, a new grouping of states took shape, and after coming to terms with the new conditions (political, social and economic), the need for unification was felt within the museum community. One expression of these efforts was the establishment of the Office International des Musées as early as 1919. To a certain extent, this organization followed on from the national organizations which had been established particularly in the second half of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th. In 1926, the Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle – part of the Office International des Musées – began publishing the international Mouseion journal. This contributed significantly to the expansion of interest in the theoretical explanation of museum culture and gathered information from around the world. Some authors see the date of issue of the first issue of Mouseion as the year of the birth of museology as a science with its own rules and laws. However, this is too formal a way of looking at this. This period also saw the establishment of the Czechoslovak Museums Association in 1919.

Despite markedly museological tendencies, museum thinking at the beginning of the 20th century was still predominantly in transition from the museographic to the museological phases. The differentiation of the terms museography
and museology was related to the gradual differentiation of the epistemological levels, namely the descriptive „graphia“ and the theoretical „logia“. However, the terminology was also complicated by the fact that in the German language circle the term „Museumskunde“, i.e. „museum studies“, was preferred. This more or less corresponded with the term museography. This was also reflected in the title Museumskunde, which was published in 1924 by Otto Hamburger and presented this field comprehensively, but still using the museographic concept.

In the Francophone area, the term museography had been adopted from the end of the 19th century, and is still the most frequent expression in museum theory in this part of the world. In contrast, the term museology gained ground in the English language ambit, as documented, for example, by the Bibliography of Museums and Museology, published in New York in 1923 by W. Clifford. In the United States, there was a growing interest in the theoretical explanation of the museum phenomenon, especially in connection with efforts to introduce specialised education. As early as 1895, George Brown Goode defined the requirements for the qualifications of museum staff. He emphasized, inter alia, that „intelligence, general education, organizational ability, commitment and a special talent, which might be described as „a museum sense“ are qualification prerequisites“. This resulted in university courses, the first (female) graduates of which were granted their diplomas in 1926 (Stránský 2005, 93–94).

The establishment of an independent Czechoslovakia was also a new impetus in the museum sphere, which gets rid of its marginal provincial nature and becomes involved in the cultural life of the new state. While in the field of conservation the approaches from Austria-Hungary continued to be followed, in the field of museum management the situation was somewhat different. The Vienna Central Commission for Monument Care had never gained great influence in the museum sector, which is why the path of museums in the new state was more complicated. In the Czech milieu, the texts of V. V. Jeníček, Albín Stocký, Fridolín Macháček, Jaroslav Helfert, Ladislav Lábek, and also of Jan Hofman, who considered the comprehensive protection of cultural heritage, are all worthy of note. One impetus for the education of museum staff was the establishment of the Lectorship of Museums at Masaryk University in Brno in 1921 (Kirsch, Jagošová 2013); since 1936 the field of museology has been taught in a similar way at Comenius University in Bratislava.

Western Europe, America and other parts of the world underwent similar developments. A relatively unknown area is the development of museum theory thinking in Russia. Immediately after the fall of tsarism, there was a significant increase in the number of museums, which motivated the publication of methodological works, especially of a regional type. The pleasing accent of perhaps all revolutions, the „democratization of culture“, was also echoed in Soviet Russia. In February 1919, an All-Russian Conference of Museum Staff met, which defined, at least in the form of a proclamation, quite progressive tasks. Museum journals appeared and museological centres were established, such as the Cabinet for Theoretical Museology in Moscow, created in 1923 as part of the Historical
Museum. Of the personalities of Russian museology of this time, one should mention at least Fedor Shmidt (1877–1937), whose publication Muzejnoje delo (*Shmit 1929*), published in 1929 in Leningrad, can stand comparison with contemporary output in central and western Europe. However, his work was not available at the time of the establishment of central European museology (1960s–1970s), since Shmit died as a „class enemy“ in the gulag in Tashkent sometime in 1937 (*Čistotinova 1994*).

Perhaps surprisingly, Russian (Soviet) museums in the period following the October coup developed a number of interesting activities (e.g. the Tretjakovsky Gallery), including tracking of visitor numbers, etc. (*Ananiev 2016*). At that time, educated people from the tsarist regime were still working here, and the new regime did not yet have the strength to take a deeper interest in museums for purely practical reasons (the civil war, war with Poland, famines, etc.). The museological production of this period can also withstand stricter assessment. A change did not occur until the turn of the 1920s and 1930s. In 1930, the All-Russian Museum Congress met (Lenin’s widow N. Krupská was also active in this at that time) and established a Stalinist dictatorship and programme for transforming museums into „complexes for political education“ to fight against „the fetishism of things“ (*Majorov 2005, 12*). With these intentions, the journal Sovetskij muzej, today called Muzej, began to be published in Moscow. In 1932, the Central Scientific Research Institute of Homeland Studies Methods was founded in Moscow, in 1955 renamed the Scientific Research Institute of Museology, from 1992 the Russian Institute of Cultural Studies, and from 2014 the Russian Scientific Research Institute of Cultural and Natural Heritage. In 1934, a Department of Museology was established at the University of Moscow.

The interwar concept of museology remained characterized by the opinion that the museum is the subject of this field. This was also reflected at the International Congress in Madrid in 1934, from which the two-volume work Museographie was born. L.V. Coleman characterized the overall situation in museological education in the inter-war period as follows: „University training for museum staff is still in its infancy, but is the subject of constant demand. New courses appear almost every year“ (*Stránský 2005, 196*).

---

7) We can paraphrase that instead of the supposed fetishism of things, fetishism occurred not through ideas but through ideology.
A major turning point in the history of mankind was the end of the Second World War, although in the field of museology it manifested itself only after a certain delay. The crucial milestone for the museum sphere in much of the world was the disintegration of the colonial system around 1960. The newly liberated states and nations are fundamentally redefining the face and mission of their existing museums, at that stage largely “white man museums” with a strong ethnological emphasis, and are establishing new museums. Of course, they are also reclaiming their heritage, in many cases scattered throughout the museums of the former colonialists. The new situation in the former colonies often led to tribal wars and other unrest, which manifested itself not only in a failure to care for heritage, but also in a one-sided interpretation of their own history (Dolák 2006). So by no means can we talk about clear progress in the field of museum management.

Under the influence of the horrors of war, there is a certain shift in musealization from a majority emphasis on progress to the commemoration of negative experiences, such as the Museum of the Holocaust. Gradually, however, a certain crisis of the modern, an emptying out, loss of ethos, etc. can be felt. Authors are increasingly writing about the crisis of the traditional museum and reflections on this.

Of great importance was the establishment of the International Council of Museums ICOM in 1946, under the auspices of UNESCO, as a new international platform for museum management. One of the founders of this international organization was Georges Henri Riviere. Although he was particularly visible as an author, he did contribute to the development of the theory of the field, and his lectures were later captured by his assistant, today Professor Emeritus of Museology André Desvallées. At the University of Paris Riviere led the Cours de Museologie for many years. He was one of few to realize the need to distinguish between the concepts of museology and museography. He pushed for the following definitions in the published materials of the UNESCO Regional Conference on the Educational Role of Museums, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1958: „Museology is a science that aims to study the mission and organization of museums. Museography is the set of techniques relating to museology“ (Stránský 2005, 95).

Jiří Neustupný (1905–1981) from the National Museum in Prague also took part in founding ICOM and the separating out of museology, as he had had the opportunity to get to know museums outside Europe (USA, Mexico, etc.) and had a major influence on the transfer of former German museums into the Czechoslovak state after May 1945 (Dolák 2019a). In 1950 he received his habilitation at Charles University for „the field of archaeology with respect to museology“. Related to this was his book Current Questions in the Museum Sphere (Neustupný 1950) in which he not only recorded the development of museology, but also presented his own conception preferring the determining role of so-called special museology. Neustupný advocated the division of collections into basic, study (depository) and exhibition, as well as a unified network
of museums and a unified record system for collections, etc. Neustupný understood
the museum item as a scientific source sui generis, so he appealed for a special
museology, which is the „theory and methodology of the application of scientific
disciplines to the function of a museum“. Neustupný also formulates a requirement
to deepen the theoretical dimension of museology, to have it included among
the university disciplines, but he formulates less clearly what the content of this
teaching should be. According to Neustupný, „at its best, general museology should
primarily become the sociology of museum work, dealing with both internal and
external relations in the museum sphere, such as the issues of its contribution
to scientific knowledge and enlightenment.“ (Šopák 2012, 26). Oto Kirsch (Kirsch 2020)
dealt extensively with special museology in his habilitation thesis.

In 1971, Neustupný formulated his approaches (Neustupný 1971) as follows:
„Museology is the theory and methodology of museum work, but the museum
itself is not the subject of its study. If based on existing experience (the static
approach), museology becomes museography, „well-tried instruction“ and loses
all momentum. Museology does not have its own work methods, so it must use
the methods of the „museological disciplines“ (the theory and methods of the
disciplines cultivated in museums: prehistory, mineralogy, etc., but also the theories
of communication, sociology, architecture, etc.). General museology is then formed
from these museological disciplines. If general museology is not connected
with specific theoretical work, it leads to inanimate and infertile theorizing.“

Neustupný maintains that collections are nothing other than sources
for the scientific disciplines and are processed using the methods of these sciences.
Not only within ICOM, but also outside it, the development began of a distinctive
profile for museology. M.G. Viana shared in this with his Elemonetos de museologia
dated 1953, and in the territory of the former Soviet Union Avram Mojsejevič
Razgoň (1920-1989) was undoubtedly the most important museologist (for more
about him see Igumnova 1999, Skripkina 2001), the anonymous co-author of the
monograph Osnovy sovětskого muzejevěděnija dated 1955. Razgoň, an employee
of the Research Institute of Culture in Moscow, was significantly influenced
by Czechoslovak approaches, but he himself also actively developed them (Razgoň 1984).

Also significant was the Japanese museologist Soichiro Tsuruta (1917–1992), who
defined a special concept and system of museology in his Principes de Museologie
(1956), where he characterized museology as „a highly developed applied science,
which studies the objectives of museums and the methods for the achievement
of these; its results are focused on museum development and should contribute
to human happiness and world peace“ (Tsuruta 1956 – according to Stránský 2005,
95).

To some extent, we could encounter a similar concept with Luc Benoist in his
Musées et Museologie, who also saw the object of museology in the museum,
but at the same time criticized its approach. „Contemporary museology ignores

8) It is worth noting that Stránský’s work is not mentioned either in the article or in the bibliography.
the religion of modern life, efficiency, organization, this science as old as the world itself, which has been given the new name of praxeology. Museology ignores automation… museology, greedy for visitors, has not tried to eliminate the tedious standing for several hours, the constant movement from one hall to another, the repeated adjustment of visitors' eyes…" (Benoist 1960 – according to Stránský 2005, 95). Benoist aptly called western European museums the museum–salon, a place of luxury for the elite; and museums in the Eastern bloc: the museum school. For North American museums, full of active life, he used the term: the museum–club. The Slovak museologist Anna Gregorová (1932–2015) successfully argued against Benoist's conception of collecting activities.

According to her, the museum sphere is the community of people working in museums, or better still, the set of all activities carried out on the grounds of a museum or relating to museums. Museology is thus the science that examines the specific relationship of man to reality, consisting in the purposeful and systematic collection and preservation of selected, especially three-dimensional, objects, which are evidence of the development of nature and society (Gregorová 1980, 254).

Within this framework, the separating off of museology as an independent discipline began. This was accompanied by the systematization and examination of its mission, but also by the introduction of the teaching of museology at universities and the building of museological documentation and methodology centres at museums and museum associations around the world. In Czechoslovakia after 1945, and even more so after the „victorious February“ of 1948, museums were intended to „serve the people“. The emphasis was therefore on the educational function of museums, on their openness to the public (more declared than actually implemented). Despite the absolute differences in social institutions in western Europe and Czechoslovakia, we can state that in their basic features the museums had similar objectives. That is, to increase their impact in society. Certainly their methods, resources, and in the end, their results, were different.

In Czechoslovakia the period from 1948 to 1989 was not homogeneous. Initially, it was characterized by the onset of radical Marx-Leninist indoctrination. Museums often commented on current issues, such as the fight against the American (potato) beetle, and „opened up to the people“ by decorating textile factory canteens with high-quality paintings (Jindřichův Hradec). Gradually, less aggressive forms of promoting the single correct „worldview“ were chosen. For example, natural science exhibitions emphasized evolution (as opposed to the creationist, i.e. religious, conception of the world), but otherwise depicted quite fairly the development of nature in a given region. In the 1950s, museology was influenced not only by the aforementioned works of Jiří Neustupný, but also by translations from Soviet authors. In the Slovak milieu, the book Museology from 1955 by Július Kálmán (1911–1991), is worthy of note (Kálmán 1955).

---

9) For its time, a fine scientific exposition in the Museum of the Vyškov Region at Vyškov was dominated by a large quote from Karl Marx, completely invented by the author Dr. V. Tlusták, as he later admitted. Thus, under official, often declarative signs, we can often find a great deal of honest work by museum staff.
The 1960s represent a radical change, worldwide, and according to Šopák this was a “radical modernism, fully responding to the replacement of an “historicist” museology with a „perspectivist“ museology, an emphasis on conceptuality, systematicity and at the same time a scientific approach.” (Šopák 2012, 26). The period of “anti-institutionally” defined museology begins (in the words of P. Šopák). Thus, the subject of museology is no longer the museum or museum object.

Within the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the director of the Moravian Museum, Jan Jelínek (1926–2004), played a significant role, recognizing that museologists need special training, specific training that would reverse the prevailing practicism. To do this, he found a scientist focused on this field – Z. Z. Stránský. Within the scope of this trend, a museological department was established in 1962 at the Moravian Museum in Brno, headed up by Z. Z. Stránský, and an external department of museology was established in December 1963 (Rutar 2014). Before the start-up of so-called postgraduate study (in today’s terminology, specialization study) of museology, the department held a museological symposium in 1965, the subject of which was both museology itself and the programming of its university teaching. The publishing of the theoretical journal Museological Notebooks (from 1967) followed; this contributed not only to the shaping of the theoretical foundations of museology, but especially to the dissemination of this knowledge on an international scale. In 1967, teachers of museology from a number of European countries met at the premises of the Brno department in 1967, establishing the International Committee for the Training of Personnel – ICTOP, under the auspices of ICOM. The meeting was also attended by H. Raymon Singleton, who became the first chairman of ICTOP. As early as 1966, he had founded the Department of Museum Studies at the University of Leicester, laying the foundations for Britain’s most important centre for museum studies and museology. As chairman of ICTOP, he significantly influenced the application of museology and museum studies, especially in South and North America.

This trend resulted in the mid-1970s in ICOM’s proclamation that museology should be considered a science. In 1977, ICOM established as one of the last the ICOFOM International Committee for Museology, with Jan Jelinek elected its first chairman. His successor for two terms was a Czech emigrant with Swedish citizenship, Vinoš Sofka (1929–2016), who gained a remarkable reputation, albeit more as an organizer and editor than as an author. In the 1960s, fundamental works were written on the history of museum culture and collecting. We are thinking here mainly of Germain Bazin (The Museum Age, 1967) and Niels von Holst, but also of Alma S. Wittlin. This period also includes the attention paid to museology in the former GDR. In 1964, the so-called Diskussionsbeiträge zur Museumswissenschaft were published as a supplement to the Neue Museumskunde. New here was an effort to integrate museum work into a broader framework of fields focused on documentation. However, these theses gradually became subject to ideological criticism from the ruling regime. Proponents of the Marxist „Museumswissenschaft“ – such as Erik Hühns and Wolfgang Herbst – opposed the „bourgeois museology“ represented for them, for example, by the West German anthology Das Museum der Zukunft, prepared and published in 1970 by G. Bott.
Within the Marxist conception, Klaus Schreiner (1929–1991) in particular developed theoretical and publishing efforts, either about the system of museology or the history of museum studies. This trend culminated in the late 1980s, when a university textbook of museology was published in Berlin in collaboration with Soviet authors, stating: „Museology is a social science that examines through museum objects the processes and laws for conserving social information as well as for communicating knowledge and its emotional impact: it examines the museum sphere, the museum as a historically conditioned social phenomenon, the basic social functions of museums and their implementation in various economic and social formations.“ (Herbst-Levykin 1988) – (according to Stránský 2005, 96). Klaus Schreiner from Alt Schwerein (Schreiner 1982, 1985, 1985a) significantly influenced museology in the GDR and was probably the most vocal critic of Stránský’s approaches within the so-called „Eastern bloc“. If we refuse to consider the formation of museology as a manifestation of Marxism, which is a common opinion of museologists from the Western world (van Mensch, Burcaw and others), then it is with this author that we most often encounter expressions such as „ideological class problems“, „a Marxist-Leninist conception of culture“, and so on.

Schreiner is also convinced that theoretical foundations need to be laid for museum work. But according to him, the subject of the study of museology is the collection, preservation, research and use, or to be exact, the communication of museum objects. He reminds us that the standpoint where the subject of museology research is the museum itself is gradually disappearing (a planetarium is not the subject of astronomy), but rejects the practice of distant and abstract „metamuseology“.

Schreiner’s critique of Stránský’s cultivation of „bourgeois axiology“ was in fact a material one. Stránský’s conception of museality, i.e. a kind of value with a great possibility for changes, had nothing to do with Marxism.

More elaborate considerations than Schreiner’s were put forward by Ilze Jahn, who was habilitated for her work in the natural sciences (Berlin 1978), which already had the word museology in the title. According to her, the subject of museology is work with a „factual witness“ (a museum object). She then summarized her approaches as a series in the journal Neue Museumskunde (Jahn 1980). She advocates the use of scientific knowledge by the social sciences and formulates what the „theoretical foundations of museology“ are based on.

Wilhelm Ennenbach was also influenced by Stránský. According to him, the museum acquires things with a very broad range of properties for its collections, but then other properties also reveal themselves in the context of the museum. On the one hand, these come from the new relationships between objects, but also undergo physical and chemical changes (due to conservation-preparation interventions); above all they change their meaning: they acquire a symbolic meaning, which they did not have in their original context. Ennenbach divides items into: physiofacts (natural products), namely inorganic bodies and organisms, anthropofacts divided into artifacts, and mentefacts (written, visual and sound media).
There may be transient and mixed forms among these items. Physiofacts acquire the character of a cultural value and are thus integrated into social relationships (Ennenbach 1983). Museology was also cultivated in the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1971 Hermann Auer, the chairman of the ICOM National Committee, initiated an international symposium in collaboration with UNESCO, with the aim of mapping the situation in Europe, as evidenced by the later published proceedings entitled Museology (Dyroff 1973). However, the course of this simply confirmed the inconsistency of the concept of museology. However, we also encountered an attempt to subordinate the museum phenomenon to the umbrella concept of documentation, which was promoted in connection with the advent of information science (Bieberstein 1975) or with a work dealing with the media function of museums, published by J. Rohm der in 1977. Although originally not a museum specialist, Villi T. Jensen in Denmark took the initiative of organizing a survey, on the basis of which he tried to arrive at a generally preferred conception of museology (Jensen 1976). He later published the findings of this survey in Museological Working Papers (1980). (Stránský 2005, 97).

In Hungary museology was studied by Zoltan Oroszlán, L. Barbarits, as well as by József Korek, who headed up the Institute for Conservation and Museum Theory in Budapest for many years. István Éri was the initiator of an international terminology campaign which, under his leadership, resulted in the publication of the Dictionarium museologicum in 1986 after ten years of work. This initiative was only partially successful, as it was a translation, not a monolingual dictionary. From the Czechoslovak side, Z. Z. Stránský and Oskar Brůža were those most involved. One of the basic problems was to determine which language would be set as the one from which the translations would be derived. While Stránský advocated German, English was chosen as that language.

In Romania, the periodical Revista muzeelor si monumentelor had become the platform, but in 1975 a compendium Museologie generala by C. Nicolescu was published. From the younger generation, the output of Virgil Nitulescu and Monica Birá (Birá 2009) is worthy of note.

The-then Yugoslavia, where Antun Bauer (1911–2000) founded a museum documentation centre in Zagreb, had a truly fundamental influence on the development of European museology. Bauer also opened the study of museology at the local university but focused strongly on information science, i.e. in relation to archiving, librarianship, conservation and nature protection. In Belgrade, let us name Miodrag Jovanović, in Ljubljana Sergei Vrishar, but many more could be mentioned. A certain transformation affected the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Ivo Maroević, Tomislav Šola (Šola, 1992, 1997) and Branka Šulc were the most prominent figures in Zagreb.

10) The last international conference at which the modest, but at the same time extremely erudite Croatian presented his contribution was a symposium in honour of Z.Z. Stránsky’s 80th birthday, held in 2006 at the Technical Museum in Brno. The symposium was organized by the Museums and Galleries Association and the UNESCO Chair of Museology and World Heritage in Brno.
Now one of the most respected European museologists, Tomislav Šola as early as 1985 strongly opposed the opinion that there was no need for a theoretical basis for the work of a museum. However, given the current ideas (rejection, a practicist approach and the declaration of museology as a science), he sees a resolution of this only in the distant future. According to him, museology is, like former religious dogma, at the stage of the prophets whose testimonies will eventually be amalgamated into a consolidated system. Šola develops the idea that, by its nature, museology, like many newer scientific disciplines, resists a fixed and permanent definition. So it may be that museology does not exist, but is scattered across indefinable values and indefinable places. Šola understands a museum item as the basic unit of the work process in a museum, but it is assessed by individual museums and thus a „scholastic classification of the item“ occurs. The item has become the basis of everything that makes a museum a museum, which determines the nature of the theory to be applied to the museum’s work process. From this, there are then tendencies to cultivate specific museologies (one for the skeleton of an ichthyosaur and another for a painting by van Gogh). Šola not only rejects this approach, but even believes that it threatens the very existence of museology (Šola 1985).

Professor Ivo Maroevič (1937–2007) was also in favour of a separation of museography (which is a survey of practice) from museology. According to him, museology does not deal with the object itself, but with knowledge of the object (Maroevič 1984). Through his comprehensive approach to the question, we can recognize in this author a strong connection between museology and the information sciences. Maroevič’s main work was his Introduction to Museology, which was published in English with the subtitle A European Approach (Maroevič 1998). The Serb Milan Popadič, referring to the Belgian authors André Gob and Naomi Drouguet, lightly questions whether such a European approach to museology exists at all and writes that it is as if a certain iron or at least velvet curtain between western and eastern museologies still exists (Popadič 2017). As if a more practical approach of the „west“ and a more theoretical „eastern“ approach were still visible.

Of more recent post-Yugoslav output, it is worth mentioning the work of the Croats Darko Babič, Žarka Vujić and Helena Stublič; Aleš Gačnik from Slovenia; Milan Popadič from Belgrade, and many others.

In 1980, for a meeting of the ICOM General Conference in Mexico, Vinoš Sofka arranged the first issue¹¹ of the Museological Working Papers bulletin – MuWoP. It contained answers from across the world to the question Museology – science or just practical museum work? A year later, Judith K. Spielbauer of Miami University analysed these views in the following manner: „So far, there is no uniformity within the profession as to the essence, objective and appropriate focus of this discipline. If we can solve this problem and create the necessary formal theoretical, structural and data bases, the result will be recognition by both the professions and the universities, and consequently by the general public.“ (Spielbauer, 1981). Spielbauer also says that enforcing the recognition of museology through „academies“ is only to the future detriment of museology.

¹¹ A year later, a second issue was published focused on Interdisciplinarity in Museology.
The debate on the status of museology continued with an international survey based on the methodology adopted at the ICOFOM meeting in Berlin in 1986. At that time the participants came to the conclusion that three basic concepts of museology can be identified in the world:

- as the study of the mission and organization of museums;
- as the study of the implementation and integration of certain basic functions related to natural and cultural heritage;
- as the study of the specific relation of man to reality, the expression of which is the conservation and documentation activity focused on this reality and communication of this knowledge to the public (Sofka, 1986).

From the available sources, it can be stated that the two debates mentioned from the first half of the 1980s actually only summarized what was obvious. On the other hand, we must also state that a similar differentiation in museology persists, perhaps with only minor variations, to this day.

Thanks to the dominant position of English in the world, Anglo-Saxon output receives by far the greatest response today. Most Anglo-Saxon museology has always been very sceptical of the theoretical basis of museology, preferring pragmatic solutions and having a partial role in dividing up the very basis of the theory of the discipline into a kind of „all-encompassing“ and general trend-questioning form. In this by no means do we deny the contribution of American and British museologists. For example, the American John Cotton Dana is still considered one of the founders of museum pedagogy. In the 1970s, W. E. Washburn attracted attention in a provocative contribution describing museology as „grandmotherology“. He was certainly right at the end of this work: „The almost complete lack of theoretical work on whether museums have the right to postulate an independent profession for the skills needed to run them is key to a simple philosophy that underlies the demand for recognition of the museum profession.“ (Washburn 1979, 20). However, another American gained considerable influence in the USA with his practical approach. In 1975, the first edition of Introduction to Museum Work was published, written by Ellis G. Burcaw. He conceived his work as a „textbook of museology“ and indeed it also played this role in American museum culture. Burcaw is very sceptical, for example, of documentation of the present, which, according to him, makes sense in Sweden or the countries of the Eastern bloc. Burcaw opposes the museology of the Eastern bloc, but sympathetically advocates a globally unified „one general profession and one general museology“ (Burcaw 1983, 11).

R.G. Chenhall and his book Museum Cataloging in the Computer Age (1975) and the historically oriented work Museums in Motion, edited in 1979 by P. Alexander, were also important. A translation into Czech of Chenhall’s work, with an introduction by Stránský, was published relatively early (Chenhall 1981).
and quite often we can still find it today not only in the libraries of museums, but also in the stacks of various institutions. Stránský was well aware that the issue of registering and processing collections is an extremely difficult problem for our museums, and without the use of computer technology, is virtually impossible to resolve. However, the book came at a time when Czechoslovak museologists could as a rule only dream of using a PC, a “personal computer”. The translation was thus ahead of its time and is today (and indeed was soon after 1989) completely out of date.

Although Americans do not pay much attention to the development of the theoretical basis of the discipline, the work of David Dean on presentation and John Falk on work with visitors is of very high quality. Of the younger generation, Yun Shun Susie Chung (Chung 2020) and many others are active. The publication of the globally read Museum Studies Journal, Museum History Journal, Curator, Inclusive Museum, Museum News and many others has great influence. Across the United States, there are many departments of Museum Studies, albeit with varying levels of quality.

In England, Kenneth Hudson (1916–1999) represented a certain British conservatism in relation to museology. According to him, museology is not a science, in the same way that cooking is not (Hudson 2000, 69). It is worth mentioning the extremely frequently cited work The New Museology by Peter Verge and the similarly focused work Ecomuseums: A Sense of Place by Peter Davis. Both have met with some criticism in Francophone areas, especially for their alleged misunderstanding of the French concept of the ecomuseum. Leading authors are David Lowenthal, Eileen Hopper-Greenhill, Crispin Paine, Tymothy Ambrose and others. The Leicester department has gradually become one of the leading chairs of European museology, providing doctoral studies in several programmes, and characterized by extensive publishing activities; it is associated with the names of Susan Pierce, Gaynor Kavanagh, Richard Sandell, Simon Knell, Vivien Golding and others. The outputs of Karen E. Brown from the University of St. Andrews and Raymond de la Rocha Mille from London (de la Roche Mile 2011) are also important.

In Canada, we find a slight distinction between experts writing in English and in French, where the latter tend to be more inclined to the French concept of museology. We have in mind personalities such as Pierre Mayrand and the head of the Montreal facility, Prof. Y. Bergeron. Duncan Cameron dealt with the communications aspects of museology, Ann Davis, a former president of ICOFOM, was active teaching museology at Calgary University, and was active as the editor of a number of high-quality museology anthologies.

---

13) However, Hudson does not question the very existence of museologists; he compares them to teaching support staff who are also not directly involved in day-to-day teaching work. Museologists and educators are the academic counterparts of professional restaurant critics. They do not deal directly with the cooking of the food which is served (Hudson 2000, 70).

14) One of the few Britons who has used the concept of musealization of the object (Kavanagh 1989, 93).

15) It is interesting that the Leicester department cooperates only to an extremely limited extent with the ICOFOM commission.
Lynne Teather, head of the centre at the University of Toronto, became a pioneer and advocate for museology and its teaching. In her summary paper (Teather 1991) this Canadian museologist recalls the Congress in Rio de Janeiro in 1958, shows appreciation of Neustupný and especially of Jelínek, who was concerned about the activities of museum curators and focused on two issues: the profile of the museum profession and the nature of scientific research in the museum context.16 She also makes it clear that in North America, museology is marginalized, both among practitioners and in academia. If the idea of cultivating museology has arisen anywhere, then it was basically “museum studies” at most that were established. For processes within the museum, Teather uses the term museumizing, a term close to the European concept of musealization. Teather, uninfluenced by Victor Turner and Bruno Soares, maintains that in English the words reflective and reflexive mean the same thing. Of interest is the observation of this Canadian museologist on the explosion of many theoretical views of museums from anthropologists, sociologists and semiotics specialists who study museums from an external perspective (Teather 1991, 404). We also must agree with her. We are still witnessing interest from these (and not only these) disciplines in the issue of museum culture. Museology is cultivated as it were “from outside” perhaps more than by museologists themselves.

France also has been and remains a country with a high level of museological output. Hugues de Varine-Bohan and Georges Henri Riviere (1897–1985) are considered to be the founders of so-called ecomuseology. André Desvallées achieved international recognition; of the museologically oriented philosophers let us mention at least Bernard Deloche, according to whom museology is the philosophy of museums. Michel van Præet became a major promoter in France of museological thinking with a focus on natural sciences. Of the younger generation, let us mention Jean Davallon or one of the world’s most authoritative museologists today, former ICOFOM president Francois Mairesse. Daniel Schmidt is concerned with presentation activities, and André Gob cultivates museology in Liege in Belgium.

However, the process of forming museology was not only connected with the activities of ICOFOM. For example in former West Berlin, the Institut für Museumskunde, headed up by Andreas Grote, developed intensive research, organizational and publishing activities. Other names from German museology include W. Klausewitz and Katharina Flügel. The monthly Museum Aktuell, published by Dr. Ch. Müller-Straten in Munich is devoted to museology. Hildegard Vieregg from Munich, former president of ICOFOM, and Marcus Walz from Leipzig remain active (Walz 2018).

We consider Professor Fridrich Waidacher from Graz to be the founder of modern museology in Austria. He co-published Einführung in die Museumskunde together

16) Of significance is her recollection of the CMA conference in Ottawa in 1990, when the director of an Australian museum said if anyone opened up the question of the museum profession, he would pull out a gun and shoot him (Teather 1991 409).
with Walter Graf in 1987, but it is his book Handbuch der Allgemeinen Museologie, published in 1993, that is of fundamental importance. A Slovak translation was published in Bratislava in 1999, but the book was also translated into Chinese, Ukrainian, Hungarian and Latvian. The Slovak edition has provided significant impetus in the museology of the entire Slovak-Czech area, where it is still one of the basic sources for students and practitioners. It is quoted for its intelligible language even by those who did not agree with Stránský’s metatheoretical views.

Waidacher writes (Waidacher 1996) that at the end of the 1980s there were almost five hundred museology courses worldwide, with most of them relating only to source disciplines in museums or to museum methods and techniques. About two thirds of the courses took place in the United States, but fundamental research was conducted primarily in Europe. With reference to T.S. Kuhn (museology brings about a new paradigm), this discipline is meeting with resistance, especially from experts whose specialization is affected. Waidacher writes quite clearly: „The primary medium of the museum is the concrete and unique naturefact and artifact, not the mentefact. The primary communications method is the exhibition, not teaching or lending. The primary goal is a comprehending experience and not the acquisition of knowledge or skills.“ (Waidacher 1996). This distinguishes the museum from similar memorial institutions such as the library, archive, research institute or databank. One can only agree unconditionally with the Austrian museologist.

Waidacher aptly called his inaugural lecture in 2002 as incoming Professor of Museology at the University of Graz „Von Orchideen und Disteln: Museologie im Spannungsfeld zwischen Ahnungslosigkeit und Verweigerung“ (“On orchids and thistles: Museology caught between ignorance and denial.” (Stránský 2005, 104). Of other Austrian output, the work of Eva Sturm and Bernadette Biederman is worthy of note.

Waidacher clearly adopts Stránský’s basic concepts and thus becomes his largest promoter worldwide, evidently with greater impact than the work of Stránský himself. The sometimes invoked „Waidacher-Stránský model“ became the reason for the outraged reactions of the Czech museologist, drawing attention to the fact that it is only the „Stránský model“.

It is worth saying that, unfortunately, Stránský devoted quite a lot of time to „refining“ the work of his greatest followers, among whom, in addition to Waidacher and others, was and still is another prominent figure in the world of museology, Martin R. Schärer from Switzerland, former president of ICOFOM. Schärer’s monograph Die Ausstellung, Theorie und Exampel is widely quoted and used in the German-speaking world. Unfortunately, it has never been published in an English version; however, in 2018 ICOFOM published his next book, dedicated to presentation.

---

17) Stránský’s review of this book (Stránský 2012) is full of philosophising condemnation, including accusations of insufficient falsification (a reference to K. Popper); the reader learns less of what the book is actually about.

18) The author of these present lines was to have written an annotation to the English edition for a publishing house in Manchester.
The Reinwardt Academy in Amsterdam has become an internationally famous centre for museology, mainly thanks to Peter van Mensch, who for a long time lectured here on museology and is still considered a leading authority in the field. His equal partner is today his wife Leontine Maier van Mensch. Van Mensch’s opinion platform is characterized by the concept of museology as a science, „which deals with the unity of theory and practice of the conservation, research and presentation of material testimonies of man and his surroundings.“ (Mensch 1989 – taken from Stránský 2005, 100). Van Mensch is rightly considered a leading expert on „Eastern museology“ (this meaning central Europe), was the most frequent foreign participant in the Brno Summer School of Museology – ISSOM, his works are translated into foreign languages (most recently Russian) and is one of the most frequently cited museologists overall. Perhaps it is in the work of this prominent Dutch museologist that the shift in the development of museology can be best documented. The linguistically well-equipped van Mensch carefully studied central European output, his PhD was awarded in Zagreb in 1992, when the supervisor of his work was prof. Ivo Maroevič. However, Van Mensch was also familiar with the output of western Europe and America, and he blended all this knowledge into a progressive system of museology. Over time, he seems to have switched to another concept. Despite the large number of his insightful observations, we must argue in part with van Mensch’s methodology. We mean his sorting of collections into exhibitions, depositories and open depository, or his very clear recent rejection of the category of museality (van Mensch 2015), which the prominent Dutch museologist himself soon partially relativizes (van Mensch 2016).


a) The Marxist-Leninist, in which the museum is an ideological instrument;
b) New museology, which is dissatisfied with museum praxis and seeks a way out in Heritage as a whole;
c) Critical museology, which poses questions and then seeks adequate answers for them.\(^{19}\)

We do not consider this breakdown to be precise. In his critique of „Marxist-Leninist museology“, Van Mensch rightly draws attention to the views of some authors (Razgoň, Zachs, Schreiner) that the museum is an ideological instrument and as such should be controlled by the Communist Party. Although this is true, mentioned papers were more about the museum than about museology and were participating fairy minimally in the formation of the scientific thought concepts of museology. Although some anthologies and methodological papers edited by Stránský begin with a quotation from Lenin, which was a certain „offering“ to the ideological „gods“ of the time, the content of these anthologies no longer had much in common with Marxism. We understand Marxism to be a mix of dialectical and historical materialism, with an emphasis on rigid atheism and the class struggle. Stránský genuinely never wrote about this. If we were to use the Marxist division of all philosophy into materialism and idealism and subsequently into gnosticism

\(^{19}\) Also accepted by Ivo Maroevič, surprisingly without critical analysis (Maroevič 1998, 92).
and agnosticism, then Stránský was undoubtedly a representative of idealism, but was rather a gnostic than an agnostic.

We cannot therefore agree with the inclusion of the museological approaches of the Czech Stránský, the Austrian Waidacher, the Pole Glusiński or the Yugoslavs Maroević and Šola under Marxism-Leninism, where we might only in part assign the Russian Razgoň (he wrote, for example, about the need for partisanship in museum work) or the German Schreiner. We question whether the so-called new or critical museology are theoretical concepts (see Chapter 10).

Van Mensch criticizes Stránský that his terms “truth” and “eternal” are no longer part of the vocabulary of today’s museologists\(^{20}\) (van Mensch 2015). The prominent Dutch theorist is right in this, but the terms “truth” and “eternal” have never been part of the vocabulary of Stránský and his companions. The latter genuinely understood the collection item as a real, in a sense “true”, proof of some reality, but with a large range of interpretive positions; they did not use the word “eternal” at all.

In Scandinavia also, museology training centres were gradually established, in Denmark, Finland (Vilkuna 2021) and Sweden, which was positively reflected in the publication of periodicals such as Nordisk Museology, Svenska Museer, Papers in Museology and Museo. Swedish museology has gained worldwide fame for its SAMDOK project to document the present; this is associated with the name of Gunnila Cedrenius, and later of Eva Fägeborg. Currently, the most prominent figure is Kerstin Smeds from Umea, before her it was Per Uno Agren.

In Spain, Rosario Carillo tried earlier to draw attention to museological issues. Only the efforts that began to take shape in Barcelona signalled a new approach. Of the younger generation it was Ana Maria Riba who was active here. Probably the most important Spanish chair of museology is at Zaragoza, where Jesús Pedro Lorente works, cultivating for the most part those known as critical museologists. The department is highly art-oriented. In both Spain and Portugal, the thinking is strongly influenced by the Movement for a New Museology, MINOM, as well as by relations with South America. Navajas Corral Óscar is active in Madrid.

For Europeans, the development of museological thinking in South American countries and a certain correlation with the “central European school” may be surprising. In 1978, Waldisa Rússio Guarnieri founded the Instituto de Museologia de Sao Paulo in Sao Paulo, trying to capture the truly theoretical essence of museology. In Buenos Aires, Nelly Decarolis and especially Norma Rusconi promoted museology, followed later by Monika Gorgas from Alta Gracia. The oldest department of museology (perhaps worldwide) is in Rio de Janeiro, where the well-known Tereza Cristina M. Scheiner works. Today, the leading figure in Latin American museology is Professor Bruno Brulon C. Soares of Rio de Janeiro. His colleague Bernardo Anaildo Freitas recently defended a doctoral thesis focused directly on the person of Zbyněk Z. Stránský.\(^{21}\)

---

\(^{20}\) Van Mensch also relies on an unpublished Stránský lecture from Leiden, which we do not consider to be a happy argument from a methodological point of view. Stránský’s English was quite average, he had his lectures translated and we believe that the whole misunderstanding (the use of the words truth and eternal) arose through an inaccurate translation.

\(^{21}\) The author of these lines has also assisted him with consultations and literature.
African museology is being established only slowly, dealing primarily mainly with practical issues (e.g. management and marketing issues), it is influenced by Anglo-Saxon, in other parts Francophone, output. A summary text has been prepared by C.D. Ardouin and E. Arinze (*Ardouin, Arinze 2000*).

The first General Museology in China was written by Chen Duan-Zhi as early as 1930, but the actual beginnings of museology and museological training date to later times, especially from the late 1980s, when the entire museum sector was consolidated and there was an unprecedented quantitative increase in museums. The Chinese Museum Society was also established in the early 1980s. In addition to the nestor of Chinese Museology, Su Donghai, one should also name the ICOM leader and ISSOM graduate Laishun An; both of these are from Beijing. Contemporary Chinese museology is characterized not only by a boom in numbers, but in addition to the undeniable influence of American output, also by the influence of central European thinking, partly due to the translation of Waidacher’s work. A promoter of the central European conception, indeed of the Stránský concept of museology, is Prof. Wenli Zhang from Changchun, capital of Jilin Province. Liang Jisheng, Professor Emeritus of Nankai University and Song Boyin of the Nangjing Museum, are currently working on questions of museology theory.

The development of museology in the Republic of China (Taiwan) has moved along similar but different lines. Here there is a greater influence of American output, and in the case of associate professor Wang-Chen Chang, of French output also. The leading figure here is Professor Kuoning Chen, and Professor Lai Ying-Ying deals with ecomuseology and the connection of museology with the fine arts; both are from Taipei.

In Japan, following the passing away of S. Tsuruta, the leading figure is Professor Eili Mizushima of Tsukuba, promoting the connection between museology and librarianship and archiving. Important centres of museology were established in India as early as the 1960s. In the first place one should name Baroda, but also New Delhi and Hyderabad, thanks to the activities of authors such as V.H. Bedekar, S.M. Nair and Sadashiv Gorakhkar. Supreo Chanda, publishing the Journal of the Department of Museology in Kolkata, and Anita Shah, are active today, with Susil Saraswat on the organisational side.

Museology is also cultivated on the smallest continent, Australia. The theoretical approach was defended here by John Hodge, who also had a founding role in the founding of museological studies at the University of Sydney. Today Jennifer Harris from Perth and Laurajane Smith, the latter closely cooperating with Amsterdam, are particularly active within the framework of the Anglo-Saxon concept of museology.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and subsequent to the death of A.M. Razgoň in 1989, the position of museology in this part of the world was somewhat disturbed. The upcoming generation has freed itself from the „communist straitjacket“ (Mikhailovskaya, Zachs), but realizes that the way forward is not only in free thought, but also in the widest possible international contacts. Gradually, the ideas...
of western European and American museology are breaking through here, but on the other hand, Russia retains a certain positive tradition of original museological thinking. It is important for our approach that it is in Russia that museology is most openly cultivated as part of culture studies. High-quality museology, as part of cultural research, is cultivated at the universities in St. Petersburg - Antonina Nikonova, Marina Biryukova and especially Olga Sapanža and Vitaly Ananiev,\(^{22}\) in Moscow (Maria Maistrovskaya, Maria Kaulen, Irina Chuvilova, Olga Cherkayeva, et al), in Stavropol (Vladimir Plochotnyuk), and there active departments, Novosibirsk (Olga Shelegina), Barnaul (Olga Truescheva), Chelyabinsk (Irina Andreeva), in Kazaň (Gulchachak Nazipova), in Khabarovsk, in Ulan-Ude (Oksana Mishakova), etc. The Department of Cultural Studies in Yakutsk also has an interest in museology. The Russian Institute of Cultural Studies of the Russian Federation in Moscow also deals with museology, publishing extensive anthologies with this focus (Dukelsky 2010, Nikonova 2009). Of the periodicals, Voprosy museologii from St. Petersburg is rapidly gaining recognition. The philosopher Olga V. Bezzubova is concerned with combining philosophy and museology (Bezzubova 2005). A comparison of contemporary Russian and foreign approaches in museology has been provided by Anna Leschenko (Leschenko 2017). Maria Bezpalaya from Minsk, Belarus, worked mainly from Russian language resources.

A remarkable rise of museology is manifested in the independent Baltic states, where Janis Garjans and Anita Jirgenson should be mentioned. The situation in other post-Soviet countries is affected by the difficult state of their domestic economies, with its impact on the activities of museums and museological facilities. The most internationally visible are the newly emerging museums of non-freedom, the former gulags. Polina Verbytskaja is active in Lviv, Dmytry Kepin in Kyiv (both the Ukraine).

In Poland, Kazimierz Malinowski (1907–1977) played a pioneering role in promoting museology and introducing the teaching of it. On the pages of the periodical Muzealnictwo he not only captured the history of Polish museology, but also contributed to resolving a number of important museological issues. His followers, and pioneers of museological thinking, were Wojciech Gluźniški (a pupil of Malinowski) and Jerzy Swiecimski (1927–2012), who was strongest in the field of presentation (Swiecimski 1980).

The formation of museology thus began roughly in the mid-1960s (the Subject of Museology seminar held in Brno in 1965) and culminated in the 1980s. We can consider the turn of the eighties and nineties as a certain divide, connected mainly with the radical change in socio-economic conditions in central and eastern Europe and the whole expanse of the former Soviet Union, where the approaches of western Europe and America were adopted relatively quickly. At this time, Chinese society is also changing radically, and new philosophical currents are affecting the whole world.

\(^{22}\) The present author has also written the „otzyv“ on their scientific publication for the title of Doctor of Culture Studies (DrSc.).
At the end of the 1960s in the former Czechoslovakia, Jiří Neustupný significantly shifted his conception of museology; we have in mind in particular his still-quoted book Museum and Science from 1968 (Neustupný 1968). Josef Beneš (1917–2005), who published hundreds of works on the key elements of museology, had the largest part in the development of the former's legacy. He also remained a tireless fighter in promoting its teaching at university level and was of key importance in the establishment of the Opava department. In his judgement, museology is “a designation for the theory and history of the museum sphere, which aims to replace experience-based practicism with a theoretically sound basis.” (Beneš 1978, 85). According to him, museology is the theory of the museum sphere, which based on the study of the development of museology and museum thinking, current practice and organization, management and education of staff and, using knowledge from the theories of related disciplines and auxiliary disciplines, establishes knowledge and formulates objectives, methods and resources in the museum sphere. Beneš defends the specificity of the museum item, but at the same time admits its lack of clarity. He understands it as a multifaceted document and uses the term “multimedia hyperdocument” with reference to the German museologist Manfred Tripps. Beneš distinguishes clearly between a bare item without documentation, an item with accompanying documentation and an item enriched in terms of meaning and relationships. He thus moves the item from document to sign. The museological approach to the concept of a collection item goes significantly beyond the boundaries of the individual collection disciplines, it is primarily a cultural asset and a multi-layered structure of meanings and values for contemporary man.

At the end of his scientific career, Josef Beneš formulated three self-reinforcing levels of museological activity. First, the creation of a system of museology as a science. Second, promoting this knowledge in people’s awareness. According to Beneš, this is a key link connecting abstract science with practical life in museums. And third, the application of museological principles and methods of working with collections in museum practice. Only at this third stage can we assess the significance and contribution of museology (Beneš 1997, 7).

According to Pavel Šopák, Beneš was “a diligent ministerial official, whose numerous texts lack depth; however, they are characterized by urgency, and by the ways his expression appeals to people” (Šopák 2012, 28), in which he is partially right. For many people Beneš’s practicist conception of museology („not being based“23 on general museology) was much more sympathetic than Stráňský’s metatheoretical reflections. We are convinced that a number of Beneš’s recommendations are still valid today, and if Slovak (and indeed Czech) museologists had followed them, present day museology would look somewhat different. On the other hand, it must be admitted that especially towards the end of his life Beneš wrote less forcefully, his last article, published in the AMG Bulletin, is erroneous in its very title (Beneš 2005). It was called The Original Functionality of a Work as the Main Characteristic

---

23) Beneš’s own expression, which we understand more as a negative evaluation of something (Beneš 2000, 351).
of a Collection Item. It is evident at first glance that, for example, we do not include a hat which belonged to T.G. Masaryk in collections because someone once wore it on their head (i.e. for its functionality), but because of its connection to an important person. However, by the unfortunate expression functionality Beneš meant the connection of an item with other contexts of its use.

The internationally most significant achievement in the former Czechoslovakia was the establishment of the UNESCO International Summer School of Museology in 1986 at the University of Brno (Dolák 2016), followed in 1994 by the UNESCO Chair of Museology and World Heritage (Dolák 2016b).

In Slovakia, Milan Rybecký dealt with the history of the museum phenomenon, as did Ladislav Šásky, who deepened museological thinking with his work. Anna Gregorová has tried to define the basics of general museology, according to Stránský „not based on the original idea“. A. Gregorová’s basic works remain valid, although they may have claimed to be a little more independent than they actually were. Mišo Kováč Adamov was more original, focusing mainly on literary museology. Soňa Švášová continues in his footsteps today. Musical museology is pursued by Jana Kalinayová-Bártová and Marianna Bardiová; Tibor Dite and Richard Senček comment on theoretical problems, and Peter Maráky on the organization of museology. Štefan Mruškovič (1932–2016) and Ladislav Mlynka (1954–2010) dealt with ethnology and museology, as currently do Jolana Darulová and Alexandra Bitušíková, and Katarína Chmelinová with art history and museology. Ján Kautman deals with the combination of the natural sciences and museology, Stanislava Gogová and Pavol Šteiner deal with the combination of museology and archaeology, and Miroslav Palárik with the history of the Slovak museum sphere. Daniel Hupko comments on the methodological problems associated with the registration of collections. Lenka Vargová and Luboš Kačírek deal with a wide range of museological issues, from the history of museums, via exhibitions to museum pedagogy.

Here our general, brief and far from complete overview of the development and formation of museology and its teaching at university ends. Despite its understandable non-complexity, it undergoes basic historical turns and shifts, nodal points, etc.

We believe that the theoretical essence of the whole of museology was best captured by the Pole Wojciech Gluziński (1922–2017) and the Czech Zbyněk Zbyslav Stránský (1926–2016), we therefore dedicate a separate space to them.

3.2 Zbyněk Zbyslav Stránský

The Czech museologist Zbyněk Zbyslav Stránský is considered to be the true father of modern museology, even by those who do not reflect his approaches. According to Stránský, we form our attitude towards reality on three levels: gnoseological, axiological and ontological. Let us add that making the world meaningful is one
of the most important challenges facing society. A feeling of ontological certainty strengthens in man credible answers to questions about himself (the meaning of life) and about the universe (the question of the nature of the world). Man simply needs to believe that the world is meaningful. To know who he is, where he is coming from, where he is and perhaps even where he is going. Part of the answer to these questions can also be found in museums.

The key concepts in Stránský’s concept are museality and musealization, which he himself introduced into museology.

Museality: the value of a sense-specific aspect of reality that is so cognitive and valuable to society that it is in the objective common interest to preserve its bearer against the nature of change and decay and apply them in terms of this new quality in scientific knowledge and culture (Stránský 1984, 39). If we were to adopt this ambitious concept, then no theory of protecting any kind of heritage would be needed. Bratislava Castle and Lake Baikal also have their museality, so it is not just three-dimensional items.

Musealization: the process leading to the distinctive cultural acquisition of both natural and cultural realities. However, not every preservation is a musealization (e.g. discarded things on the ground). The decisive factor is the transformation of reality as such into a meta-reality, i.e. reality shifted semantically to the level of cultural reality (Stránský 1993, 27).

Stránský structures the museological system into the following general levels:

- Diachronous – capturing the development of the subject of cognitive intention, monitoring the development of a certain phenomenon over time.
- Synchronous – position in the contemporary context.
- Theoretical – the most important.
- Application – operates also with knowledge adopted from other fields.
- Specialization – focuses on specific cases, the application of specific knowledge.

According to Stránský, the basic structure of museology is:

- Historical museology.
- Contemporary museology.
- Theoretical museology.
- Museography.
- Specialized museology.

Museology is thus the scientific field dealing with the musealization of reality. Stránský’s understanding of museology as the science dealing with the specific relationship of man to reality can be found in a number of authors around the world, some of whom only refer to this approach, while others adopt it (e.g. Zejlkо 1999, Jureněva 2001, Maroewič 2004, but also many others).

25) Given that in this book we deal primarily with the answer to the basic question – what is museology – we do not consider it necessary at this time to deal in more depth with the division into the special museologies – ethnomuseology, archaeomuseology, etc. We might recall the quite apt observation of Anna Gregorová, who took a most cautious position on the issue of special museologies: „In our opinion, it is hasty to say that there are special museologies when general museology is struggling to be established (Gregorová 1980, 251).
Stránský paid considerable attention to the scientific terminology of the field. Inter alia Stránský correctly and consistently distinguished between the terms museum as an adjective (everything related to the museum and its activities) and museal (that which represents the cultural and memory value of museality, i.e. potentially museum).26

Stránský’s approaches are well known, at least in central Europe, so let us give space to those who dealt with his theory. It was the Czech art historian, associate professor Pavel Šopák, who included Stránský’s approaches within the modern. “Stránský formulated his theory in the 1960s and 1970s, at the time of the culmination of modernism with its optimistic perspective and rationality, mastering the „acquisition“ of reality for the benefit of man and his existence in the world. In this respect, Stránský remains a modernist, just as Neustupný was.” (Šopák 2012, 26). Associate professor Šopák correctly associates the museum phenomenon with various philosophical, sociological, aesthetic, cultural and anthropological concepts. For him, collecting is an anthropological constant, it is not a learned behaviour, but is an integral part of the human race. At the same time, it contains an existential message: The collection of „useless“ things, conditioned by the complex psychological structure of the human personality, its interests, strategies and by the openness of man to the world, is inseparable from man’s incompleteness, inadequacy and vulnerability. In the relationship between the museum and identity, he understands the museum as a space of ritual, i.e. periodically repeated activities that lack a practical function, but serve to increase or (self)-confirm the integrity of a particular specific social organization, beginning with the family and ending with the state. Museum practice can be described as a way of manifesting spiritual values, their transmission (in the sense of a tradition) and their preservation (in the sense of memory). According to Šopák, the core of the museum phenomenon is museality, a specific quality that is the result of an intellectually-reactive reflection on an item and its contextual transposition. The process of musealization itself is key (Šopák 2012, 9–10).

Šopák defines museology as the science of the museum phenomenon, i.e. of the complex of those phenomena in which the musealization of objects and things takes place, or phenomena of a biogenic or anthropological nature. In that the museum phenomenon is dependent on a time perspective, i.e. it has a diachronous character, museology contains a unity of theoretical and historical components (historical museology). The historicity of the museum phenomenon is not direct, but mediated by a cognitive subject, by a way of looking at the issue of „historiographication“ of the museum phenomenon as a phenomenon for which the nature of the plot is crucial” (Šopák 2012, 12–13).

According to Šopák, dealing with the concept of museology is quite complex, but he distinguishes two different concepts: critical and historiographical. „The first has

26) We have many times encountered the problem of translating these terms into non-Slavonic languages, but also vice versa. While German has simply das Museumsgebäude, we have to think about whether it is a museum building or a museal building. It is unfortunate for the Slovak environment that the translation of the key Waidacher Handbook is somewhat inaccurate in this respect.
its starting point in the postmodern turn, which attacks not only the musealization process itself, but all its consequences and provokes the question of whether the museum makes any sense at all, whether it is not an instrument of repression, manipulation, power (Carol Duncar, Douglas Crimp, Donald Preziosi, et al). The second also has its roots in the 1960s and draws attention to the historicization of the museum, the product of a thought-rich stage that it makes sense to study. As examples Šopák gives the German art specialists, Volker Plagemann and G. F. Koch, as well as Manfred Sommer, who studied the philosophy of collecting, and Werner Muensterberg, who dealt with the psychological aspects of collecting. He puts the by-now classics of the field Wojciech Gluziński and especially Fridrich Waidacher into this stream (Šopák 2012, 15).

In this context, we could draw the attention of the representatives of the first critical concept to the ever-increasing number of museums around the world, including the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The change in the social climate after 1989 led to the establishment of many museum-type facilities, some of which do not meet all the features of a museum, i.e. they are museum-type facilities (a term from Slovak legislation) or what Maroevič called a Museum Facility or the Russians a museum institution (музейное учреждение). Even if we accept the critical voices that all state, regional and municipal museums are maintained somehow out of habit, or as deliberate manipulators in the service of majority society, the expansion of small, often private museums indicates the opposite.

Pavel Šopák considers Stránský to be an original and accepted more abroad than at home. According to Šopák, the view of museology as „the scientific knowledge and evaluation of museum content” is handicapped because this evaluation cannot be static, „because musealization is a permanent act taking place in every experience of reality and in every individual interaction of the perceiving subject (spectator, listener, layman, and museum operative) with a museum item” (Šopák 2012, 27). According to Šopák, getting museum content „to speak” does not have one direction and one goal, it relativizes one direction of reading museum content, which would be based on a single, defining and authoritative interpretation of the concepts of tradition, heritage, culture and history „The museum item does not have to be only a scientific source (as Neustupný wanted), nor a metaphor or metonymy of these abstracts, because it remains self-contained outside of great themes and discipline concepts. However, this relativization could have been brought into museology by the post-modern turning away from radical modernism, a product of which is undoubtedly Stránský’s conception of museology.” (Šopák 2012, 27).

At this point it should be emphasized that Stránský wrote about „scientific cognition and evaluation”, which is possible only within the scientific community. Within his axiology, Stránský fully acknowledged the „floating nature” of values, but he did not accept relativization on the part of lay people, perhaps in too closed-down a manner from today’s point of view. Let us not question Šopák’s statement that today everything is relativized, including traditions, history, etc. In this situation, however, the simple question arises as to whether it is good thing whether science (the study
of history at least is a scientific activity) should take place in this way. Stránský did not really take musealization to be „permanent act“ in every encounter of a visitor with an item, but as a „permanent act“ organized by the scientific community. According to Šopák, Stránský’s concept of museology will never enter into museum practice: „…. it is and will remain a university discipline and we cannot expect from it prescriptions for the operation of a museum.” According to Šopák Stránský „sees in museology a keystone, a synthesis, and not a challenge to analysis and questioning, which is the proof of contemporary modernist objectification“ (Šopák 2012, 27). This author maintains that museology must primarily inspire museum practice.

Šopák, despite his undisguised sympathies for the Stránský concept, himself moves onto the field of the post-modern. Thus, according to him, both the expert and the viewer may musealize, these value operations are performed face to face with the item in a museum display case, in a catalogue and on a website. „There is no doubt that a monument (or a document), or museum content, would not be a monument (museum item) if it were torn from its link to the perceiver. It would be a thing absolutely without worth.“ (Šopák 201, 28). Here one should draw attention to the different concepts of each author. Stránský always considered documentation, especially the materialization of the world (reality), to be the act of an „authorized person“; in the beginnings a private collector, later specialists (in the case of museums). Stránský certainly did not consider the perception of this thesaurus by other persons (viewers) as musealization. If musealization were to depend on the quite individual opinion of each individual, we could not speak at all of professional, let alone scientific, systems. Šopák is right in that from the „presented worlds“ in an exhibition each visitor composes his own image of reality, accepting something and rejecting something into his „I“; he/she has his or her own value scale, which need not be markedly rational. But even this individuality of acceptance is not, in our opinion, in close agreement with Stránský’s concept. Museum content, an item selected from the universe for its value, or more accurately for the value we attribute to it, must, of course, have a correlation with the perceiver, a subject-object relationship. But that perceiver need not be just a museum visitor. If we put the palaeolithic Moravian Venus in the depository and no one sees it for a hundred years, it does not become worthless. Let us rather use the expression of Wojciech Gluziński for this situation: a relation(ship) between social consciousness and the item. Further acceptance and rejection of the ideas of the Czech museologist by the professional public permeates much of our text.
3.2.1 Metamuseology

A specific term introduced into museological output by associate professor Stránský was metamuseology. The prefix meta- has meant something „beyond“ or „above“ since the time of Aristotle. Thus, the term metaphysics originally meant something „beyond physics“, meaning the sphere of the social sciences.

The use of the prefix meta- is very unusual when defining the social sciences. A book entitled Metahistory was published in 1973 by the American Hayden White, but he was examining not the very essence of the science called history, but the „literary genres“ of major historians. According to him, Ranke wrote his work in the style of comedy, Trocqueville in the form of tragedy, etc. The term metahistory was used before this in 1960 by the Canadian critic Northrop Frye (Burke 2011, 105–106). Exceptionally, I encounter the term metaethics (Ondrejková 2000).

According to Stránský, metamuseology is a theory whose subject is museology itself. Metamuseology is on the one hand related to museology, but on the other hand it transcends it and is connected with philosophy and history and theories of science and culture.

By analysing the available sources, we have found that this term is used only minimally (Desvallées, Mairesse 2011), often only with reference to Stránský’s approaches, sometimes the whole system of theoretical museology (Waidacher) is understood by this term or it is used quite incorrectly. Here are some examples: e.g. M. de Mota writes that metamuseology studies the relationships between different museum systems (Mota de 1983, 16). Jean Davallon writes: the meta-theoretical level is one that forms the basis and justifies the existence and essence of the museum (Davallon 1995, 155).

Waidacher states: metamuseology has a control function. Its role is to normatively assess the use of museology and evaluate its objectives, methods and results from the position of a higher order (Waidacher 1999, 25). Van Mensch writes: the relationship between museology and other academic disciplines in general is the metamuseological level (van Mensch 1992).

There is no doubt that we must address the whole issue in relation to science and culture theory, but the question is whether it is necessary to establish a concept of metamuseology. Why are the terms metaethnology and metahistory not routinely used? There is no doubt that it is necessary to cultivate the theory and methodology of science (science in the singular) and of individual sciences. But why with the prefix meta-?

3.3 Wojciech Gluziński

We must consider this important Pole alongside Stránský as a trule philosophical museologist. His major work is the monograph U podstaw muzeologii, published in 1980 in Warsaw. Here Gluziński writes: „Today’s museology is no longer sufficient, because it is defenceless against the new situation in which museums find themselves in today’s world. Therefore, it becomes necessary to scientise
it. Museology must recognize that aspect of reality contained in its current field of interest which, unembraced by the interest of other disciplines, could be its subject of cognition in the formal sense; it must develop its own museological theory to explain museological facts, must finally carry out a systematization of its own knowledge" (Gluziński 1980, 84).

If we look at Czech, Slovak and indeed world museological output, this work is quite often referred to, but only minimally quoted. The basic problem is its complex philosophical language, and few people, except for native speakers, have read this monograph in Polish. Let us therefore explore Gluziński’s work in a little more detail. It is worth mentioning that his monograph was published and distributed during the state of emergency in Poland, is now difficult to access in Polish libraries, current Polish output deals with Gluziński to only a very limited extent (Lorenc 2021), in Slovakia the book is extremely rare (Brngalová 2019).

We must consider Gluziński’s 1971 contribution to be fundamental: Muzeum – przedmiot muzealny, podstawowe pojęcia muzeologii (Gluziński 1971). At first, he sympathetically confesses to certain adjustments to his own approaches. He recalls Alfred Kuhn’s famous 1922 sentence on the need to “make museums less museum-like” and links it to Cameron’s 1969 call for “more museum-like museums” which Cameron understands by listing the same activities of a museum as does Kuhn.27 „The circle has closed,“ writes Gluziński. And we must not be confused by the quantitative increase in the number of museums, because the same hereditary diseases only multiply. With this pendulum movement, we are still between the extreme poles of “less museum-like museums” and “more museum-like museums”. We are following a path of negation, i.e. the rejection of what was (as is characteristic, for example, of the new museology, adds JD). However, instead of negation, we must penetrate to the essence of the museum. Cameron was already complaining that museums had become a means of entertainment, a club, school and bazaar, and under such layers the museum lives out its half-secret life. According to Gluziński, we do not need to look for the essence of the museum (that exists, if there is a museum), but to uncover it. Furthermore, Gluziński submits various definitions of the museum to a critique (including the one proposed by Stránský) and considers them descriptive, instrumental. The museum is an institution in the administrative sense, but in theoretical considerations the institutional legal status of a museum is of no significance. The concept of an institution can be understood in an abstract sense (a court has ruled – where we do not mean a specific court, a court building, but a court as an abstract institution). The museum is not an abstract institution, just as it is not a shoe repair shop or a public bath. Even when we say „museums protect values“, we always mean places where specific items are kept, items in one place.

According to Gluziński’s concept, all definitions of a museum come together in the function of preservation or storing. He himself prefers the term storing. Because we can also preserve a building, but as soon as we preserve museum

27) Josef Beneš also remarked that everyone who wants to make museums more or less museum-like actually wants the same thing
contents, then we are also storing them. The specific features of a museum are the functions of collecting, preserving, documenting and making accessible (technical, instrumental functions), but these are derived from some more essential features, which are hidden deeper. The functions of a post office include receiving consignments, their recording, the sale of postage stamps, but a definition based on these functions would be superficial. The basic function of the post office is to maintain and strengthen connections for the functioning of society. This is its essential characteristic. Nor do we understand literature by the categories of its technical prerequisite, namely books.

In his book U podstaw muzeologii, Gluziński deals quite extensively with the concept of a museum item. The concept of a museum item is conditioned, in a sense, by the concept of the museum itself and vice versa. The current concept is too broad if we rely only on certain cultural values. The ruins of a castle are certainly of great importance for cultural heritage, of great historical, scientific and sometimes artistic value. For example, the cultural layers of archaeological sites have great documentary value, but they may be destroyed during a dig. In neither case, however, are these museum items.

The category of the value is important, i.e. individual or social recognition. However, that is always relativized in terms of place, time, social group and cultural circle. A museum gathers external things, genetically transcendent, but that is the nature of any warehouse.

According to Gluziński, the museum is not an administrative unit, but a certain manifestation of culture, like literature or science, abstracted away from all material forms. Also, the museum item ceases to be a concrete object and becomes an abstraction similar to, for example, the subject of knowledge in epistemological considerations. Without this item the museum does not exist, and vice versa. Thus, the museum extracts transcendent items, but not in order to store them, but in order to create immanent items for itself on their material substrate. The museum and the museum item are actually the obverse and reverse of a single medal.

What exactly is a museum item? We perceive the bird in a display case differently from the bird in nature, in the display case it is different, a bit like an illustration, like a model, but in a different way. Just as a mineral in the display case is different from a stone we might find somewhere in the rubble. We do not say „look, a stone“ when at the display case, but we read „granite, a crystalline rock“. We do not see an ordinary stone, but „granite“. Here Gluziński gives charming examples from his own childhood, when during a walk a teacher pointed out „look, a funny little sparrow“ and had in mind a particular bird, „this bird“. Later, on a walk, another teacher pointed out a magpie and described its feathers, beak, etc., meaning all magpies, the type of bird. The magpie was an example of all magpies. Suddenly, however, it took off „became that bird there“ and flew away.

In a museum, however, it is not so easy to switch from one type of perception to another. The magpie in the museum is an exhibit, an example, a representative in a kind of extra-spatial and extra-temporal conception. But at the same time, we
realize that it was once unique and haphazard in its individuality. The exhibit is not understood as an individual, but as a set of characteristics that represent the sum of all magpies. It is de-individualized, shifted out of time and space. The exhibit is not understood as an individual, but as a set of characteristics that represent the sum of all magpies. It is de-individualized, shifted out of time and space. It is a model design, it is a generic item. The essential immanent function of the museum lies precisely in the creation of museum items (Gluziński incorrectly uses the term exhibit) as model designs of a type. The items are not concrete real objects, but are only and precisely patterns, model designs of a type, we can call them museum items, they do not occur anywhere else than in the museum, here they are intentional. This item cannot exist by itself, but draws its existence from the intentional experience of consciousness. An item is existentially independent because its being requires it to exist with something else within the bounds of a single whole. We see a medieval pot in a similar way, when we do not notice its cracks, which previously disqualified it, but today it is a model exhibit, a sample of pots of that time. It is more complicated for a work of art, on which the artist herself has already imprinted intentionality, but it also is a sample, a sample of the style of its epoch, the style of its master. However, a picture is also a concrete picture, an individuality. The essence of the museum is thus the creation and fixation of immanent museum items, which are items of intention. In this approach, we can significantly distinguish museums from libraries and archives. While museums create their items as intentional, libraries and archives do not create their items, but take them from an already finished reality, created in external processes and external objects fixed by external processes (the content of literary works, scientific works, documents) and indicate their material substrates (books, atlases, documents). In this understanding, libraries and archives are truly repositories, preserving what was created outside of them, while museums create their items for themselves. When asked what is the medal whose obverse and reverse are the museum and the museum item, Gluziński answers another question. What is the third factor whose manifestations are the museum and the museum item? What is the driving force and mechanism that is the basis for the existence of the museum and the museum item? So what then is the “glue” of that obverse and reverse? (adds JD). Gluziński states that museums collect three types of transcendent objects:

1. Relics of undated (dehistoricised) culture (relics of past periods). This is the medieval pot that fell out of the circle of culture as being without worth, but is now involved in the current culture, in a new function, imbued with a new value. It has been transferred from the scale of utility values to another scale (e.g. cognitive). The item has been re-evaluated.
2. The creations of current culture. Here, the item has some currently recognized value (for example, aesthetic). By putting it in a museum, we recognize it as a representative document of current culture, the item’s value has been added to.
3. Correlates of cultures (works of nature). An insect in nature has no value for us,

28) The Czech museologist Jiří Žalman would use the term “de-lived”.
29) To get our bearings more quickly, we would clarify: an exhibit is a collection item that has been selected for communication, mainly in the form of expositions and exhibitions.
30) In these passages, Gluziński works from the ideas of Roman Ingarden, a disciple of Edmund Husserl.
but when we put it into collections, we at that moment attribute some (cognitive) value to it, it has been evaluated for the first time, we can say that it was analysed. Items are as if mummified, which Gluźniński calls thesaurisation. Items no longer fall out of culture (like the pot once did), so this is about accumulating culture. However, the accumulation of culture cannot take place only through the way of thesaurisation (in its creations), but culture accumulates primarily in human awareness. Thesaurisation is therefore at the same time incorporation into a system of organized information, the item itself is the bearer of information content (not via a description as in a book), which means that there can be no information chaos.

Gluźniński’s definition is therefore: a museum item is created on the basis of re-evaluated, added to, assessed or thesaurified items, involved in an accumulative process of culture and involved in a system of organized information. It is the so-called R relation, i.e. the relation between social awareness and the given item.

The last characteristic (a system of organized information) is specific exclusively to museum items. Each monument (a work of art in a church, a chateau, etc.) can be a subject which is re-evaluated, thesaurified and incorporated into an accumulative process of culture, but only items in a museum are directly involved in a system of organized information. „However, the first three characteristics, i.e. re-evaluation, addition or evaluation, thesaurification and accumulation, are features that are specific only to the museum exhibition and thus differ from other types of exhibitions. All expositions, whether of a commercial or example nature, are organized information systems. But only a museum exhibition deploys items that have the first three properties.“ The item transferred to a museum has special features, as if a spotlight rested on it. They are not characteristics determined by the item’s own features, but are as if thrown at the item, connected with something else, they are relative characteristics; the relative characteristic is outside the item itself.31

In this relation, the item acquires new properties and behind these are associated such relative features as „being thesaurified“, „being accumulated“ and „being involved in a system of organized information.“ The R relation is a factor that connects both sides, the museum and the museum item, the obverse and the reverse of the „medal“ – into a single whole. The museum realizes the requirements of consciousness.

Gluźniński devoted an entire chapter of his book U podstaw muzeologii (pp. 214–231) to Stránský’s approaches, which he partly accepted (the highest methodological discipline of all), and partly rejected. According to Gluźniński, Stránský introduced a number of happy formulations, approaches and conclusions that will remain a valuable contribution to museology, but Gluźniński raises a question mark over the entire Stránský system. First of all, he actually reproaches him for his poor theoretical standard. That is, Stránský betrays his methodologically valuable opinion and instead of examining museology as a system of knowledge with the help of criteria from the theory of science, he slides from the meta-scientific level „to

31) Again inspired by Ingarden.
the level of museological problems“ and his conception of museology is intractable. He criticizes Stránský for ahistoricism, since he understands the meaning of a museum to be in the creation of a „documentary base through primary documents – museum content“. Gluziński points out that materials collected once may be documents for us today, but initially they need not have been collected as documents. The collection activities of a museum have also had other motivations, but the museum has not ceased to be a museum.

The differences between these two giants of museology lie in their different understanding of the concept of documentation and also in Gluziński’s failure to distinguish between collecting and the collection-building activities of museums. There were certainly various motivations for the creation of pre-museum collections and subsequently museums as such more or less consciously, professionally or unprofessionally implemented the „materialization of the world“, capturing some cultural values, which Stránský called museality. In other words, an art collector did not create a collection in the sense of „I want to document Impressionism“, but created a collection according to some personal criteria – art-historical, emotional and very often in line with financial demands. Today, this collection is a document (proof) not only of impressionism, but a document of the collector himself, his personal approaches, a document of public reactions to this collection (for example, someone damaged a painting because it seemed inappropriate for some reason), etc. If this collection is in a facility which implements all the features of a museum: preservation, access, etc., then it is a museum collection. If it serves only private interests, it represents collecting. Museality is present in both cases.

Gluziński writes that Stránský’s definition of the subject of museology as a focus on original, primary documents causes new difficulties, since primary documents (collection items) are also the subject of interest of various special disciplines.32

Gluziński objected most to the concept of museality. An item thus has some features (Gluziński actually uses the term features) “by nature, but on the other hand it is conditioned by the evaluating relationship of the cognitive subject. In this second part we see that museality is a conditional property. Gluziński asks whether this theoretical term is subordinate to observational terms as well, and whether the whole construction of museality is not just an empty name. Gluziński asks where to look for a sign of museality, for its real nature. What are the „unmediated features“ (by nature) of the item, so that the existential basis of the observed feature is mediated (the relationship of the evaluator). Gluziński (in our opinion correctly) argues through the history of collecting, in which we are witnesses that what went previously unnoticed is now being collected. How do we discover museality when we do not know the methods for detecting its presence, if we do not know what it is, Gluziński asks. According to Gluziński, items are collected not with regard to some hypothetical feature of museality, but with regard to themselves, because they themselves are able to satisfy our curiosity and needs for cognition and

32) However, the truth is that Stránský did not connect museology directly with that item (that really is the subject of special disciplines), but with its cultural value.
exploration, which is accompanied by countless different features and an enormous quantity and variety of selection needs and intentions. According to Gluziński, therefore, museality is the total reality of an item, its everything, but nothing else. If museology is the science of museality, then it is the science of a fiction; if its subject is an original item, then museology is only a special part of documentary studies, writes Gluziński.

Here, Gluziński is, in our opinion, too strict and himself went astray by absolutizing the concept of a feature. An item of itself really has no features other than „what it has by nature.” However, it may have value in terms of the subject’s intention (which is genuinely truly diverse). By their value, these items satisfy specific needs of man (Stránský maintains), or rather, „they are able to satisfy our curiosity and needs for cognition and exploration” (writes Gluziński). Gluziński refuses to acknowledge an item’s „own characteristic of museality”, but in practice he and Stránský are in agreement. Museality is neither a feature nor a quality, but a value (Šuleř 1981) and evaluation is always performed by a human being.

Gluziński also attacks Stránský in connection with the terminology and methodological approaches he uses. He criticizes, with reference to the neo-positivist Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), that Stránský’s statements „a museum is a facility”, „a museum is not the subject of a given science”, are not subjective statements, but pseudo-subjective statements. Gluziński clarifies using the following examples (sentences):

A school has 10 classes. Educational problems of a school.

A museum has prepared an exhibition. The museum and aesthetic education.

In the first sentences of these pairs, words appear in an instrumental sense. In the second case, these are no longer a technical and organizational facility, but what constitute the essence of a school and a museum and are immutable.

If we compare the language used by Gluziński and Stránský, we see clear differences. In fact, however, their approaches are very similar and we can clearly add both authors to the same stream of museological thinking. Although Gluziński uses the word museum more often than Stránský, he does not understand the museum only as an administrative-institutional unit. Both distinguish museum items very similarly from castles, works of art in churches, etc. Both write about awareness (Gluziński) or about the specific relationship of man to reality (Stránský).

On the other hand, we must question the somewhat detailed, even scholastic, conception of the Gluziński division into re-evaluation, additional and evaluation. At first glance, it is clear that today’s thesaurified work of art is gradually losing its relevance in Gluziński’s conception and over time is becoming more and more a relic. To set a time boundary between a relic and a current item would be foolish (Dolák 2014). Stránský’s more general approach to the value of museality seems more worked-through. On the other hand, we accept Gluziński’s conception of only two main aspects (parts) of museology – the materialization of the world (in practice selection) and communication (similarly elsewhere Desvalles – Mairesse 2011). Stránský repeatedly advocated three theories – selection theory, the theory
of thesaurification and the theory of presentation. These are clear concepts, we have used them ourselves many times. However, the inserted intermediate function, thesaurification, does not play a very serious role from a theoretical point of view. Stránský rightly points out that at this stage, collection items enter into new relationships, form a collection, we see whether or not they belong together. But in practice, this is still choice, selection, something for which we use the term “secondary selection”. Other activities within the framework of thesaurification (recording, storage, conservation…) have museographic rather than truly museological relevance.

Gluziński reproaches Stránský for conceiving the term museum purely instrumentally, which is true, and Stránský explained it more than once. We do not believe that Carnap’s approaches to museology are usable; according to our information, few people today use Carnap’s arguments in the social sciences. Although the name Carnap is mentioned only once in Gluziński’s text, Gluziński’s insistence that the theoretical term be subordinated to observational terms, blaming Stránský’s lack of “observation” suggests that he was significantly influenced by the great German philosopher. Carnap maintained that there were meaningful and meaningless sentences. All metaphysical problems are meaningless, so writing about God, the absolute, etc. has no meaning. According to Carnap, a sentence is meaningful when there are no meaningless words (for which no empirical signs can be given) and when it is correctly syntactically formed. Thus, all metaphysical statements are meaningless, when they use meaningless words such as „god, absolute“, etc. We again draw attention to Carnap’s emphasis on signs, which is also reflected in Gluziński. The verification of some statements, however, can be immediate; such statements are called observational (protocol) statements.

Carnap soon had a number of opponents, the most famous being Thomas Samuel Kuhn, and we dare to venture here that his approaches are outdated. The closer to us then is the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert (Rickert 1910, 89) with his familiar sentence: „Values are not facts, physical or mental. Their essence does not lie in any factuality, but in the fact that they are valid.” It is also worth mentioning the fact that Carnap gradually softened his radical assertions, but Gluziński is working with his book Philosophy and Logical Syntax from 1935, i.e. with the early (and markedly radical) Carnap. While Carnap strived for a unified language of all the sciences, the neo-Kantians, including Rickert, worked from the idea of a substantial difference between the natural and so-called spiritual sciences, which is closer to us in terms of terminology.

In Chapter XI The subject of museology and the structure of the museum sphere (pp. 363–378) of his monograph Gluziński writes the following: Attempts to define the subject of museology have three basic defects. They are either too general and lack the appropriate theoretical basis, looking for comparisons with non-museum areas, or they invent a subject of museology and are then completely adrift. These attempts then end by denying museology its own subject of knowledge (Neustupný). The basic problem is not distinguishing between the concept
of the subject of a science in the formal sense and its concept in the material sense. There is no distinction between the concept of the subject of a science as its abstract knowledge and the concept of the subject of research, which is the object of the technical procedures for research in a given science. Science still does not have the same subject of research, it differs according to whether a science is at the starting point or whether it is already being constituted. At its starting point, the subject of a science is the „field of projected observations.” Later, a science combines diverse empirical data and seeks explanations. The subject (material) area of knowledge of museology is the whole sphere of museum activity, where the nodes are museums, but not as immutable units. Therefore, the subject area of museology should be examined from a diachronous perspective (Stránský always thought similarly). Everything that happens in museums can be assigned to individual special disciplines. Then there will be no room left for museology as a special discipline, unless there appears some aspect of reality that these disciplines do not cover. This aspect would then be the subject of knowledge of museology in the formal sense.

If today (according to Gluziński) we are talking about the museum sphere, we do not mean a whole composed of individual things (museums, collections), but the individual properties of those things, that are common to them all. Thus, the museum sphere contains the sign „to be a museum” or the sign „to be a museum activity” or the sign „to be the result of museum activity” or „to be awareness of museum activity”. In general, we call this sign „to be museum-like” (museum sense), which is a kind of common meaning of all parts of the ensemble, which then form a specific area of human activity. This museum sense is not given ex natura, but follows from the meaning of the museum sphere. Collecting, preserving and exhibiting also exist outside of museums, but only the whole makes sense, and this whole is the museum sphere. If the elements change, but the whole does not change its state, then this whole is a structure. The museum sense, then, does not consist in the variable elements, but outside of them, in the structure they form, in the relationships. Unfortunately, in museum definitions, museum functions are only calculated, mostly in the order of instrumental application, but never in structural contexts. Gluziński refers to the French philosopher and psychologist Jean Piaget, according to whom the structure has a threefold character: the whole, transformations and autonomy.

The objectivization of human ideas takes place either in the form of museological knowledge (transmitted in writing or orally) or of collections and exhibitions. „Museum” should then be a specific field composed of human retentions (fixation, memory) and their creations, in other words, a field of specific relationships on the one hand between people and on the other between people and things.

It is important for the museum to couple together the functions of collection (the relationship of symbolization) and representation. Both functions are an expression of certain retentions, the first is internal, the second external, communicative. Symbolizational retention at the initial stage conditions the
communication retention, and this (communication) in turn strengthens them and does not allow it to go out. This circulation of the two types of retention forms the active and initiative core of the museum sphere as special structures of retention. In the immediate vicinity of the core of the structure are the internal retention (of knowledge, recognition) associated with the reception of a communication and external (technical) activities. Somewhat further out are the retentions which are expressed in the museum functions of preservation and conservation of museum content, and on the margins are organizational, administrative and economic retentions.

The museum sense is the exponent of the relationship of a given element of the structure of the museum sphere. At the core of the museum sense arise specific phenomena which, if combined into a system of museological knowledge, will represent scientific facts, museological facts. Structured retentions cannot alone be museological facts, because it is they that evoke them and reach too deep into human nature, where museology no longer reaches them.

One subject of museology in the material sense is the museum sphere as an integrated whole, which represents an area of knowledge for museology. A subject of museology in the formal sense will be the museum sense of retentions and the creations of these retentions.

The object of museology research are the retentions (internal and external) that together form museology, examined from the perspective of their museum sense. Museology examines museological facts.

So far, present-day museology considers all museum functions, even administrative and business, to be equal. The result is a flat, mirror reflection of everything that happens in the museum world. The connection between the collection function and the representation function will be a museological fact. These functions in particular cannot be museological facts, since they also exist in other activity areas. An exhibition as such will not be a museological fact, but the selection and arrangement of objects will be. Conservation (a technical fact in itself) will not be a museological fact, but its objectives will be.

A number of interesting museological facts can be determined in the public activities of museums, because the museum sense has a social origin and is socially recognized and could not exist outside society. Without symbolization retention and communication retention, one cannot speak of the museum sphere at all. Contemporary museology postulates nothing but „making museums less museum-like”, depriving them of their museum sense, which is the same as the liquidation of the museum sphere. These are the consequences of an instrumental-institutional and scientistic understanding of the museum.

In the next chapter of the book U podstaw muzeologii, on pages 379-398, entitled Museology as a Science, Gluziński writes: Museology has a problem with determining its own subject and determining its place among other disciplines. Interested in the practical aspects of museum activities, it has failed to notice what was within its grasp, the disfunction of the structure as a whole. In addition,
Museology breaks museums down into prime factors, by function. It fills up rooms which are already occupied, at best in an auxiliary or secondary role. Alternatively, it dreams up its task and determines it with the help of artificial knowledge subjects such as the so-called ownership of museum quality (museology as the science of museum quality (better formulated: the science of museality – clarification by JD). We take these passages to be an undisguised attack on Z. Z. Stránský’s concept. The museum in an auxiliary role, Gluziński further writes, is taken to be an instrument offering its services to that area of activity at which it has taken a seat in a shared chair. The museum is taken to be a machine whose activities can be freely programmed and the museum functions are just like cogs in a machine. The role of museology is transferred to the role of a mechanic, who disassembles the machine into components, repairs, cleans and oils them, but does not dwell on the meaning of the whole. The museologist is then far from the function of inventor-designer. Museology is not interested in the principles of construction, but only in the operation of the machine.33 Museology is more of a cookbook (a set of experiences, prescriptions, rules, etc.) than a scientific manual of dialectics. What can be done to make museology a science? Science is not about gathering information, however interesting and useful, but about solving problems. Science is above all clarification, description of facts and the creation of explanatory theories. A scientific character is given to theses not by their suitability, but by a conscious justification of their epistemological value. Even if we do something successfully, it does not mean that we have an explanation for certain events or processes. When museology explains something, it confines itself to primitive and random teleological explanations or argues with the knowledge of relevant specialized disciplines. The theoretical side of museology is still in its infancy. The construction of its own theory only makes sense if there are phenomena about which we are asking: why this is so? And that no other science can answer. Clarification of museum facts consists in referring to the laws of structure. The symbolization retention is the incoming current, while the communication retention is the outgoing current. Both together form a closed circuit, a circulation. Thus, collection-building activity expands with more and more new types of items, and these objects preceded the sciences that dealt with them, and these sciences usually arose later. Creations in the form of a collection which copies the axiological structure of the human world, as well as its communications, belong entirely to the domain of museology. A communication is a vision of the structure of the human world. Meanings in a collection will be as if mummified, torn from the network of social interactions. In communication, objects wake up from

33) Let us support Gluziński’s views from the point of view of the cultural scientist Zuzana Slušná: “Culturology has the ambition not only to describe the object of reflection (for example, to create a perfectly accurate list of „the components“ of culture), but also to understand, explain and justify them” (Slušná 2015, 13).
their lethargy, regain their old strength and gain even more, connect with new values, return again to their culture. All such retentions take on a museum sense, which they do not possess of themselves and which they would not have within another structure. So one theory, including the museum collection, that which is presented, is enough. This theory would then explain all museological facts. That is why Głuziński advocates two theories in one. A theory of what is presented, with the auxiliary apparatus of semiotics, and a theory of the museum item with the conceptual apparatus of cultural anthropology. Then each museum item must have features that are the same for all, without exception. The collection is then organized according to a certain idea. The museum item, or its realization, is governed by two laws, the law of selection and the law of interpolation (filling in the blanks in a collection).

The task of museology is to examine museum functions whose aim is to optimize museum activities. It should consist of two parts, theoretical and practical. The first would form the basis for the second, and the second then for museum activities. One asks: why is it so? And another asks: how should we work to achieve this focused result? Of course, the other will also make an appeal to other sciences. Previous efforts to systematize museological knowledge have been guided by the study plans of museologists or by Beneš’s proposals, i.e. by exclusively pragmatic criteria.

Museology is needed because museums exist, there is a need to make them more scientific. The subject of knowledge of this science will be in the material sense the museum sphere as a structure of retention, in the formal sense it is the museum sense and phenomena that are a manifestation of this sense.

Głuziński understands real museology (RM) as the current state of museology, but on the other hand postulated museology (PM) as what museology should look like. RM is the totality of museum work. It does not form a coherent system, it does not have its own methodology, it uses the methods of other disciplines. Although it too includes scientific knowledge, it cannot be considered a science in a structural sense. Nor is it a theory in the formal sense. The basic feature of museum activities is a knowledge of the individual material sources, but this is not part of museological knowledge, but belongs to the individual scientific disciplines, because it was obtained using their diagnostic methods.

The difference between the research activities of a museum and those of the sciences is: the sciences generalize on the basis of research into particulars and create classifications or typological systems. Museums assess particulars on the basis of these generalizations and classify those particulars into appropriate classes. Although it is possible that the results of purely museological research might sometimes lead to a revision of special systematizations and generalizations, with the gradual theoretization of the sciences, this possibility decreases.

RM addresses in particular the descriptive and practical functions related to museum activities. The development of museology should lead to the establishment of museology as an independent or relatively independent scientific discipline.
RM is very important for the work of museums, but is an expression of a mechanical concept of museum activity (the museum as an instrument) and diverts attention from problems of the essence and meaning of the museum.

According to Gluziński, a museum is a building, an institution, but also a specific cultural unit in the semiotic sense. The essence of the museum is in the first place a matter of the meaning which in the system of culture is represented by everything that makes up the museum – items, specific human behaviour, museum output (exhibitions, collections, catalogues). All this is the M factor (museum meaning). This factor unites all these elements within a special cultural unit – the museum. If we delete this factor, the museum will cease to exist. The museum is one of the nodes of social events and interactions in the tangle of human behaviour; if we unravel this tangle, we will destroy the museum. The main conceptual category then is: a system of specific actions and interactions and cultural attitudes and a specific cultural unit in the semiotic sense, whose meaning is defined on the one hand by chains of connotations and on the other its standing in the system of other units (here Gluziński quotes and relies on the ideas of Umberto Eco).

The M factor is strongly permeated by a combination of two intra-museum concepts: the symbolic concept (things as representatives of values) and the communicative concept (the transmission of these values). Both are connected by a whole network of connotations: axiological, cognitive and emotional, which allow us to give content to the hitherto empty concept of the M factor. This factor manifests itself in various ways, and we will call these manifestations museological facts.

From postulated museology (PM) we must exclude the whole area of scientific and educational work and organizational and technical activities. According to Gluziński, PM is then divided into:

- theoretical museology – the subject of research is the museum as a specific cultural unit,
- practical museology – the subject of research is the museum as a system of specific cultural expressions.

Theoretical museology will form one of the many directions of general semiotics (the semiotics of culture) and will be based on semiotic (structuralist) research methods. Its task will be to create a theory of the museum as a cultural unit, a theory of the museum item, of museum collections and museum visual communications. The method applied will make it possible to distinguish between museums and private collecting, as well as to reconstruct the semiotic systems of collecting of earlier historical periods. Beginning museum history with old collections is unjustifiably making identical the various semiotic systems represented by the collecting methods of antiquity, the Middle Ages and the modern age. Mere technical analogies and psychological interpretations of collecting do not justify such a conclusion.
Museology should not be an absolutely independent discipline; its independence should be relative and consist in separation from a formal subject of knowledge as well as research that does not belong to any of the research directions of semiotics or the sociology of culture. According to Gluziński, no science within the cultural sciences is or can be an absolutely independent discipline.

In another paper, Gluziński (Gluziński 1987) also draws on the ideas of Peter van Mensch. He again quotes Alfred Kuhn, who wrote in 1922 that we must demuseify museums. Gluziński had previously considered it a sign of despair, because „a way out of a hopeless situation seems possible only at the cost of self-destruction.”34 (Gluziński 1971). According to Kuhn, the museum is the antithesis of life. But Kuhn was already advocating for museums to become a place of public life, a venue for social events, meetings, public celebrations, training, etc.35

According to Gluziński, contemporary museology is static knowledge lacking the ability to express development (movement). Museology (in contemporary paradigms) presupposes a certain sanctity of the subject (the source is romanticism), objective truth (the source is rationalism) and progress (the source is the Enlightenment). The museum is a mirror (theatrum mundi), it is a normative of social norms (historia magistra vitae). Gluziński refers to a „new museology”, which expresses its objections to the „tyranny of tradition“. Museology is not able to address what is new, something not caused by the internal development of museology, but by external factors (Gluziński 1987).

So what are the differences and similarities in the conceptions of museology of the two great museologists, Stránský and Gluziński? Both reject the museum as instrumentally organizational, technical component (facility) as the subject of museology research. Gluziński sees this subject of museology in the museum as a (consistent) abstraction. According to Gluziński, the museum is „once and for all only a manifestation, a material objectification of awareness, expressing itself in certain systems of action and interaction.“ From these, the museum arises as a technical and organizational facility. Stránský reveals museality, a value that had various concrete manifestations in a diachronous approach, by now it has manifested itself for several hundred years mainly in the form of the museum and this value will in all probability remain, but we can only speculate on its future form, we can only guess at it. Both theorists work from the same sources of reasoning, to a large extent we believe that we can almost equate „material objectification of awareness“ (Gluziński) to an „object bearing museality“ (Stránský). We consider the Stránský concept to have been more elaborated, which can be demonstrated using simple examples. The plunder carried through the streets of ancient Rome by the legions or items in Renaissance-Mannerist cabinets certainly had some degree of museality, but we are reluctant to call them a „museum in the abstract

34) Here Gluziński returns to his own older work

35) How inspiring for today’s conception, whose authors believe that it was only they who „opened up“ the museum to the public.
sense”. Stránský distinguishes a collection item from museum content which is „an imaginary object which arises only in a subject-object relationship, i.e. when it is perceived and incorporated into the visitor’s experience, until it functions in his consciousness as a stimulus for individual cognitive activity“ (Stránský 1991, 45–57). However, Gluziński is right that museality cannot be a subject of museology. Museality is just a term, a collective word for the values by which man materializes the world. Nothing more. If we take literally the premises of Rorty and Lyotard that the truth of a linguistically articulated claim to validity is measured by the success of its social enforcement, then Stránský was successful only in part, and Gluziński perhaps even less.

If we compare the approaches of these two greats of central European museology, we must state that they are in fact writing almost the same thing.

36) We now leave aside the considerable contentiousness of Stránský’s assertion, from which it follows that it is as if a collection item could not become museum content without being seen by a visitor, in fact without his active contribution. Indeed this connection with the visitor is so unusual for Stránský that we believe that he did not think particularly deeply about the sentence he used.
4. MUSEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

We come to the question of whether there is a philosophical conception of museology and if so, what in fact is it? Many philosophers have dealt with problems close to us: the relationship of people to things, communication aspects, the structural concept of the universe, etc. Some philosophers have even included the word museum or musealization in their vocabulary. It is these who will be the focus of our attention.

Philosophy, especially modern philosophy, abounds with many new, and often very expressive turns of phrase. Let us just mention at random the terms post-structuralism, epistemé, différence, etc. All of these have influenced museological output, without many museologists knowing clearly, or rather without stating exactly, what they mean by these terms. If we state that they have influenced museological output, we do so in part with painful irony. There are not many truly philosophical texts, with a real understanding of the issue, in present-day museology. The aim of the present text is neither to accept nor to condemn the various, often contradictory, philosophical concepts nor to redefine them. We deal with them in greater detail only if we observe any correlation with museology or at least with the perception of museums. The difficult walk-through of the history of philosophy and the search for links with museology must have, at least for us, some central guidance. Therefore, we choose as the basis of our theoretical thinking the approach of associate professor Stránský, who went the furthest in formulating museology as a science. We also make use of the ideas of associate professor Šopák, who ranks Stránský among the modernists, in contrast to the present day. Let these two principles, the Stránský system and the modern/postmodern controversy, be a red thread, a guide to us in our thinking, although we are aware of the considerable fragility of this approach. In museology, and perhaps not only there, postmodernists are often only concerned with a new cover for the airing of old issues, often matters resolved long ago.

The philosophy of recent decades is strongly focused on language issues. Gradually, however, the term „text“ has been extended to other types of art (music, fine arts) and to the whole of culture. The so-called Tartu school, headed up by Yuri Mikhailovich Lotman (1922–1993), played a significant role here. In the 1970s (the post-modern era), the concept of „text“ was extended from „culture“ to „non-culture“ (biology, chaos theory, etc.). In the light of these researches, culture has been transformed into a widespread memory structure with an unevenly distributed density of cultural monads. Culture and non-culture then communicate with each other and there is an exchange. The basic element of culture is „a text that is either discrete (word sign) or non-discrete (holistic sign, visual sphere)“ (according to Slouková 2000, 26-28). Overall, we believe that philosophy is not above the world or the sciences, but is within the sciences, especially from the noetic and ontological points of view.

We will begin with the idea circle of conventionalism, whose founder is considered to have been Henri Poincaré (1854–1912), who assumes that we accept scientific theories not on the basis of experiments, of tests, but that some suit us better than
others. Poincaré considered only the relations between things to be objective values. „External items, which we call an object, are real objects only because they are not just fleeting clusters of perceptions, but are clusters bound together by permanent bonds.“ (Slouková, Kunca 2001, 8).

The British mathematician and philosopher Bertrand Russell considered the „ostensive definition“ to be the link between language and objective reality. It is the process by which a person learns to understand a word without using other words. According to him, „things“ and „properties and relationships“ are the cornerstones of the world; together they form „facts“, which he designates with the term „logical atomism“ (Russell 1993). According to Russell, much depends on the way a person comes to know things. Russell distinguishes between two classes of knowledge: knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. The first is immediate, the second indirect. Knowledge by acquaintance as direct knowledge is sensory data and inner sensation, as well as memories and a certain sense of myself. Everything I know immediately, all of this is therefore true of itself. Russell, on the other hand, does not understand knowledge by description as immediately given. It includes things and factual connections, other people and their mutual relationships. But it is not true of itself. Its truthfulness lies at the same time in knowledge by acquaintance. Every sentence we can understand must be composed of components that are known to us (according to Weischedel 1995, 248).

The American philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000) (author of the book Word and Object from 1960) even used the term „the myth of the museum“. Quine was influential in America but less so in Europe, a representative of pragmatism and critical realism, even directly of „holism.“ He sharply opposed empiricism. According to him, there is no single true parcelling out of the world. He calls seeing certain things behind expressions as “the myth of the museum (each exhibit has its own label). However, this is only a myth, because the meanings of the expressions change according to their contexts. We can (in thought) go from expression to thing in different ways, it depends on a number of interpretations and contexts, and asking which way is right loses its meaning. It is evident that Quine used the meaning of the museum as a metaphor, without impacting actual museums or museology. Quine further maintains that what any theory ontologically places as its subject (object) is a „posit.“ For example, the photon is a posit of quantum theory. Therefore, it does not make sense according to Quine, to ask about objects in general, but only about the posits of a particular theory. If we accept these approaches, then museality is a posit of museology. Quine was also convinced of the existence of variously defensible ways of conceiving the world (Slouková 2002, 43).

Richard Rorty (1931–2007) similarly denies the opposition between „context“ and „thing“; for him all subjects are already contextualized. In other words, our perceptions are inextricably linked to the beliefs we maintain about the world. Rorty took science to be part of the whole of culture and hoped to bridge the gap between the natural and social sciences.
4.1 Phenomenology and other directions

Sometimes we encounter attempts to incorporate Stránský’s concept into broader systems of philosophical reasoning. Brazilian professor Tereza C.M. Scheiner writes that Stránský was influenced by phenomenology (Scheiner 2017). We do not think that this is completely straightforward. Stránsky often used the word phenomenon, but in the sense of phenomenon, reality. We understand the term phenomenon as an immediately present experience, phenomenon or object for the cognitive subject. That would correspond to Stránský’s approaches.

So what indeed is a phenomenon? Here we can be helped by the approaches of the Czech philosopher Miroslav Petříček. „That which we see around us, what we encounter, what we perceive. But why call it „phenomena“? Because we as human beings do not have absolute knowledge?“ (Petříček 1997,18). „According to Kant, I only know what has already been somehow „subjectively“ processed, conditioned by the human mind, that is, as Kant says, we know phenomena. Knowledge of objects can only be knowledge of how an object is given to us, as it appears to us, and not knowledge of the object itself.“ (Petříček 1997,18). „Relations are what does not come from things themselves, but from us, they are relations of time and space, and time and space, as Kant says, are forms of opinion, not the properties of things.“ (Petříček 1997,16-17). According to Kant, a phenomenon is just that, the object of experience, which in no way achieves the nature of a „thing itself“, that is, the noumenon. Phenomenology can then be understood as an approach to philosophy that examines the objects of experience (phenomena) only to the extent that they are given to our awareness, without any assumptions about their nature as independent things. Stránský did not go in this direction.

The central figure of phenomenological thinking is considered to be Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), whose philosophy was a reaction to the crisis of science, an effort to recognize the true basis of phenomena as they are and not as they appear to us. A native of Prostějov, E. Husserl was aware that our world is always interpreted in a certain way, our perception of the world is influenced by what we know. I know that the colour red is actually a certain light wave with a defined wavelength. Our contact with the world takes place in language, which is a certain element of representation, every linguistic expression is a sign that represents the thing itself, without being the thing; we talk about the thing itself whenever we use language as if in its absence. Husserl, on the other hand, comes up with the motto „to objects themselves“ „That is: everywhere it is necessary to return to where things are given by themselves, where they are immediately before us as themselves, as if in their bodily presence.“ (Petříček 1997, 22).

There is no doubt that Husserl meant „things“ in the most general sense, but on the other hand, collection items are also undoubtedly things. An Eneolithic shard is not language, it is not an interpretation of the Eneolithic, but an authentic witness of that time, a product and original evidence of the Eneolithic.

Phenomenology is the science of essences and not of facts. Every perception of an object is a synthesis, i.e. the unification of different perceptions, of different
aspects of an identical object. However, the correlate of perception is the perceived thing. However, everything has its milieu and its background. The perceived thing as isolated, torn from its background and torn from its environment is a theoretical abstraction, not an original experience, i.e. an idea, not a vision. „The surroundings and background of a thing is what I refer to together with it – along with the thing I always capture the context and it is in this context that we understand it. Everything is always set in a certain context, the tree I look at is standing in a garden, the garden itself points to something broader that we can no longer see as a whole, such as a particular region, landscape, country, etc. My life is not a life among isolated, dumb things, but a life in an essential context. And not in a causal context, but in a context of sense.“ (Petříček 1997, 57).

It has happened to us many times that our thinking and acting are intentional, that is, they lead to a particular objective. For example, when we read a text, we think words up by whole sentences and do not notice that the author wrote something else. We would compare the work of a proof reader to a phenomenological approach. He does not know the context of the text, almost does not know what it is about, but he notices what is actually written down, all the typos and linguistic errors, i.e. the text as it is and not how it appears to us. Thus, in our opinion, phenomenology has little in common with Stránský’s concept. We have not found that Stránský ever quoted Edmund Husserl or used his approaches in his lectures. Stránský also mentions Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) only in passing.

The Czech philosopher Jan Patočka (1907–1977) also did not study individual things, but the natural world. That is, his interpretation of the natural world is not an interpretation of things, but an analysis of what makes us understand things, which is in the first instance the world in the original meaning of that word. Petříček explains Patočka as follows: When I see a number of different tools in front of me, I am always able to sort them by the world to which they belong (Petříček 1997, 120). These are the worlds of the carpenter, locksmith or writer. The (whole) world is then made up of these sub-worlds. Using this example, the connections between Patočka’s sub-worlds and museum collections are quite evident. The original aspect of Patočka’s approach is then the connection with movement.

The French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) is also given as one of the phenomenologists; he however foreshadows later topics – existentialism, hermeneutics and structuralism. In museological output, he is most often cited by art-oriented museologists. According to this thinker, a „thing“ acts on the spirit in such a way that it appears to it as a phenomenon, i.e. offering it a certain meaning. The dilemma arises from the fact that „my“ „I perceive“ does not overlap with another’s „I perceive“. Every „here and now“ experience reflects past experiences. And these are different for everyone. „The thing itself“ is „invisible“ and, according to Merleau-Ponty, „unthinkable.“ For example, I can never see all the sides of a six-sided die, and I cannot even imagine how that would work (Slouková 2003, 18). The thing does not make sense to itself, but to me. The meaning of this thing is for
it to appear to me. The subject (human being) is always situated, always has only
a partial view of the world, therefore the world is unfinished. The intersubjective
meaning of history or existence is hidden in symbols.

This also applies to modern art, the problem of which is interpretation. The traditional view that there is some meaning (or even a single meaning) inevitably hidden in a work of art, fails. Rather than invoking „deep“ meanings, it is necessary to „clarify interpersonal relationships, to let them mature and manifest themselves“ (according to Hajko 1990).

However, Husserl was followed by a number of other thinkers, such as the Polish Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), a teacher of the important museologist Jerzy Świetzimski, who dealt with the ontology of art. He explored, on the basis of a work of art, the various ways in which intentional objects could exist. He dealt with so-called art judgements (quasi-judgements) (Slouková 2003, 23).

The rapid development of the natural sciences in the 19th century then led to new forms of metaphysics and ontology and led again to a reflection on the world as a whole, in which Alfred North Whitehead and especially Martin Heidegger are considered the most important thinkers. Husserl’s ideas were further developed and changed by his pupil Martin Heidegger, most often referred to in the Czech museological environment by associate professor Karel Boženek from Opava. Czech professor Petříček explains Heidegger as follows: “For example, I read a book, in this behaviour or relationship this book somehow shows itself to me, it is something that serves a purpose; in this being (in this thing) there is a kind of „in order to“ (I read in order to learn, to have fun, to kill time) and I anticipate this „in order to“ whenever I take a book in my hand. And not only that: the book is not something isolated, but so are other references in it: the book refers to reading and writing (as well as to a library, printer, paper, wood – i.e. it shows the nature context), but also shows the even wider context from which it seems, as it were, to come to me. Other people, the world of scholars, the world of culture and the human world in general – point to the context of culture” (Petříček 1997, 71–72). We consider this explanation to be extremely important for an understanding of the essence of each collection item (after all, the book referred to may literally be a collection item), or indeed an entire collection. The present (in Petříček’s example the book) is never obvious as something isolated, lonely. What is obvious is that I know in advance what a book is, its meaning is already „obvious“, open to me in advance. So the world exists always somehow „earlier“ than the emerging thing (book). So a thing always has some meaning, and we relate to things because it is a case of our very being. „Those contexts, connecting things to each other with a structure of references and mutual reference to wider and wider circles, are not purely material contexts. The light that makes things apparent falls on them from human existence; in this way they are always revealed in advance, they address me, they have meaning for me, they signify“. „Simply put: because I am interested in my own being, I seem to be constantly on the road, i.e. I am free to be, I always have options in respect of my being. A small illustration that may make understanding

37) Anticipation of expectations
easier: things turn out to be of significance to us precisely because we are full of interests; I am not a thing among things, but I understand them, I am not indifferent to them – precisely because I am not indifferent to myself" (Petřiček 1997, 73).

The „linguistic“ conception of philosophy was perhaps most widespread in French-speaking and English-speaking areas. From another circle of thought (Austrian) come the approaches of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), who also dealt intensively with language. For him, the world is the sum of facts, not things. The following can be a fact: „The elephant is angry. The elephant is in the room. But the elephant itself is not a fact.“ (Buckingham, W.; Burnaham, D.; Clive, H.; King, J. P.; Marenbon, J.; Weeks, M. 2013, 249). In Wittgenstein’s conception, language must consist only of sentences. A fact is then the configuration of things, so a fact consists of things in certain relationships. As we can break down a complicated statement into more elementary statements, so we can translate facts into more elementary facts, which are composed of objects and things. In other words – a table is, for example, a thing. That the table is brown or standing in the room is a fact. This is therefore the „existence of states of affairs“. But we can also apply this to the world of museums. There is never just a table in a museum. Here there is a table that is brown or standing in a room.

Facts are not entities that we give names (words), but entities that we assert. The Slovak philosopher Danica Slouková gives the following example for this approach: A mug is an object. That I am holding the mug in my hand is a fact. That the mug is not on the table right now is a fact. That the mug „lies on the table“ now is not a fact, but it could be. That fact „exists“ as a possibility. Both options are states of affairs. A state of affairs is the union of objects, objects are interconnected in the state of affairs, like the links of a chain. Objects can occur in all possible states of affairs, but not outside these states of affairs. Different states of affairs are independent of each other. Their „whole“ (the world) is therefore not a whole in the sense of „holos“ (system, structure,) but in the sense of the „sum“ of all individual cases and possibilities. The idea is that we make for ourselves images of facts. The logical picture of a fact is a thought (Slouková 2003, 47-48). So the world is made up of facts, things relate to each other in a certain way. Sentences are then „images“ of facts as maps are images of the world. L. Wittgenstein does not give any examples of elementary facts, because „determining what these „atoms“ are, he says, is the task of the special sciences, not philosophy.“ (Petřiček 1997, 134). „Therefore, the world cannot be exhausted by compiling a complete inventory of isolated things (the items that make up the world).“ (Petřiček 1997, 134). „We know a thing from the possible relationships which it may adopt in respect of other things“ (Petřiček 1997, 134).

„Just as we cannot think of spatial objects outside of space and of time objects outside of time, so we cannot think of any object outside of its connection with other objects. „All objects thus form something like a logical space, a kind of invisible net in which things may occur in various situations and outside of which they do not make sense“ (Petřiček 1997, 135). If we follow the trail of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thinking, then a digital photograph is not the same kind of object as what it depicts, but it has the same „logical form“. However, according to Wittgenstein, words only represent reality in the same logical form.
A specific place is occupied by the so-called „Vienna Circle“, which at its conference in Prague in 1929 for the first time aired the request for a separation of the real sciences and the pseudosciences. The tool was to be the logical analysis of language. From our point of view, the most interesting representative here is Otto Neurath (1882-1945). In 1918 Neurath became director of the Leipzig War Museum and in 1924 founded the City of Vienna Social and Economic Museum. He sought to develop the „Isope-technik“ universal language – „international picture language“, a language composed of sketches, graphs and diagrams, maps and pictograms. It was this „language“ that was to be accessible and understandable to the general public. It tended towards a reduction of language to mathematics. The Vienna Circle promoted a sharp line between the statements of empirical science, the meaning of which can be ascertained by logical analysis, and other statements that would prove to be „without meaning.“ These are just expressions of some kind of „live feelings“. For example, art is not about „interpretation“ (as in science), but about „expression.“ According to Neurath, our notions reflect a „back plan“, theoretical, social and cosmic, behind directly visible objects. Every observation and experimentation is imbued with tradition and theory. Thus, protocol statements cannot be separated from their history and system and made an immutable basis of theory (Slouková 2003, 56-57). Neurath likens scientists to sailors who reconstruct their ship on the high seas. If they replace one beam, the whole ship must serve as a support (Slouková 2003, 57). Here we see one of the significant problems of some currents of contemporary museology, which as it were replace, remove or supplement individual beams, regardless however of the system of their discipline (the ship). In the Czech environment, Petra Šobáñová has dealt with Neurath, especially his approach to museum communication (Šobáñová 2014, 87–90), in the Austrian environment this has been done by Fridrich Waidacher (Waidacher 1999).

Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) also belonged to this school of thought. According to him: „The unorganized global experience of an individual at some point is an „elementary experience.“ The basic relation between elementary experiences is the „memory of similarity“ (it determines their mutual similarity). A “circle of similarity“ is then any largest class of elementary experiences, each of which is „partially similar“ to the other (Slouková 2003, 68). We see here a connection with the pre-understanding of H. G. Gadamer.

An interesting „division of the world“ is brought by Hans Reichenbach (1891–1953). It recognizes „illata“, derived things, (e.g. electricity, which we do not see flowing through a conductor), „concreta“, making up the world of observable things, and „abstracta“, which are a combination of „concreta“, are not immediately observable, but are an „abbreviation“, which sums up all observable phenomena in mutual relations. Illata, on the other hand, are not combinations of concreta, but are derived from them. The internal states of the human body are illata, because we observe only the body’s reactions, not its internal conditions, including the various states of the brain (Slouková 2003,102).
The German physicist and propagator of Christian pacifism, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (1912–2007), also belonged to this group of thinkers. According to him, there are three separate groups, theory, practice and art. Art shows us the truth that escapes us in theory and morality. Art, i.e. luxury of form and shape, is a superior concept to theory and morality, practice (Slouková 2003, 154).

However, phenomenology did not deal much with language, understanding it only as a tool, that is, that language cannot affect what we see. This is something seamless between me and a thing. But what if that is not the case? Here we come to linguistic structuralism, founded by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913). According to him, language is form, not substance, and language is of the nature of a sign, which we can illustrate with a simple example. The colour spectrum is continuous, the transitions between colours are imperceptible. However, our language is incoherent. In order to put names to colours, we place language as a kind of „grid“ over this colour continuum. According to Saussure, language is just such a grid, a „raster“ placed over an originally undifferentiated substance.

And it is this „structure“, or this system of „mutual differences“ (not the system of individual elements), that is language. The meaning of a word extends only as far as the meaning of another word begins. Thus, different language systems (for example, Slovak versus English) may classify an indistinguishable fact differently, for example, in the names of colours in the spectrum. So the signs are not natural, but artificial. This applies not only to language, but to all sign systems, which museum expositions undoubtedly are. Behind every event (a speaker’s speech, turning on the lights at a crossroads) there is a certain system, thanks to which this event signifies something, it has some meaning for us. But each element is significant only because it is connected with the other elements of this system. However, this does not only apply to language, but to all sign systems.

Signs and their systems are dealt with in a field of science called semiotics, of which Umberto Eco (1932–2016) was probably the best known exponent. Stránský often quoted this important semiotician as well, especially his statement from 1985 „...postmodernism creates the musealization of modernity, or is born when modernity becomes a museum“ (Stránský 2005, 67). Eco is characterized by his emphasis on the discontinuity of European development and other museologists also refer to him. Eco was most involved in our area with his concept that he opposed the closed structure of the structuralists with the idea of „open structure“ and „above interpretation“. According to him, each work is an „open structure“ in terms of the possibility of interpretation, partly due to the programmatic openness of its creator. However, openness does not mean arbitrariness, but an „invitation to create or co-create“. It seems that some museologists do not sufficiently understand this rejection of arbitrariness. While in the interpretation of art we can really go to extremes, to a truly maximally individual reception, in „more exact“ museum discourses (such as palaeontology) we must be narrower in terms of the breadth of possible interpretations. After all, the real world cannot be just a collection of the individual interpretations of individuals.
With reference to Eco, the Czech historian Dušan Třeštík (1933-2007) also considers the subject of history to be systems of symbolic representations of the world in conceptual, pictorial, verbal or other forms and not „society“ (Třeštík 2001, 30).

Paul Virilio (1932-2018) also had a special approach. For this thinker, the evil is not language or the image as with other poststructuralists, but speed, as an element of the military. However, he also uses the term museum. Virilio considers philosophy to be a part of literature, but which is not possible without „images“. Images must not be descriptive, they are to be concepts. One such image is the Museum of the Accident. According to Virilio, we should exhibit accidents in order to avoid being „exposed“ to them ourselves. According to him, television is this museum. The world is exposed to accidents through television. Simulators are closer to cyberspace. We are creating a different world. However, even they are fast becoming accident simulators (Slouková 2000, 73).

4.2 Karl Popper

The Austrian philosopher and theorist of science Karl Raimund Popper (1902-1994) separates out emerging events into three worlds. Thus, natural and cultural essences are mixed in the spheres of objects, psychic experiences and in the sphere of their meanings.

Brno associate professor Ivana Holzbachová explains Popper’s approaches as follows: Karl Popper largely identifies human development and the development of society with the development of knowledge. Because the main subject of his interest is knowledge, he focuses on this in connection with the problem of the development of society. The development of knowledge is anchored by Popper in the organic world. In order to survive, organisms also must solve problems, and therefore they must gain knowledge. However, with the emergence of conceptual speech, which has explanatory functions, knowledge is placed at a qualitatively different level. Here, too, we have to deal with an emergent leap. This is, of course, further exacerbated by the invention of the means of preserving knowledge already acquired in an objectified form, i.e. above all by the invention of writing and, in modern times, also of other recording media. Thanks to this, three „worlds“ can be distinguished, which Popper refers to as World One, World Two and World Three. World One is the world of material objects, whether they are natural objects or objects created by humans, such as technology, etc. World Two is the world of our thought processes, what we experience when we think, consider, and solve problems. World Three is the world of the results of our thought processes, i.e. the world of theories in the broadest sense, the world of myths and the world, for example, of art. Popper even maintains that in a broad sense it is possible to count all the products of the human spirit in World Three e.g. instruments, institutions, etc. World Three also includes these results of thought activity in its objectified form, i.e. as captured in books, libraries, tapes, and by other recording methods. In this sense, World Three exists independently of humans. Once created by humans, if captured, it will exist as an option for anyone capable of understanding it. We can
imagine the possibility of humanity’s becoming extinct, but with its libraries (or museums – adds JD) remaining. If some other thinking beings came to Earth, and if human writing and speech could be deciphered, our World Three could become part of their World Three. The objective and independent existence of World Three manifests itself in yet another way: in World Three there are also those problems, or theories, that are related to theories or result from theories that people have already discovered, but whose existence people are not yet aware of: „Although this third world is a human creation, there are many theories about themselves and arguments about themselves and problematic situations about themselves that will never be created or understood.“ To explain this view, Popper gives the following example: “An infinite number of natural numbers is our linguistic invention; our convention; our design. But not prime numbers and their problems. We discover these in the objective world, which we may have invented or created, but which (like all inventions) were objectified, separated from their creators and became independent of their will: they became „autonomous“, „completely ideal“, became „platonic“. According to Popper, modern Platonism, for example, is based on a misunderstanding, an attempt to „attribute the status of logical relations between objects in the world (these relations are in reality outside time) to these objects themselves.“ According to Popper, the „Platonism“ of the world does not go so far as to deny its connection with man. Man is the creator of given theories, the creation of these theories also gives rise to the problems that are logically connected with it (without people having to realize it). They are „Platonically“ independent only after their creation, after they have been separated from man. So they are „outside time“ only if they contain truths and logical relationships, but as our product they have their history, i.e. the history of our ideas. This concept is not something that would be characteristic only for Popper, it is espoused by many other philosophical directions, such as structuralism and Marxism. World Three is therefore the most important of the three worlds. This is because it contains all our knowledge. Although at least some of us as individuals can contribute to it, our contribution is only insignificant in view of the volume of this world itself and in view of what we have inherited from it: all our upbringing, all our socialization consist of the fact that we draw knowledge and attitudes from it. Almost all of our subjective knowledge (the knowledge in World Two) depends on World Three, i.e. on theories (at least in the possibility) expressed in language. The whole development of our knowledge takes place in World Three and takes place there, as has already been shown, mainly in the form of trial and error. Popper strongly opposes the psychological assumptions that identify our cognitive process (World Two) with the results of our cognition (World Three). However, he does not undervalue the existence of World Two. It indeed is the mediator between World One and World Three. Without it, our theory would remain in an ideal state and it would not be possible to create technical applications that are able to make hundreds of changes to the world of objects, and thus also to contribute to historical development as a whole. However, this does not change the fact that for Popper, historical development is primarily the development of knowledge (Holzbachová 2003,42–68).
Only in World Three are there theoretical systems, problem situations give rise to „new“ problems, critical arguments and the results of discussions. There is no doubt that knowledge is stored in museums, albeit mostly not as a record of something, but as an authentic document of something. Although in the event of the loss of the „records of knowledge“ (libraries, museums, etc.), the existence of man as a biological species would not be endangered, his civilization would be endangered.

According to Danica Slouková, World Two is about the self-awareness of the subject and the formation of our assumptions, beliefs and dogma and is dependent on World Three (on linguistically formulated theories). The most important kind of objective knowledge from World Three is scientific knowledge, which is the central problem of every theory of knowledge. Although Plato also assumed the existence of World Three and its influence on us, his world was divinely immutable and ultimately true. It contained concepts of things, the essence of things (ideas), but not theories and arguments. Hegel’s ideas were dialectically changing concepts and meanings. The subject of World Three in Popper’s interpretation cannot be concepts (ideas), as they are mere means of formulating theories. The meaning of the concepts is only instrumental, they can always be replaced by other concepts. World Three is thus a world not of concepts but of theories, assumptions and hypotheses (partly according to Slouková 2002, 94). Critics of Popper’s World Three like to point out that it presupposes knowledge without a „cognitive subject“, with its biological, psychological and social determination. In other words, these critics assume that alien A would understand our World Three differently from alien B.

In other words, Popper created his own conception of three worlds: the material world, the world of mental states, and a real intangible world. But how were Popper’s ideas accepted in museology, or more exactly, how could his approach be beneficial to museology? The Austrian philosopher was quoted quite often by Z. Z. Stránský, who writes in the chapter entitled The System in his book Archaeology and Museology: „For science, its knowledge system is essential. Science is not merely the set of knowledge gained in learning a domain, but a system, respectively a system of subsystems or theories affecting the cognitive domain. Karl B. Popper put it figuratively thus: „A theory is a net we throw to catch the world, to rationalize it, explain it and control it. We work on making the mesh of the net ever smaller (Popper, 1976, 31.) Thus, on the one hand, the system affects the object of cognitive intention globally, on the other hand, it leads and initiates the development of further cognitive efforts in order to reduce the „mesh of the net” (Stránský 2005,115).

The chapter Theoretical Museology by Stránský begins: “In accordance with the conception of science as a theoretical model of reality or – as K. Popper wrote – nets (1976) I consider it necessary to characterize the basic cognitive „net“ of museology, which although it still has „a large mesh“, is a system that fulfils its mission” (Stránský 2005,119).

38) This should be R., since Popper’s middle name was Reimund.
However, another Stránský observation is more important for our investigation, namely from the chapter entitled Cognitive Domains: „When archaeology operates with an object source base, we often come across the argument that these are „dead“ sources that have limited informative value. Text sources are put against this. These have a dominant role in classical history. There is a significant difference between an object and a text source. But an archaeological artifact is not a witness without a testimony. On the contrary: it bears a specific, ontically authentic testimony. A text source, on the other hand, is a fixation of someone’s thought, i.e. the expression of the subject. Therefore, from the point of view of informatics, it is data limited, while the source in question is limited only by the extent of our cognitive ability. Genuine and imagined reality are not one and the same. Therefore, even the knowledge and interpretation of this fact is not transferable to the interpretation of imagined reality. There is only one reality, the two realities are certainly related, but that does not mean that the interpretation of one should be subordinated to the interpretation of the other. We could approach this differentiation using the three worlds model of Karel Popper. This differentiation is very important from both the archaeological and museological points of view and defines the special cognitive area of World Three, but also ties in with Worlds One and Two“ (Stránský 2005, 174–175). Stránský automatically and self-evidently included the museum collection, and therefore museology, in World Three (Stránský 1994, 83–87), and after him Ivo Maroevič mentions this approach (Maroevič 1994, 19) and recently Bernadette Biederman, albeit only partially correctly. This leading Austrian museologist writes about Stránský’s epistemological foundations for a scientific discipline which have not yet been falsified (Biedermann 2016, 51–52) referring to the Key Concepts of Museology by André Desvallées and Francois Mairesse (Desvallées, Mairesse, 2011). However, the word falsification does not appear in the entire text of the authors from the Francophone area, and the authors do not refer to any of K. Popper’s works. 39

Furthermore, Biederman writes: „Without the required logical falsification of Stránský’s theories, which would be necessary according to Popper’s starting point, it is assumed that the knowledge system introduced by Stránský did not meet the requirements of the academic discipline and remained as unverified theses.“ (Biederman 2016, 59). Falsification with reference to Burkhart is briefly mentioned by Martin R. Schärer (Schärer 2003), otherwise this term is relatively rare in museology.

We believe that the views of the Austrian Popper–Biedermann duo need to be put in a different light. Science theorist Karl Popper rejected the views of the neo-positivists, verification as a criterion of demarcation, and their

39) Biedermann further writes that Stránský did not take into account Popper’s scientific epistemology of falsification and concluded that neither a museum nor a museum building could be the subject of museology and that Stránský first studied Popper’s works in his friend Frédéric Waidacher’s private library. However, the truth is that Stránský met Waidacher in person for the first time in 1980 (Waidacher 2016, 75), but that the museum is not the subject of museology he presented no later than 1965 (Stránský 1966, 30–33), when he not only did not know Waidacher, but most likely did not know Popper’s work either.
emphasis on induction, that is, that scientific knowledge arises by induction from observation and experimentation. He opposes this with his theory of falsification. Popper replaced the inductive method of verification of general scientific statements based on the generalization of individual case observations with his so-called hypothetical-deductive method for testing a theory, the core of which lies in exposing scientific hypotheses to falsification processes. Falsifiability means finding that any one of the logical consequences of a given theory is untrue and then the whole theory is untrue.

Karl Popper had and still has a number of followers, but also opponents. His approaches were criticized as early as the interwar period (e.g. by Otto Neurath in 1935), Thomas S. Kuhn and Paul K. Feyerabend thought completely differently, from the Czech environment Popper is criticized for example by prof. Jiří Heřt (Heřt 2007), Prof. Zdeněk Neubauer (Neubauer 1993) and Prof. Břetislav Horyna. Horyna writes insightfully: „In the societal (social, cultural, humanities) disciplines, the structure of which is more or less narrative, the seemingly completely rational requirement for falsification can be applied only with difficulty. Theories arising in this type of science can only take the form given by language, because historical events, social phenomena and literary events cannot be adequately presented using mathematical or logical formulas. The efforts at „exact science“ which are manifested by the transfer of the methods of the exact sciences to social science disciplines, in order to evoke the appearance of greater scientific authenticity, usually end in the formulations of empty scientistic or technicist ideals.“ (Horyna 2007). The main reason why Popper’s concept is losing relevance is the linguistic heterogeneity of the social sciences. So Popper’s approach is not omnipotent. It is therefore absolutely true that Stránský did not succeed in falsifying his theories, but let us add that he never tried to do so, nor would it be possible.

From the position of museology, however, it is necessary to deal rather with the problem of Popper’s three worlds than with falsification. Which of them actually includes the museum collection item? We can say that all three, but in each case a little differently.

World One, the world of real things, is only partially museological. It should be clearly stated that museological knowledge is only partially usable for the initial selection of an item. A „pure“ museologist usually cannot distinguish beetle A from beetle B and knows nothing about their rarity or rarity in the given locality, to say nothing of the beetle’s DNA. At an archaeological dig, the museologist does not know whether it is a Bronze Age or La Tène smelting. If a museologist has already recognized an important historical figure in a photo, when examining whether the photo is common or rare (determining its degree of museality), he is not working by museological methods, but using the methods of a historian or archivist. Associate professor Stránský repeatedly stated that in this phase museology helps itself to the methods of other sciences. However, if a museologist in the field does not recognize what he has actually found, we can hardly believe that he will recognize whether the object belongs in a collection or not. This apparent discrepancy needs to be explained. In this first phase of the selection processes,
an expert in the base science (entomology, archaeology) is absolutely necessary, but he should have at least basic museological knowledge, especially focused on creating a collection. In this context, Stránský gave this example in his lectures: „We witnessed the accidental discovery of an old comprehensively preserved shop. The historian present showed no interest in anything, two art historians were willing, in the extreme case, to take a hanging mermaid with scales and an ethnographer a large cabbage grater. Our proposal to preserve the whole thing aroused only astonishment among those present. The whole thing ended as the specialists wished.“ We may speak of a clear lack of museological knowledge on the part of specialists in their fields. The furnishings of that store would have been unique, at the very least in terms of communication. It would clearly document and explain an interesting fact (an old shop), although perhaps not a single particular detail had much value in terms of history, art or ethnology. We consider this example as proof that even a specialist should think museologically when working in the field.

Associate professor Stránský was undoubtedly right, but museological knowledge in this case did not serve so much better understanding of the mermaid or the grater (i.e. items as such), but to recognize the unique communication potential of the whole. The work of a museologist with an item is not an activity connected with a document of a scientific field (beetle, slag), but with an object as a cultural property, which is what all collection items are. This is where the museology field begins – the programmed creation of a collection, thesaurisation processes and the art of communicating the collection appropriately from the museum outwards. And these are activities with a theoretical basis, which the given disciplines (in our example entomology, ethnology and archaeology) do not deal with.

In his habilitation thesis, Stránský solves the problem of Popper’s three worlds in his own way. „Only with the help of World Two can we know, evaluate and understand the first – the organic and inorganic“ (Stránský 1992). We believe that the wording could be a little different. With the help of our consciousness, behavioural states, emotions, etc., we cannot after all penetrate deeper into the organic essence or the inorganic essence of an item. The „added value“ of museology is axiological, it is in the creation of systems, the structural concept of the collection as a manifestation of the human spirit. Thus, we will not understand the more organic or inorganic nature of items. However, we should know, compare and better understand the relationships between them. Museology, as Stránský wrote in 1979, is a final science, not a causal science (Stránský 1979, 3–11).

To which of Popper’s worlds does the museum collection item actually belong? An item really existing in the universe undoubtedly has its physical essence, it is a representative of World One. We assume its museality, it is potentially museum content. Its removal from the universe and its transformation into a museum item is connected with our cognition, emotions, thought processes, problem solving, etc., i.e. with World Two. The creation of a collection is accompanied by both cognitive and evaluation processes. These not only complete the identification of potential museum content as genuine museum content and also secure
the system of the collection. We must understand the collection not so much through the prism of the causal sciences, but as things that belong together, that is, as a kind of structure, a system, with its own order. And this is undoubtedly the field of museology. The museum collection is a record of something, i.e. in its way the kind of „recording medium“ mentioned, the result of thought processes, i.e. World Three. Thus, in the example mentioned by Ivana Holzbachová, that humanity becomes extinct and thinking beings reach the earth, they can also reconstruct, through museum collections, not past facts, but our current knowledge of these facts. The museum collection, as a product of man, thus captures the history of our ideas.

4.3 Postmodernism

The development of philosophical thinking has led to the present day, which is characterized by a distrust of great narratives; science commentaries tending to legitimise themselves are considered untrustworthy. The ideas of P. Feyerabend and L. Wittgenstein are considered to be the ideological sources of postmodernism. Jean-Francois Lyotard considered „meta-narrative“ to be the major narrative, single bridging stories that press all our knowledge into a single framework (e.g. Marxism – we conceive of history as a series of class struggles). This is the cause of the new scepticism, knowledge is sold, bought, is affected by huge technical changes (computer databases). Knowledge becomes an external matter and is gradually separated from questions of truth. Knowledge is not judged on whether it is truthful, but on how well it serves certain purposes. Unity has been replaced by plurality (be careful not to confuse the word plurality with the concept of democracy), each of us lives as if at the intersection of various stories, each pursuing his own goals and his own logic, without any of them having universal validity. It is worth recalling that one great inspiration for postmodern thinking was the work of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), including his emphasis on a tense individualism and the „oversaturation of history“. The need for „antinomianism and anti-institutionalism“ is strongly felt in culture (Daniel Bell’s expression – Holzbachová 1993 p. 127). This is a reaction to the strong feeling that something is omitted or made invisible in the description of Western civilizations (Burke 2011, 64). The turning point was the investigation of the role of women in history, the growth of „postcolonial studies“, etc. We do not examine here whether the postmodern is not just the pinnacle, the completion of modernity, as Boris Goubman from Tver State University suggests (Goubman 1998). The world simply appears to be a much more changeable, flexible and unpredictable place than it seemed, for example, in the 1950s, not only to historians, cultural anthropologists,

40) We are thinking, for example, of his article On the Uses and Abuses of History for Life (taken from Holzbachová (1993, 100). The British conservative philosopher Roger Scruton rightly notes that Nietzsche did indeed look into the abyss of knowledge, but following this path means – beware – the path leads to madness (Scruton 2003). Scruton revived an older notion – oikophobia – the rejection of heritage and home, which he said had become most prevalent in American universities, disguised as political correctness. Scruton attributes this quality to those who need to denigrate their own customs, culture and institutions. To this we might add that museums, with all their many-sidedness, will always be about home.
culturologists, sociologists, etc., but also to museologists. According to many, today scientific knowledge without a unifying paradigm in postmodern reasoning has turned into a chaos of „language games“, which together do not form any „major narrative of reality“. The perception of history has come closer to micro-stories or micro-themes, which is a positive development for museums. The vast majority of museums lack evidence of fundamental facts (the significance of the Sámo Empire – a state formation of the Slavs in the 7th century), but on the contrary, they are full of everyday life items, or micro-stories. However, the situation brings about specific problems for museology and the museum sphere.

According to Czech professor Josef Kandert, “in the historical and social sciences postmodernism has brought about some methodological improvements in the analysis and interpretation of data, for example by emphasizing their thorough critical evaluation and the critical self-evaluation of the researcher himself. On the other hand, its negative consequence has been exaggerated hypercriticism, a tendency to strong subjectivism and a rejection of any generalizing conclusions.” „Although in some fields postmodernism is still a living and utilised view of human social and cultural behaviour, in others it is already one of the outdated paradigms.” (Kandert 2013, 61).

In his book „Our Postmodern Modernism“, Wolfgang Welsch accepts postmodernism, but sets himself against a „boundless postmodernism“, which he perceives as a negative phenomenon, like „cynical pluralism“ and arbitrariness. He accuses critics of exact, precise postmodernism of ignorance, maintaining that in their complacency they become instruments of this arbitrariness, of this „bad“ postmodernism, which is really nothing more than a fashion that is applied in a predominantly „feuilletonistic“ form. He further argues that plurality is a necessary consequence of true democracy, that the modern desire for unity and wholeness needed to collapse in order for the ideals of avant-garde modernity to be fulfilled in postmodernism (partly according to Slouková, 1998, 26–32). Let us add that agreement with plurality should not result in a position that calls into question the rationalism, universalism, and critical methods of Western science. According to Czech professor Ivo T. Budil: „Today’s human sciences should avoid alliances with intellectual currents that deliberately make use of the theses of postmodernism to turn academic debate into an ideologically and power-motivated discourse“ (Budil 2003).

According to Wolfgang Welsch, the era of postmodernism itself „is understood as an epoch of universal communication (discourse) not only between human cultures, but also between man and the cosmos” (Král 1994, 63). Welsch also dealt with an issue very close to museums, that of the original and copies. „A simulation, according to Welsch, replaces the original to the extent that it becomes the original (e.g. exhibiting a copy of the Mona Lisa entails the same security measures as the original)” (Slouková 1998, 28). According to Welsch, we are now witnessing an „aesthetic thinking“ that is not just about visual perceptions, but rather an orientation towards an overall „feeling“, „sniffing and tasting of the fabric
of thought.” This is not just a trivial „sensory perception”, but a challenging „sense perception”. According to Welsch, we are now in a time of a „museum boom” and of staged spectacles. Within this aestheticization, there is a systematic loss of sensitivity, i.e. anaestheticization. For example, we no longer feel the „beauty of the place” where we spent our holiday, but the „beauty shown in the brochure” or subsequently „discovered on television”. However, an aesthetically sensitive person is able to detect this reversal and opposes a directed aesthetics against systematic anaesthetics (Slouková 1998, 31). The Czech professor Pavel Štěpánek also refers to Welsch and his book Aesthetic Thinking (Bratislava 1993), where he also mentions the current „museum boom” (Štěpánek 2002, 46-48).

Jürgen Habermas, the leader of so-called critical theory, also did not doubt that society lives through criticizing its own traditions, and that individuals must be able to question and change society’s traditions. So all the closer to us is Anthony Giddens’ notion that tradition is a routine, an internally meaningful routine, and not just a self-serving, empty habit. „Tradition contributes to ontological security by maintaining confidence in the continuity of the past, present and future” (Giddens 2010, 96). Another Briton, Edmund Burke, living in the 18th century, saw culture and society as an unwritten contract between the dead, the living and the unborn. American Professor Patrick J. Deneen strongly opposes the disruption of the natural evolution of traditions, which he calls the „broken time” (Deneen 2019, 69). Criticism of traditions, changing traditions are topics that fundamentally affect museums, and therefore museology. In the field of museology, perhaps all postmodern ideas have fallen on truly fertile ground, and it is not possible to address their complex decomposition. We will reveal some excesses of contemporary philosophy precisely using the approaches of the originally „modernist” Stránský. Stránský repeatedly criticized the so-called Cartesian-Newtonian paradigms of science and often quoted the Czech philosopher Miroslav Král. According to Král, the ancient Greek philosophers „knew nothing of the genetic memory by which living organisms can transmit not only the basic rules of body layout, but also the basic dispositions of their mental and cognitive abilities” (Král 1994, 10). Král further writes that „the conscious memory (psyche, mentation) that we know from our own introspective experience is not limited to man” (Král 1994, 46). Stránský himself criticizes: “… we recognize as being only what we see and what we can touch, measure and weigh, and we have eradicated concepts such as the soul or spirit as meaningless. As the subatomic physicist Fritjof Capra demonstrates, it is essential to eliminate the opposition of matter and spirit. „Consciousness and the general existence of the subjectivity of natural systems, states Miloslav Král, is in fact much more entrenched than the accidental epiphenomenon of the human psyche in the unconscious (blind) cosmos of classical science” (Capra 1992, Král 1994, 47– 48), (by Stránský 2005,106).

Miloslav Král develops his idea (which Stránský no longer cites) with reference to Stanislav Grof and his book Beyond the Brain (Prague, 1992). According to Grof, we could attempt to decode the cosmic order from within (meaning from
inside the brain), if we were to decipher our a priori genetic memory by systematic introspection. Grof recommends the use of drugs for this. Grof also considers it probable that consciousness memory at various degrees (levels) is also part of other than human forms of the cosmic memory.” (Král 1994, 54). Thus, Stránský inclined to Capra, the author of the book The Tao of Physics, the ideological forerunner of the New Age movement, but Stránský saw the New Age movement itself as revivalist. When Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1922–1996) came up with the original concept of paradigms, the nonrectilinear course of scientific research, his onomatopoeic word paradigm became an integral part of Z. Z. Stránský’s vocabulary; he tended to see a paradigm in almost everything. He used it to defend the positions of museology and as a moral appeal.

Another major theoretician of science was Paul Karl Feyerabend (1924–1994), considered a scientific anarchist, who, in agreement with Imre Lakatos (1922–1974), called for the use of various alternative theories, which, if not available, it is our duty to develop. Stránský names this critic only in general terms as one of those who criticize contemporary science. However, this philosopher did not have in mind the end of any scientific methodology; he sought rather not to limit human creativity.

It is no coincidence that some museologists also respond to current feminist theories, which can be divided into liberal (women’s rights) and radical (men and women as two different species of man), the second is, according to some thinkers, under the considerable influence of Marxism. One representative of this second trend, Betsy Warrior, (1969’s book Man as an Obsolete Life Form) calls men an anachronism that has been, so far insufficiently, displaced by technical progress (Slouková 2000, 89). In the 1970s, there was a significant transformation of feminism, which led to the emergence of specific Women’s Studies and Gender Studies, which also led to new research in the field of collecting. For example Patricia Ebrey, in her 1993 book Interiors, dealt with China during the Tang Dynasty (960-1279). This was a period of change in the ideal of masculinity, a shift from warrior to scientist. Hunting was replaced by collecting as a fashionable matter for high-ranking men. This shift may have been motivated by the Chinese desire to differentiate themselves from their militant neighbours such as the Turks and Mongols. Ebrey comes to the conclusion that in order for a softer man not to be considered effeminate, the ideal woman had to be even more fragile, silent, and immobile (Burke 2011, 108).

In the field of museology, Julia Kristeva is probably the most recognised feminist author. According to her, the basis of the intellectual structure at this time should

41) Grof is a two-time holder of the Stray Boulder anti-prize awarded by the Czech Sisyphus sceptics club. Grof parts company with rationality when he acknowledges the status of reality for his fantastic experiences and derives from them the idea of a „cosmic consciousness.“ People, animals, plants and inanimate nature are all said to participate in it with their consciousness. Thus, according to Grof, human consciousness is not tied to neurophysiological processes, it can detach itself from the body, it can „transpersonally” identify with another consciousness or „travel” to other past lives or to the time of one’s birth. There are no barriers in time or space.” (Král 1994, 48). Grof also received an award from Václav Havel.

42) We found the word seventeen times in the book Archaeology and Museology.
be dialogism, as we know it from Bakhtin. Dialogism, however, does not mean saying anything we like, it is a drama. Kristeva questions the concept of representation in fine arts, and also deals with photography. The radical representative of feminism Donna J. Haraway is also somewhat negative about the efforts of natural scientists to collect the diversity of nature and store it in „banks“ (undoubtedly meaning museums also, adds JD) (Slouková 2000, 109). Feminism is part of so-called critical museology, but its output is based on case studies rather than on a programme concept. At first, these authors noticed the absence of women, later a superfluous presence, i.e. how a male-dominated society portrays women. Research found that at the New York Metropolitan Museum, only 5% of the artists exhibiting were women (an excessive absence of women), but 85% of the depicted nudes were female (an excessive presence of women). This “mistake” was eliminated as early as the end of October 2019, as the newly opened exhibition has five times as many female artists as before (Kroupová 2019). According to Mira Sochor, it is necessary to dig up women artists buried in history, in order to increase the self-confidence of today’s female artists (according to Hanáková 2005, 28). Another criticized phenomenon is the so-called patrilineage-writing of art history from the father-son or teacher-student perspective, which allegedly restricts women. According to some, the „modernist artist“ – white, Western, heterosexual – has run out of inspiration. From the positions of museology one cannot reject everything that feminist philosophy or gender studies have brought about, but we do not see any way forward in the (probably fruitless) search for unknown medieval women painters or a perfect reciprocity of female and male nudes in an exhibition. Being a white, western and heterosexual man must not be considered an „exhausted inspiration“. This view goes far beyond the relatively small space of museums.

4.3.1 Michel Foucault

Probably the most quoted modern philosopher in terms of museology is the French structuralist Michel Foucault (1926-1984), who, due to his inclination towards open structures, tends to be assigned more to the poststructuralists. Stránský referred to this author in connection with authors dealing with collecting and then as a critic of science. However, it is necessary to enlarge on the approaches of this thinker more deeply than did Z. Z. Stránský. Foucault was persuaded of the connection between knowledge and the mechanisms of power, and all his life he dealt mainly with three topics:

1. What relationships do we maintain through scientific knowledge with those “games of truth” that are so important to culture and in which we are both a subject and an object.

2. What relationships do we maintain with others through these special strategies and power relations.

3. What are the relationships between truth, power and we ourselves (Slouková, 2000, 39).
This author introduces his book *Words and Things* (*Foucault 2007*) with a “certain Chinese encyclopaedia”, taken from Borges,*43* where animals are completely meaninglessly arranged (those that belong to the emperor, the one that broke a jug, those that look like flies from a distance, etc.). Things are stacked up as if without principle, randomly, this classification seems to us like a zero classification. However, here there is a connection between things and their classification (which is the basis of thought) on some basic principle, which in our case is shown by its absence. Such a principle must be somewhere behind our thinking, but we do not have the opportunity to look “from the outside”, so this principle is invisible and Foucault calls it epistémé. Epistémé, then, is what shapes a space in which things are either near or distant. This space allows us to talk and move in an organized world. Foucault promotes the so-called „archaeology of knowledge“ (*Foucault 2002*), that is, a method of discovering and uncovering past epistemes in the history of our thought. The history of thought represents not only continuous movement, but also radical breaks. Thought is always remotely regulated by a certain „code“ (linguistic structuralists would say structure) that is unconscious. Thought then moves within a given „discursive order“.

In his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1970, Foucault presented his conception of the discourse (the framework of scientific discussion) using Gregor Mendel from Brno, who discovered genetics but initially received no recognition for his approach. He was in fact right, but he was not „in the truth“ of the biological discourse of his time (*Foucault 1994, 19*). Only subsequently were Mendel’s ideas adopted, effectively changing the discourse of the sciences of organic nature.

Of course, in his works M. Foucault does not deal directly with museology. From Foucault, museologists prefer to quote the „certain Chinese encyclopaedia“ and his mention of Velázquez’s painting *Las Meninas* (*The Ladies-in-waiting*), using the description of which Foucault explains his approaches by actually re-narrating the painting. About the fact that the painting offers multiple possible interpretations, but art historians have been writing about it for many years.

In the final chapter of his book *Words and Things*, entitled Humanities, Foucault defines the modern epistemological field as a „triangle of knowledge“: 1) mathematical and physical sciences; 2) empirical sciences of life, language and work; 3) philosophical reflection, which is connected with the mathematical sciences through the formalization of thinking. Although the humanities belong to this general epistemological disposition, they exist only in the projection space of the empirical sciences (they also proceed according to their models and concepts) and the thought of finiteness; therefore they are not, in the true sense of the word, „sciences.“ Foucault’s triangle has a number of critics, including Jean Piaget.

However, Michel Foucault provides a very specific critique of museums and considers them to be a manifestation of heterotopia, a term taken from medicine where an organ is in the wrong place. Unlike utopias, heterotopias

*43* Jorge Luis Borge – Argentinian writer.
are real places right at the centre of society, where objects from different times and cultures are located, presented and contextualized together. Foucault likens museums to ships or cemeteries. Thus, like hospitals, prisons and schools, museums are also places of state power; like encyclopaedias and libraries, museums are 18th century monuments designed to categorize and classify the order of the world as a universal, intelligible space. Foucault „in some agreement with Max Weber and Theodor Adorno,“ is convinced that modern, developed societies can only survive because a dense network of control institutions takes care of the growing disciplining of the human body in order to keep its subjects in an intentionally rationally maintained life and to suffocate every form of resistance from the outset” (Honneth 1996, 81).

The power of the museum is therefore in collecting and exhibiting things, which are functions of capitalism and imperialism, and this power is exercised over individuals through the careful deployment of institutional control and publicly monitored places. Thus, it tries to control the museum as a product of the European Enlightenment. In the days before the Enlightenment, museums were places of individual choice. Cinemas and meticulously arranged gardens are also heterotopias of incompatible things and unconnected times, they are places of illusion set against the real „order of things“ . According to Foucault, museums involve a double paradox: things from infinite time in a finite space, and therefore are places of both time and timelessness, with their effort to collect everything; all forms from all periods belong to our modernity (Lord 2006).

It must be admitted that the museum is by its very essence the process of musealization by the artificial world, Stránský would write the „metaworld“. This is not a new idea. Hegel had already noticed that the living „Sich-in-eins-Wissen“ was broken and destroyed in a museum of works of art (according to Ennenbach 1983). Even a depository of finds from the period of Great Moravia is not Great Moravia, but its relic part, necessarily deformed by the sieve of time and our own imperfect knowledge. The objects in the museum are de-lives, explained, precisely because they are torn from their original contexts, into which we return them only illusorily, illustratively, i.e. imperfectly, as part of the museum presentation. At an exhibition we are not afraid of snakes or weapons, on the contrary, we learn to know them. But even a tiger in a museum is not a tiger. A stuffed tiger, full of preservatives, standing with one paw above the surface, without its basic instincts, is simply something other than the very similar animal from southern Siberia. However, unlike Foucault, we do not see a fundamental difference between the Renaissance cabinet, a Museum of Modern Art and today’s museum. The Renaissance cabinet, full of exotic items, created in the vast majority of cases quite unprogrammatically, was, in the make-up of its collections, more heterotopic than a regional museum of the 19th century. The cabinet, which mostly served only its owner, did not have the power of a modern museum to shape the consciousness of the general public.

---

44) Among other things, Theodor Adorno presented a sharp critique of the culture industry – see his essay Cultural Industry Reconsidered (published in The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture – for the first time in 1975).
The British philosopher Beth Lord from the University of Dundee argues well with Foucault (Lord 2006). She points to the fact that museums have never tried to obtain everything, partly for practical (transport, spatial) reasons, partly through developing museum and museological theory. Let us add that a museum collection is a document, a representative of some kind of, in practice always of a past world, created here with greater, there with lesser erudition. Lord rightly points to the critical essence of Enlightenment thinking, which can and should be part of any activity of even the present-day museum. According to Lord museums are not essentially about objects (which we agree with), but about „representation“. According to Lord, everything that works in the realm of „representation“ can be called a museum. How to interpret or explain the relatively common English word representation? Probably as representation, substitution, perhaps even depiction or imitation. Here we would need to clarify the overly broad concept of the word „representation“. Items in a museum really are representatives of something (reality), but it is possible to represent this, i.e. to present, in other ways than through museum items. However, in her effort to distinguish between „modern“ and present-day museums, Lord gives examples from British museums where manufactured (non-authentic) objects or directly interactive expositions not based on objects are used. At first sight, this argument is not a very strong one.

The Polish museologist Dorota Folga Januszewska is convinced that museums are changing from heterotopia to autopia, places of sharp identity and autonomy, which is a very specific attempt to interpret Foucault’s approach (Folga Januszewska 2016).

In another of her works, aptly titled „Spaces of Life and Death,“ Lord summarizes some negative evaluations of museums (Lord 2011). The comparison of museums to mausoleums (Adorno), works of art placed in the collection are torn from their own world (Heidegger), the museum breaks every connection between art, life and the perceiver’s specific relationship to a work of art (Gadamer), the museum kills the power of painting, it is historicized death (Merleau-Ponty) etc. If Adorno is convinced that the most important feature of a work of art is its autonomy, then his assertion that the life and death of an artefact depend on its location (for example in a church or in a museum) seems questionable. The poet Paul Valéry also thinks of the museum as a place of chaos, death and constraint. The French writer Marcel Proust, on the other hand, celebrates the chaos of the museum as a place where consciousness has found its very way to the image. Adorno then asserts that none of the French greats of literature is right and that it is necessary to look for a certain dialectic between the one and the other. Lord sees a resolution in the museum as an „experimental laboratory“ with reference to the approaches of the Basque-Spanish artist Jorge Orteiza (1908–2003).

It is evident that the aesthetic view of the matter is very important, but is too narrow for museology. We do not consider whether a painting or a flower in the herbarium found life or death in the museum. There is no doubt that, for example, a church altar should remain, if possible, in its church. It retains its
artistic value and the original function associated with other circumstances (the architecture of the building, other church furnishings, the spiritual atmosphere, etc.). A beetle and an altar, both in the museum, are torn from their original ties and begin to play a new role. To paraphrase the title of Lord’s article, the museum is neither a place of life nor death, but a place of reincarnation. Foucault quickly found many admirers, but also opponents; among the older of these was Jean-Paul Sartre.

French structuralism is an intensive continuation of the artistic avant-garde, often dealing with the interpretation of works of art. It should be recalled that continental (French, literary) philosophy had a much smaller impact in the English-speaking world, where it was often viewed with distrust and even with a smile. This is the source of criticism of its often incomprehensible style, of how little it is understood by the general public, the high level of abstractness of art combined with its professional treatment by the intellectual elite. Perhaps we can end this passage with a statement from one of the most important figures of the Enlightenment, Denis Diderot: Scepticism is the first step towards truth.

4.3.2 Jacques Derrida

Structuralist philosophy is gradually turning into poststructuralism, the most important representative of which was the French radical philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), who was long active in the USA. Derrida’s philosophy is actually a critique of the classical concept of the sign, in which the meaning of a sign is determined by the structure of language; where there is no code, we cannot speak of a sign. According to Derrida, the sign does not have a fixed meaning, but the meaning of the sign is constantly developing. Language is code, it is a system, it is legislation. Classical structuralism understands this structure as closed, Foucault’s episteme is also closed. Language is power and one of the tasks of postmodernism is to unmask this power. However, Derrida, for example, in the word “resonance” understands a double meaning, the action of resonance and the result of this action. His conception of structure is no longer static, but “dynamic”. The space where the monopoly of power is systematically disrupted is the field of art and literature, where the hidden power of the system is constantly being challenged. Art is therefore an “open structure”. This is related (as Russian formalists knew a hundred years ago) to the basic principle of a work of art, which is “differentiation”. The work of art refers to itself, disrupts established automatism, leads us from an ordinary registration of things to their rediscovery. Derrida has a penetrating and quite original approach to understanding the text, which, according to him, is in all cases full of “a priori”, i.e. contradictions, riddles and dead ends.

Derrida introduces a completely new word “différence” into philosophical theory and practice, playing with the fact that the French verb “différer” means “to differentiate” and “to defer”. The meaning of the word is therefore continuously postponed in the text. When I say “the cat”, I can add “that was sitting on my lap” and add “it was white”. So I am continuously correcting, clarifying what it is I really want to say (Buckingham, W.; Burnaham, D.; Clive, H.; King, JP; Marenbon, J.; Weeks, M.; 2013, 310–311).
At this point, we consider it appropriate to point out the differences between the text and the museum exhibition, in which we can also present the cat and supplement this exhibit with a short, but also a very long text. However, the cat itself is here and now, it is “praesens”, it has neither a past nor a present. As the Czech professor Ivo Osolsobě (1928-2012) proved, ostention is a communication which is grammatically very poor. A museum exposition based on ostension is therefore not a language in the true sense of the word, it is governed by other rules. We therefore recommend consistently using the traditional term “exhibition language” only in quotation marks. The Bratislava associate professor Lukáš Bielik has also dealt with the definition of ostension (Bielik 2019).

J. Derrida influenced museology the most with his concept of deconstruction, which was also based on the critique of Hegel, i.e. his merging of opposites into unity. Let us recall that Hegel, or rather his historicism, was often criticized by Stránský. Put another way, we will not find many links between Derrida and Stránský.

Let us stop at the term deconstruction, often used not only by critical museologists, but also in the field of ethnology, cultural anthropology, etc. It is Derrida’s term, in two senses. It is about revealing the double conception of philosophy, both as a way of thinking and also as a tradition. Derrida also seeks to dismantle traditional semantic oppositions (reason and madness, spoken and written word, man and woman, city and countryside) in order to relax them and recombine them in another form. Deconstruction has found its expression especially in architecture, where is characterized by breaking up and shifting of surfaces, seemingly illogical design, the impression of chaos, etc. An example might be, for example, the so-called Dancing House in Prague. This is an original but entirely functional object. Thus, deconstruction is by no means equal to destruction, which some critical museologists do not fully understand. The philosophy of deconstruction says that the objective meaning of a work of art does not exist, because meaning is a product of interpretation and interpretation is always a misinterpretation. However, we may object: Our interpretations in reality fail to construct a completely objective meaning. But by failing to distinguish a work or text (by not categorizing), we could not interpret the work or text at all. With the notion of deconstruction, it seems as if the ancient motto of the alchemists – Solve et Coagula, dissolve and coagulate – has returned to us.

From literary studies, deconstruction has also reached the field of historiography, especially the history of art. The concept of history as linear, teleological history has been undermined. History is thus understood as a mere historical story, a construction, a discursive social practice, not as an “objective description”. The meaning of a work is understood in the process of interpretation with

45) An important role in this transformation was played by Hans Belting’s work The End of Art History and Donald Preziozi’s work Rethinking Art History, in which he compares current art history to a battle-field of conflicting theories and methodologies. Keith Moxey, in turn, distinguishes between “traditional” theory as the epistemological basis of knowledge and “critical” theory, which relates to the cultural and social circumstances in which it is formulated. According to him, art history is a form of political intervention and should be directly involved in the process of cultural transformation (Slouková 2000, 67.)
the participation of the interpreter. Interpretation is not to capture the truth, but is to be an original, truth-like, fact-based, understanding. The consensus of the scientific community then plays an important role.

A wide variety of gender currents are involved in this post-structuralist “movement” at American universities. Proponents of feminism and critical law theory refer to Derrida. These “movements” are often seen as an attack on traditional values, and the conflict of thought between “representativism” and “deconstructivism” is reflected in categories of power struggles, including struggles for power positions at universities. Allegedly, American professors are afraid to teach certain events so as not to be accused of “whitewashing” the humanities (Pavelka 2018, 30).

Understanding in the humanities is understood in the concepts of the poststructuralists not as an impartial activity, but as an activity connected with political and ideological interests. It is not by chance that Derrida’s teaching, known in the United States as French theory, has attracted many fans as well as staunch opponents. The American philosopher John Searle openly called Derrida a charlatan (Fischerová 2012); in addition, the so-called Sokal affair was inspired by Derrida’s difficult-to-understand texts. It is not a coincidence that the greatest opponents of all “post-movements” are natural scientists, for whom science cannot be a non-binding dialogue or a “consensus of the scientific community.” Michel Foucault called Derrida a terrorist obscurantist. According to the American psychologist Jordan B. Peterson, Derrida’s philosophy, especially his absolutization of interpretation, “is such a nihilistic and destructive philosophy that it is difficult for anything to surpass it in this respect” (Peterson 2019, 324). Peterson is highly concerned that Derrida has replaced the critique of wealth with a critique of power. It is important for the issue we are monitoring that Derrida has, inter alia, been strongly involved in various means of exclusion, expulsion, in relation to the other and the foreign. Derrida’s deconstruction is the search for new relationships between seemingly unshakable systems: man – woman, city – countryside, etc. Metaphorically speaking: one must demolish the building and build a new one on the exposed foundations. More precisely, Derrida does not understand deconstruction as a one-time act, but as a process, a permanent, endless task. However, Derrida’s critical approach is meant to rescue the silenced and oppressed. “If our heritage sets us conflicting tasks (to accept and yet choose, to accept something that comes before us, and yet to reinterpret it, etc.), it is because this testifies to our finiteness. Only a finite being inherits and its finiteness binds it. It is obliged to accept what is bigger, older and more powerful and lasting than it is. Outside the experience of inheritance, the concept of responsibility no longer makes any sense.” (Petříček 2004, E-III).

4.3.3 Jean Baudrillard

Many museologists have also been influenced by the “high priest” of the postmodern Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007), at the centre of whose attention is the so-called simulacrum. The word simulacrum is translated as an image,
the image of something, even the breath of the deceased. The simulacrum is a sign whose signifying side is arbitrarily interchangeable with the signified, one refers to the other and vice versa, there is no boundary between reality and illusion. As a result, images of things are ultimately more appealing than the things themselves; things begin to exist in the form of hyperreality. According to this philosopher, we live in a time of simulacra, which are created by man, but continue to live their own lives. As one way of breaking down this closed-down nature of the simulation, Baudrillard cites the resistance that objects themselves impose on manipulations and transferability. Baudrillard calls this resistance a fatal strategy, the logic of an object. However, this does not mean any active resistance that the objects themselves produce, but only their material impenetrability, complete indifference and inability to participate in any way in the exchange of signs. It is the superiority of the object over the subject, over man (Baudrillard 2000).
If we were to use the approaches of Jean Baudrillard, then it is precisely the object (even a museum item) that is real, difficult to change, in a sense more truthful than anything else.

According to Baudrillard our contemporary civilisation has lost three key pillars of its existence: reality, history and difference. The destruction of reality has come about as a consequence of the loss of the link between an object and its sign. The information technologies which we have created in an attempt to communicate more effectively have in reality caused a surfeit of information which we are less and less able to form into a complex image. The link between object and sign has dissolved in the indeterminate game between signs themselves, generating ever newer layers of signs. The world thus falls into a kind of reality which is more real than reality itself, a hyperreality. But the tragicomic thing about this is that this murder of reality arose as a consequence of our attempt better to know the world and ourselves. We then compensate for this loss of the historical thread by turning to stories experienced earlier, filled with emotions which we try to recall and thus find ourselves in them. Baudrillard rightly points out the fact that the sign represents reality. Importantly, however, the verb to represent has two meanings. In the past, the emblem represented, that is, presented, reality. Today, the sign represents, but in practice displaces, reality.

According to Pavel Rankov, the huge explosion of information evokes short-term memory, i.e. we approach information as a consumer product in a cycle of production, distribution, consumption (liquidation). This explosion of information is leading to an implosion, i.e. a collapse, a disappearance of information. „People are beginning to worry about the loss of information on non-electronic media“ (Rankov 2000). If there is too much information, our receptors become numb, desensitization occurs. There is a reduced sensitivity to the message, the communication, a disrespect for facts and data.

This strongly affects museum culture also. In this situation, museums and their objects must then appear to be something incredibly outdated and undynamic. Kerstin Smeds correctly asks: “Are we then going to witness total anarchy of narratives and meanings in cyber-space? Subcultures, subjective beliefs,
conspiracy theories? Will the “real” world cease to be real and turn entirely virtual, spiritual? It remains to be seen” (Smeds 2007). Is futurologist Rolf Jensen right in saying that “we have already left the information society behind and are now entering the “dream society“ where the best story is what counts and what will make the money, and the future”? (Smeds 2007).

Stránský also belonged to the „material”, authentic world of museums during the time in which he lived and worked, so he was most concerned about all these manifestations of „inauthenticity“, which he associated with modern technologies, virtual reality and „inauthenticities“. In 2005 he wrote „We have commercialized and industrialized culture, and for many, even the ruling class, culture is just a matter of private interest, something like entertainment. More and more culture is losing its human-centred mission, and at the level of hyperreality, as Umberto Eco or Jean Baudrillard write about it, it destroys in us any remnants of humanity, as we can experience on television every day and as it manifests itself especially in young people through their fascination with “cultural drugs” (Stránský 2005, 106).

In addition, Stránský notes Baudrillard’s relationship to collecting. „Jean Baudrillard (1991) wrote that when an object is abstracted from its original function, it creates a system by which the subject seeks to reconstitute the world.“ In his judgement, referring to Maurice Rheims, it is a „game“ built on the passion to have, to possess. The decisive factor for getting the object into this game is the subject. The thing „personifies“, a person „lives in the thing.“ One is obsessed with this game: it is fanaticism. This is why Baudrillard points out that the connection between collecting and sexual activity is obvious. Collecting seems to play an important balancing role during the critical stages of sexual life. Collecting on the one hand and active sexual relations on the other are mutually exclusive, but without talking about any substitute function. Collecting is a regression at the anal stage in relation to sexuality, characterized by a multiplication and arrangement of behaviour as well as aggressive restraint. This preoccupation with collections cannot be compared to sexual relationships, because it does not lead to carnal satisfaction (such as fetishism), but can nevertheless have the significance of intense satisfaction. The object here takes on the meaning of a beloved object – Baudrillard 1991,112 (according to Stránský 2005, 72). „However, one is not satisfied only with the individual – “above everything lies the scent of the harem“ but strives for series, for a system. The series and the collector are integrated in a series. What is missing mobilizes the collector’s passion, keeping it alive, because the closing of the series is a „delirium“. Important to the full extent of this phenomenon is Baudrillard’s pointer that today, when religion and ideology have failed, it is a means of comfort and consolation, which helps to overcome our sense of fear in terms of time and death.“ „What man finds in things, however, is not further life, but the cycle of his existence as a symbolic overcoming of the real course of life, the irreversibility of which is beyond his influence“ (Baudrillard 1991,124 – according to Stránský 2005, 72). Death is also involved in a collection. When a collector dies, he survives in the collection that still represents him. However, Baudrillard also very rightly points to the transpersonal significance of collecting and collections. In this way, these
are involved in their own way in culture and cultural life. Collections and their elements also relate to the value of the exchange, the value of the sale. Through public presentation, they not only revive, but also influence interpersonal relations and the institutional sphere.

The inclusion of the word musealization in Baudrillard’s vocabulary was fundamental for Stránský. Although Baudrillard is considered a theoretical terrorist, in practice, he airs our concerns about the loss of traditional cultural values, which are at the forefront of Stránský’s lifelong interests.

How to summarize the philosophy of the great Frenchman? According to him, creation is created for creation’s sake, fashion for fashion’s sake. These phenomena break free from traditional ties, creating unsystematic combinations of elements of all styles, a carnival. According to him, we live in an order of hyperreality, the real is pushed aside by a general simulacrum. The real cannot be distinguished from descriptions, interpretations and representations. Reality is created by information. We live in an age of models without their original reality. Baudrillard sees America as the perfect simulacrum, where there is no boundary between reality and illusion. Images of things are more appealing than the things themselves. We are in love with self-presentation. „America is a big “rollover”“ Disneyland, cinema, TV (mental AIDS) is the „reality“, not museums, culture, churches“ (Baudrillard 2000). We believe that it is museums and the things in them that are the real (original) reality, the real witnesses to the past.

4.4 Museology, nature and universum

A number of experts from various fields, and they were not always just philosophers, have tried to express themselves on the most general problems of humanity, the universe, the interconnection of the various sciences, etc. About 150 years ago, the differences between the natural and social sciences deepened. If the Vienna Circle sought to bridge the problems of science by emphasizing induction, Karl Popper, one of the irreconcilable opponents of neo-positivism, by sharp criticism of inductive methods and promoting his falsification. Hypotheses that are not falsifiable are not scientific, according to Popper. According to Popper, these include Marxism, Freudianism, etc. Karel Popper’s radical approaches provoked a wide debate, following which the author himself had to correct some of his statements. Popper’s approaches thus remain valid, but not as the only principle or universal criterion of scientific authenticity. Both of these logically contradictory concepts (verification – falsification) unanimously reject metaphysics and place many social science disciplines outside of science, as simply not fitting into this scheme.

Nor did the views of T.S. Kuhn (1922–1996) lead to this connection of social and natural sciences; according to him it is necessary to prioritise people outside the established scientific mainstream, those standing „on the edge“, who look at the field from a different angle and can formulate unexpected, indeed surprising conclusions. Kuhn thus became one of the spiritual fathers of the New Age

46) An expression of the Brno associate professor Radim Brázda from his postscript to Baudrillard’s book
movement, through the concept of S. Grof, Rupert Sheldrake, etc., who accuse contemporary science of being caught within the Cartesian – Newtonian paradigm. Here then is a breeding ground for a conception of science from relativistic, postmodern positions, for a conception of science as a set of fragmented, unrelated, non-binding discourses. However, even Pope Benedict XVI also criticized the „dictatorship of relativism.“

In our Czecho-Slovak environment, these practices were adopted and developed especially after November 1989, when a society saturated with militant materialism eagerly adopted everything immaterialist, spiritual, if not exactly „Western“. However, in addition to undoubtedly beneficial currents of thought, controversial, ideologically tinged or downright erroneous views were also adopted, often uncritically. However, this imaginary pendulum did not stop in some (desirable) equilibrium position, but occasionally swung over to the other side. We have witnessed the marked onset of parapsychology, esotericism, occultism, etc., into society, and partly into science.

Nor did museology escape these tendencies either, which we can best explain using the texts of Z. Z. Stránský, especially from the end of his working career. Let us recall that November 1989 led to a desire to learn about practical museum work in western Europe, new methods of working with visitors came about, new exhibition methods, new preservatives, etc. There was a practicist wind blowing, which we do not mean just pejoratively. Stránský did not greatly change his basic ideas. He only added to his lectures that the current problems of museology could not be solved even with the help of the existentialism of Václav Černý (1905–1987) or the phenomenology of Jan Patočka, and he did not mention these thinkers any further. Stránský began to gravitate towards certain trends not far removed from esotericism and towards those theorists whom Umberto Eco called „propagators of the apocalypse.“ At the end of his career, Stránský tended to distance himself from the life of museums, thanks to the free movement of people and literature, he lost a certain „monopoly“ on „what it looks like in the West“ and found himself more and more isolated.

In 2005 Stránský wrote: „Even today, we cannot approach these fields, he means primarily museology and archaeology, without having regard to the contemporary existential climate of humanity. No field of science can assume that the external world does not concern it, that it is a world sui generis, in which only what is proper only to itself applies. However, this is not just an external reaction. This is a paradigm shift. What is true here is the statement of the author of this theoretical explanation of the development of science, Thomas Samuel Kuhn: „To reject one paradigm without simultaneously substituting another is to reject science itself“ (Kuhn, 1962).“ (Stránský 2005, 167–168). Then Stránský continues: „It was only natural that the postmodern focused on criticism of science. Nor should we be surprised that science has lost its reputation in the eyes of adherents of would-be revivalist movements such as the New Age.“ (Stránský 2005, 168).

47) We draw on our own experience in the study of museology in Brno in 1993–1996 and many perso- nal conversations in later years.
Thus, Stránský was (perhaps in part rightly) convinced that we are at the stage of a global, existential crisis of humanity and its culture, and sees the way to improvement in some new paradigm, which he does not more closely specify. Or more exactly, the crisis itself is the paradigm for him. We believe that Kuhn understood the paradigm as something else, as something within scientific disciplines. Thus, for physicists, the world formulated by Newton was less and less in line with their scientific observations, and therefore Einstein and others discovered a completely new conception of certain physical phenomena, thus formulating a new paradigm. But these were all processes within science, not a general desire for change based on the crisis of humanity. “If a scientific theory loses the status of a paradigm, it loses its validity only if there is another that can replace it” (Petříček 1997, 170). Kuhn understood the division of sciences into two periods: when they work normally and when paradigmatic changes take place, scientific revolutions. The crisis of humanity cannot on its own be a paradigm, but let us admit that to some extent we are already living, as Kuhn suggests, in „abnormal times.”

Whether we work with Kuhn’s paradigms or Foucault’s discourse, it will always be a demonstrable change within science, not just a concern about the current state, in Stránský’s conception about the state of humanity, culture, nature, etc. It is positive that Stránský did not slip into admiration for New Age-type movements, but even he was affected by some of these changes. He often referred to meme theory, Rupert Shaldrake, Susan Blackmoore, sympathized with the so-called alternative museology of his wife Edita Stránská, etc. Stránský often combined these authors into a mix that seemed extremely theoretical to the less knowledgeable reader, but was in practice rather eclectic.

For example in 2005 Stránský wrote: „After the division of Czechoslovakia, museum culture went into crisis under pressure from economic changes. Museum methodological centres ceased to exist and the provision of museological education – as a result of generational changes – was largely practicist-oriented and lost, in particular, the necessary international links. Efforts in Slovakia to apply a new orientation of museology, i.e. ecomuseology, gradually lost their basis due to personnel changes and, above all, misunderstandings, and a field focus and a seemingly „salvatory” practicist again prevailed. This also applied to alternative museology, which was responding to the issue of the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm of science (Král, 1994, 1998; Fajkus, 1997; Stránská, 2000).” (Stránský 2005, 103).

We admit that Stránský’s negative description of the situation was in many ways very apt, but his guidelines for solving it were less applicable. In fact, Stránský founded a Department of Ecomuseology in Banská Štiavnica (Slovakia) as part of the Faculty of Science of Matej Bel University. However, the actual focus of the department had little in common with the original (French) concept of ecomuseology. It was the „old“ Stránský museology, but supplemented by mentions of the crisis of humanity, eco-problems, etc. However, a positive achievement was the publication of two anthologies, Muzeologica I/2000 and Muzeologica II/2001, with texts by Slovak, Czech authors and translations of renowned foreign authors.
In Slovakia, on the pages of the Múzeum journal, a fiery debate took place on the topic of ecomuseology in the late 1990s. It was opened up in issue 4/1998 on pages 22–23 by Ilja Okáli from the Slovak National Museum – Museum of Natural History and involved Z. Z. Stránský and Z. Šustek. Both scientists were amazed that the M. Bel University in Banská Bystrica opened the study of ecology with a specialization in ecomuseology, led by associate professor Stránský. A specific feature of the Slovak (Stránský) approach to the issue of ecomuseology was Stránský’s statement that the current world ecological crisis should become a new paradigm of scientific, including museum, work (Stránská, Stránský 2000, 99). Stránský himself admits that ecomuseology is not a new or entirely special museology. In his view, it is a certain return to a holistic conception of the world, as it used to be (Theatrum mundi, tactica conclavium), i.e. before the individual sciences began to be divided up; these, in Stránský’s opinion, are unable to take in and understand the whole, the new paradigm of science. Stránský advocated a deep ecology and directly calls on us for a moral relationship “to all living things, to Gaia and to the whole Universe” (Dolák 2018).

We feel from this that at the end of his life Stránský sought to combine various scientific approaches into some all-explanatory and all-resolving science. Here, at least in part, we feel a kind of superiority of museology over other disciplines, as if museology were some “science of science”, or even “deux ex machina” (Stránský 1988). Within this system, museology is probably to play a significant, perhaps even a dominant, role. Nothing could have hindered museology from developing further than these approaches. During this period, there were and still are museologists and museum workers following the ideas of museality and musealization, but any effort to combine their work with responsibility to the Universe is zero. After Stránský’s departure, the department began to address a topic with a somewhat indistinct title, Environmental Management of Museum Facilities, and later the cultivation of museology completely disappeared here.

Stránský’s reference to so-called alternative museology is also inaccurate. It should be recalled that the Czech theoreticians of science Miroslav Král and Břetislav Fajkus never wrote about alternative museology and to connect associate professor Břetislav Fajkus (Fajkus 2005), an active member of the Sysifos Czech club of sceptics, with Stránská’s alternative conception of museology, is inaccurate, to put it mildly. The very first sentence in Stránská’s article is that unfortunately no alternative museology yet exists. The work is an appeal to a holistic conception of all aspects of „human and cosmic existence” and a critique of the current concept of the museum, especially of work with the visitor. The author understands the exhibits as „energy information concentrates, shape emitters, emitting waves of various intensities, which affect the visitor physically and mentally“. Edita

48) Stránský took the term “deux ex machina” over from theatrology, where it means a sudden, unexpected solution. In this 1988 article, he understands museology as the solution to general and specific problems of museum work. At the end of his life, Stránský suggested that museology was a solution to the crisis of culture, ecological problems and even the global crisis of humanity

49) The article was written on the basis of a lecture for ISSOM in 1997. The text of the lecture is in the personal possession of the author of this book.
Stránská’s approach is interspersed with admiration for the people controlling the sidereal pendulum (Stránská 2000).

It is somewhat surprising that Stránský did no work with the concept of Edward Osborn Wilson (1929–2021), the founder of sociobiology, promoting the ideal of unified science and the co-evolution of genes and culture. Wilson50 was close to so-called meme theory, a kind of culturogene, which is the concept of R. Dawkins51 and later Susan Blackmore,52 which Stránský quoted several times, especially towards the end of his life. According to Dawkins, a meme is supposed to be a kind of parasitic pattern that replicates by parasitically infecting and altering the human mind, the infected mind then further promoting the pattern. Memes can spread from brain to brain, from brain to book, from book to brain, from brain to computer. The method for making pots is given as an example of memes. Memetics wanted to be the science of information transfer within culture. The American Liane Gabora even considers memetics to be the missing link between science, the spiritual notion and feminism (Gabora 1997). Wilson was a supporter of the „consilience“ of scientific disciplines. The meme was understood as a unit of culture, while according to Wilson (Wilson 2016) the gene determines the epigenetic rules of the regularity of sensory perception and mental development, which govern the acquisition of culture. Culture helps determine which of these genes will survive and reproduce. The Czech psychiatrist Cyril Höschl, for example, spoke negatively about the possible combination of the natural and social sciences, while the Slovak biologist Ladislav Kováč (close to Wilson’s concept), who writes about the constitution of a new science of memetics, spoke out in a very positive light (Kováč 1999), the Slovak biologist Anton Markoš considers it from another point of view.53

While Wilson’s arguments are considered by some (Prof. Jiří Heřt) to be solid and quite acceptable, for other authors they are less so. A substantial part of the scientific community takes the whole of memetics to be a complete pseudoscience. We do not consider the museum collection, where there are naturefacts and artefacts, as the required (fully-fledged, complete) “consilience” of sciences, we do not consider a natural science collection itself to be that consilience, where besides for example insect specimens there are collector’s letters, drawings of finds, etc. However, it is a set, a system, a structure of things that belong together and cannot be examined only from the positions of entomology, history and the artistic disciplines.

There is a need for a museological perspective, bringing with it a certain „added value“ in the cognitive processes and in the resulting amount of information.

50 Wilson, inter alia the curator of an entomological collection, is the originator of the charming consideration that Marx’s concept of communism, in which everyone selflessly helps each other, is possible, but only among ants. In other words, Karl Marx was working with the wrong species.

51 Dawkins saw the meme as „a separate, faithfully replicable, and gene-like unit. " Together with Richerson and Boyd, we believe that “a large quantity of culturally transmitted information is neither stand-alone nor faithfully replicable." (Horský, Tuček 2015, 118).

52 Blackmore received a PhD in parapsychology in 1980.

53 Markoš translated into Czech the fundamental work of Paul Thagard – Introduction to Cognitive Science (Prague 2001), which Josef Krob reviewed with considerable scepticism (Krob 2001).
However, such a collection must be designated at least as the first step towards the required blending of the natural and social sciences.

In the Czech environment, associate professor Čeněk Zlatník (1937–2019 (Zlatník 2005) has dealt with the possible linkage of the natural and social sciences. According to him, scientific progress not only brings about prosperity, people fear science all the more because they are ceasing to understand it.54 Science is fragmenting into many specializations, the representatives of which are having difficulty in communicating with each other. For example, governments can scarcely reconcile the contradictions between nature conservation, the economy, and social and cultural needs. The question is whether it is the fault of politics or rather of the practical implementation of problems by politicians. The results of scientific work are ethically neutral. Nobel’s dynamite was originally intended to assist the work of workers in quarries. „In the social sciences, the polarity of the rational and the emotional is more pronounced; it is not (in my opinion) desirable to forcibly separate these opposite aspects of knowledge, but we should constantly strive to distinguish them. “ (Zlatník 2005, 12).

We can say that towards the end of his active career, Stránský „enriched” his concept with general proclamations about the crisis of humanity and certain tendencies towards the supernatural. Nothing could have distanced museology from the museum sphere, at this time under the influence of radical Western practicism, more than Stránský’s „innovation” in his own line of reasoning. We must state that at the end of his career Stránský seemed to have betrayed himself. While most of his life he devoted himself to the separating out of museology as an independent science, its understanding and promotion, at the end of his life he implanted in his original system „all-encompassing approaches”, distancing museology from any truly scientific way of thinking.

We will end these passages with quotations from Stránský himself: „This framework also includes the attention which is today increasingly devoted to the phenomenon of memory, which is identified as an ontic category not only in the inorganic, organic, psychological and social world, but also in the cosmos.“ (Stránský 2005, 109).

We could further list other connections of philosophy and museology (museums)55 but this is where our efforts must end. It was successful only in part, but we do not think it was pointless. Museology, as one of the sciences of man, has an unquestionable correlation with a number of philosophical conceptions of the world. On the other hand, we have perhaps clearly shown how complex the interconnection of museology and philosophical considerations is, what complex aspects the museologist must take into account when formulating his theories. The simple statements of some museologists, mostly in the introduction to articles „as Foucault has shown” or references to essential deconstruction according to Derrida, are of little benefit, and perhaps even counterproductive.

54) We have already written about the widespread need to understand science, including through museums (Dolák 2015).
55) For example, the French philosopher Henri-Pierre Juedy has published the book Die Welt als museum (The World as a Museum – Berlin 1987).
Unfortunately, at the end of this chapter we must state that a substantial proportion of museologists do not concern themselves with any theory, methodology or even philosophy of the discipline at all. Others “deal with” this issue at the beginning of their “case studies”. “Conservatives” mention Stránský, for example, and “progressives” mention Peter Verge’s new museology. Bolder authors will then begin with some references to their “favourites”, mostly misunderstood philosophers or sociologists, among whom the names of Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard, Bourdieu, etc. predominate, while for art historians Crimp, Malraux, etc., figure. In museology, perhaps the most current is Feyerabend’s famous statement “Anything goes”, even more broadly than Feyerabend himself\(^{56}\) thought.

An interesting comparison of philosophy with museology has been made by Brno professor Petr Jemelka. It literally „condemns to death“ visions that philosophy is the roof or, on the contrary, the foundation of the legitimate construction of all other theories, and ordains a philosophy of „voluntary modesty.“ (Jemelka 2008). Perhaps we can apply these approaches to museology. Z. Z. Stránský’s ambitious texts and in particular his personal appearances at conferences were not particularly modest, but rather gave the impression of museology as a kind of „science of sciences“. Perhaps here also is one of the reasons for the frequent non-acceptance of museology both within the university environment and by museum staff themselves, who understood it as a theory for theory’s sake. Museology must prove its usefulness through daily, untiring work. Let us add that modesty does not equate to weakness.

All that remains is to repeat W. Gluziński’s sigh of 1963: „In no professional scientific discipline are there so many people who know everything better (Besserwisser – in German) than in museology. This is all the easier because, where there is a lack of exhaustive scientific analysis, where there is a lack of solid theoretical foundations, everyone finds an open field for the unlimited creation of not always correct and usually unsubstantiated ideas.“ (Gluziński 1963).\(^{57}\)

If we understand museum culture as part of the broader problems of culture (culturology), then we should end this chapter with the opinion of Zuzana Slušná: „The philosophical disciplines are the heart of cultural knowledge“ (Slušná 2015, 13).

\(^{56}\) Feyerabend even demanded the separation of science from the state, analogously to the separation of church and state. He believed that if the state supported other activities in the future, such as the arts, to the same extent as in the case of science, the world would be a better place and relations between people more humanistic. Feyerabend’s approaches evoke the views of Friedrich Schelling, according to whom a work of art is the most sublimated act of human freedom, the highest in the realm of the spirit. However, a work also has a material form, so it has its share in the necessities of nature. Nature and spirit, necessity and freedom are reconciled in a work of art. According to the German philosopher W. Weischedel, real works of art can open a viewer’s attention to the metaphysical depth of the world – in the form of an almost concept-free grasp of the absolute.

\(^{57}\) Most authors cite this source incorrectly and state that the work was published in Warsaw, when in fact it was published in Wroclaw. The question arises as to how many museologists have actually read the work of the great Pole and how many take the wrong quote “second hand” from F. Waidacher’s Handbook.
5. MUSEUMS AND SOCIETY

Probably the most common topic for today’s museological output is the link between museums and the public. For some, especially younger, authors, we get the impression that a greater focus on the public did not occur until after the collapse of the Eastern bloc, and within the “Western world” sometime from the 1970s in connection with the “new museum sphere”. However, the situation is somewhat more complicated than this. Czechoslovak museums in the years 1948-1989 also sought visitors; they were, in the vocabulary of the period, “to serve the people”. How successful this effort was and what methods of museum work were used is now of secondary importance. Immediately after the Second World War, the Czech museologist Fridolín Macháček (1984–1954) calls for museums not to be just a temple.58 Looking even deeper into history, we see at least the declared effort to “democratize museums and the whole of culture” after the October coup in Russia in 1917. We see similar tendencies in the great French Revolution at the end of the 18th century or when František Palacký (1798–1876) joined the National Museum in Prague. In other words, museums have always, but sometimes only officially, sought a greater impact on the public, sometimes they have done better, at other times worse. The effort to please the public, at least the official public, has always been there, often for purely utilitarian reasons. There is absolutely no doubt that museums must be important to society and constantly defend it.

Contemporary museological output is very often directed at the public. Museums should therefore be open, visitor-friendly, democratic, participatory, inclusive, with a greater impact on the public, etc. This is certainly true and the recommendations or even the conclusions of the authors of these articles are, at least in part, worthy of consideration.

However, the authors of these texts are museologists or museum specialists, so this is a kind of “view from the inside”. But what is the real position of museums in today’s changing society, what does society need from them, in what way is the situation different from, say, thirty years ago? A fundamental question needs to be asked: What or who is society and what does it really want and need from museums? There are not many answers to these questions in museological output. We believe that it is necessary to look at the whole issue with “outside eyes”, not to live and not to think only within the museum environment, which in practice is not that extensive. Here we make use of the whole field of contemporary sociology. According to some sociologists, society does not exist at all. There are only individuals with their interests and specific behaviour. The anthropomorphization of society into a kind of being who acts in a similar or even in an identical way, leads to false ideas and often to great disappointment. Thus, the “needs of society” run into the conflicting interests of completely different but completely specific

58) The opposite processes, the transformation of many temples into museum facilities in Russia after 1917, have been thoroughly studied by Moscow associate professor M.E. Kaulen (Kaulen 2001).
For more about Czech museums after the Second World War, see Dolák 2019a
persons. The „needs of society“ are most often spoken of by those for whom the interests of very specific groups of influences are clear and are sometimes not that far from demagoguery and politics. Admittedly, museums have never stood aside from political interests, and this is not the case even in today’s democratic society.

Quite often museologists (e.g. Mairesse, Soarez) use the ideas of the French philosopher and „laboratory ethnologist“ Bruno Latour. He bases his treatises on science on observing and describing the work of scientific teams at work, he is close to sociology and ethnology. According to him, the construction of scientific truths is not just a matter of the logic of scientific research and its methodology, nor just a social construct, but a broad, long-term network of various elements of nature and society (humans and non-humans) will be involved. Science is based on a network of allies (the social and psychological activities of people, finance, affirmative theories from other disciplines, but also various facts and artefacts). On the outside, this network guarantees a certain resilience, but on the inside, political processes are occurring. Latour thus presents a picture of science that is based on a certain construct of scientific results. Here we see at least a partial tendency to see behind science only a social phenomenon at the level of „folklore“ and „reality“, only as a result of the „scientific process of conjecture“. In this context, theoreticians of science write about the sociological turn in science.

Some museologists include the oft-quoted French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002). His study of the mass democratization of education, led him with Jean Claude Passeron to write the monograph The Heirs (Les Héritiers) in 1964. The authors prove here that a school class is actually composed of several different subgroups, the school itself is defined as an organization reproducing inequalities, doubling social inequalities by maintaining an academic aristocracy. Students from higher social classes are able to express themselves better, have (have inherited) cultural capital, i.e. cultural benefits that are passed on to the descendants of the middle and upper classes. The school then transforms the cultural heritage of the parents to the benefit of their descendants. The use of museums is part of this cultural capital. Cultural capital has three sources:

a) cultural objects (books, works of art, technical devices, etc.),
b) cultural competences (cultural abilities, skills and knowledge acquired through education),
c) documents on cultural competence (school certificates, diplomas and degrees attesting to the completion of a certain school at a certain level), which Bourdieu considers to be the most significant, since they confirm and create a status position in society.

However, Bourdieu’s critics point to his underestimation of the real activities and initiatives of various actors and accuse him of an inclination towards Marxism. It should be noted that Bourdieu was working from a survey of the Algerian Kabyle people nearly sixty years ago, who did not really did not make much use of museums. But modern Slovakia or Czechia are not the lands of the Kabyle. We are
persuaded that today, every child goes to a museum as part of their compulsory schooling, and more than once. Whether he or she continues to use museums for their own development is largely a free choice of the individual. Even if we stand up for the concept of the famous French sociologist within the inclusive approach of this book, then a very simple question arises. What effect does the concept of cultural capital have on museums? Should they cease to exist or be more popular? In other words, Bourdieu is probably right, but his afficionados in museology far less so. Museums are accessible to all, so they cannot be direct factors in social stratification. These factors are access to power, scale of assets, etc. However, we do not question the obligation of museums to deal with marginalized groups, minorities, etc. In other words, everyone should „find themselves“ in a museum, even minorities living for a long time in Slovakia (Roma) and minorities living here for a short time (the Vietnamese).

Professor Jan Keller also writes that the so-called discreet elite (the richest of the rich) are frequent customers in the art market, their houses are small museums, children from these families visit other museums together with their social peers, as an expression of their segregation (Keller 2011, 73–75).

Museums are one of the institutions that pass on real values to new generations and thus ensure the cultural reproduction of society. However, this is closely related to the conviction that there is something to pass on, or more exactly that the new generation will adopt the legacy of the previous one; or even better put, that the new generation will take over that legacy (or part of it) as something it itself needs and not just as reverently protected ancestral junk. It was perhaps most often Z.Z. Stránský who pointed out that everything around us is a „legacy“ from which we choose our heritage, that is our permanent values (at least we think so today). However, the questioning of the values of earlier cultures (we have in mind western Europe and the North American continent), including the „modern“ one, has been so successful that it is difficult to speak of a new value system. The much-valued critical thinking, critical studies that permeate the humanities, are sometimes revealed as a significant handicap. Competition in the interpretation of the world, values, heritage leads to the questioning of many of them, leads to a loss of their credibility. Cultural needs do not have their saturation threshold, unlike purely biological needs. Attempts to eliminate inequalities (social, cultural, differences in the whole sphere of heritage) can lead to the establishment of other forms of inequality.

We must use a sociological vocabulary to distinguish between museum work and museums. By an institution we mean a way which is generally practiced and approved, a way of acting and relationships. This is a mechanism of control of order, a pattern of action that facilitates life and cooperation. Institutions simplify orientation within the world („reduce complexity“), save energy and also significantly facilitate the cooperation of a large number of people. They make the actions of others clearer and more predictable, so they also promote mutual trust and a sense of cohesion. These are for example education, banking, marriage,
etc. One proponent of this view of the concept of institution was, for example, the American economist Thorstein Veblen (Dolák 2009), Roger Scruton (Scruton 1999, 50-51) and many others think similarly. Just as there were more primitive ways of trading money (e.g. usury) before the rise of banking, so before the establishment of museums there were simpler forms of preserving and presenting the materialized world. Jan Keller writes: “A cultural institution is nothing but an behaviour that has itself become a binding example” (Keller 1992, 32). By this he means, for example, marriage, fasting or duelling. Institutions are not decreed by the state, people respect them themselves, naturally. The organization is then a less permanent special-purpose unit, with a clear division of labour, membership, clear affiliation to the organization, etc. Organizations are not power-neutral. Thus, the museum sphere is an institution, the museum is an organization. The main prerequisite for whether a person behaves as expected is his socialization. Thus, a person adopts not only the knowledge, but also the values, norms and standards of his culture. Some authors write about a second sociocultural birth, after which a person as a biological creature becomes a being (unit) capable of behaving as a member of a particular society. Without the possibility of socialization, the opportunity to pass on its cultural norms is lost, and such a society collapses, even if it is not physically liquidated, which we can unfortunately demonstrate with more than one example from the period of colonialization. Socialization processes do not lead only to positive results. While traditional societies were threatened by a certain sterility, a lack of development, modern societies, on the other hand, are under the influence of a certain anomie, i.e. an absence of norms and values. We are under the influence of a strange mix of conformity (we all drink the same things, we dress very similarly) and uncontrollability.

Institutions, including the museum sphere, are the axis of every culture. A person may be a member of more than one organization, but need not be a member of any institution. Getting to know a foreign culture means acquainting oneself with the functioning of its institutions. We can compare this to the work of a linguist who uncovers the grammatical principles of an unknown language. Every culture tends to consider its institutions as understandable, or even as the only right ways to behave, which may lead to ethnocentrism. It is precisely the museum sphere that has recently been systematically attacked as a product of the European Enlightenment, i.e. as something artificially implanted in non-European cultures. It is probable that societies that are more closed and homogeneous in terms of ethnicity and culture may not have created more complex differentiated specialized organizations. On the contrary, societies exposed to the need for social innovation (clash of cultures, migration, internal social differentiation, etc.) have had to create more complex systems for explanation and control, including the oldest museums. Was the creation of these museums a product of European thought or rather a consequence of the-then economic maturity of the European continent, which of course brought with it the aspects referred to (migration, clash of cultures, etc.)? Perhaps if areas of Central Africa had been at that time the most developed, the oldest museums in the modern sense would have been established there.
So what does society want from its museums? The simplest answer, inspired only by a marketing vocabulary, is to do something different from the others and to provide different information and experiences than those available on the ubiquitous Web. The main characteristic of a museum, i.e. its difference, is the holding of collections as documentation systems for past facts. Collections, including buildings, sites, etc., together with the knowledge system on them held in the museum, are what makes a museum a museum. In the communication of these we see the main axis in the museum–society connection. However, this principle is not entirely new. But what is changing rapidly? It is the earlier mission of museums as one of the basic sources of information. If the older generations had no other option for seeing a bronze axe but by visiting a museum, today the situation is completely different. The endless information highway of the Internet, Wikipedia, specialized projects directly publishing collection items (e.g. Slovakiana) provide countless photographs accompanied by text, or videos with the spoken word. Therefore, when a museum visitor sees an exhibited object with a description and a short, complementary text, he must be naturally disappointed. So the task of museums is not to “uncover” basic information for the visitor. Their basic task is to have a carefully composed collection and with its help to present past and present worlds in a comprehensive and contextual way. Other communicators also have these ambitions, but only museums, through their collections, enrich the presentation in a way that other communicators are not capable of.

5.1 Identity

One of the most common expressions in the current output of the social sciences, including museological output, is the word identity, or more exactly, cultural identity. We understand this term as a defined space of values, which a given community takes as the expression of its culture, and there is no doubt that museums play an important role in its cultivation, but perhaps sometimes in its suppression. The whole ICOFOM committee meeting in Buenos Aires in 1986 was devoted to the topic of Museum and Identity. From the inexhaustible number of approaches, the concept closest to us is that of the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo. According to him, it is necessary to consider a “weak identity”, able to tolerate a certain, relatively high degree of conflict without becoming nervous and causing violence. It is clear that cultural conflicts are not violent by their nature, as conflicts of ways of life or visions of the world, but as a result of their link to power and the division of wealth. According to Vattimo, education should be aimed at the middle ground. Thus, complete cultural minimalism is unacceptable, a tendency to reduce the symbols of social life to a minimum so as to reduce the implications of cultural, ethnic and religious identity. On the other hand, there is an unacceptable “strong” variant of cultural identity that breeds inter-cultural violence through

59) This answers the occasional calls for a “museum without collections”.
uncompromising power and economic enforcement. This version of the „middle” identity has not yet been constituted, rather we observe the proliferation of both of the extremes referred to (Slouková 1998, 34–35). The relationship between the museum and identity, especially from an ethnological point of view, has recently been addressed by a group of authors in a collection edited by Jana Tichá (Tichá 2016). Professor Dalimír Hajko has long dealt with the relations of cultural identity in the era of globalization (Hajko 2005). Today, there is pressure in the literature and in practice to respect the full identity of ethnic, racial, religious and sexual minorities. In order to avoid any undesirable asymmetry, we must respect the identity of nations and nation-states just as strongly. It is essential for the museum world that so far no unification of cultures or subcultures into some superior meta-identity has taken place, and even in the future such a state is highly unlikely.
An absolutely fundamental issue in the Slovak-Czech environment is dealing with the ties, but also the differences, between museums and monument care. The roots of these two spheres are common. By Austrian imperial ruling dated 31 December 1850, architectural monuments were placed under state protection and the establishment was ordered of a Central Commission for Research and Preservation of Architectural Monuments. From 1872, the scope of the commission was extended to movable monuments; in 1911 the State Monuments Office was established. In addition to the practical protection of monuments, the theory of monument care was also beginning to take shape. The work of Franz Wickhoff (1853–1909) and especially that of Alois Riegl (1858–1905) and Max Dvořák (1874–1921) can be considered the peak of world level at that time. After the establishment of Czechoslovakia there were no absolutely fundamental changes; the system of the monument office, including the appointed conservators, was basically preserved, but gradually expanded, for example the State Archaeological Institute in Prague founded in 1919, etc.

Significant changes took place here after the Second World War, when hundreds of protected buildings and millions of cultural objects fell to the custody of the state – museum collections and objects from the furnishings of castles and châteaux. Despite achieved partial successes, for example of a legislative nature (establishment of the institution of urban conservation areas, etc.), we cannot consider the period of socialism in Czechoslovakia as a period somehow significantly inclined to the protection of heritage, indeed rather the opposite. However, paradoxically, in some cases, the failure to care for important buildings did not lead to their decay, but on the contrary to their preservation. In Germany, the term zweite zerstehrun – second destruction is sometimes used. This was a period from the end of the 1950s, when the enormous boom in the German economy also led to the irreversible destruction of a number of monuments (buildings, sites). In Czechoslovakia, we could talk more about the gradual, permanent destruction and decay of the monument base, although we can find a number of truly brutal interventions in monuments.

A major milestone was November 1989, which freed our museums and monuments from ideological ballast and led to fundamental changes in the discipline, especially the extensive privatisation of museums and monuments. We believe that Slovak and Czech care for monuments are not necessarily considered global models, but on the other hand they are not considered completely bad. Nevertheless, we believe that, for example, the protection of monuments in Austria (Dolák 2013) is more dynamic and, in a positive way, bolder. This is evidently due to the uninterrupted democratic trends in the country, when monument care had to be flexible in adapting the monument base to the needs of everyday life. It is certainly worth considering whether the Slovak and Czech preservation of monuments did not freeze its ideas sometime in 1945 or in 1948.
However, good conservation anywhere in the world is a stool with three legs: practice, theory and ethics. If Riegl or Dvořák were at the world level, then we cannot be satisfied with the current theory of monument care. At the same time, a theoretical solution to fundamental problems would greatly help the day-to-day execution of monument protection. In our defence of these attitudes, we can use, for example, examples from urgent problems in the field of nature protection. This is not a comparison of the incomparable. One current world trend is the abandonment of the strict division into cultural and natural heritage. In English the term „integrated heritage“ is often used (van Mensch, van Mensch-Meijer 2011, 87-90), which can be understood as an attempt at the joint impact on man of monuments, museums, libraries, archives and, last but not least, natural heritage. Is the Lednice-Valtice area in southern Moravia the creation of man (an artefact) or of nature (a naturefact)? Undoubtedly both.

One of the basic features of Czech (Slovak also, but somewhat less significantly) museology is the predominantly homeland character of museums, going back deep into the 19th century. What were the Czech regional museums, often established around 1895, actually striving for? It was a manifestation of strong Czech nationalism, of the nation defining itself. Through early documents (archaeology, early paintings, books, etc.), but especially through live documents in use at the time (folk costumes, handicrafts, folk customs, etc.), they highlighted the maturity of Czech culture, setting themselves against the politically ruling German element. So the self-identification of the Czech nation with these subjects was marked. In some cases, however, museums have remained mentally fixed on this homeland conception, although over the past 125 years society (the clients for our services) has changed radically. Thus, the degree of self-identification of Czechs with a cobbler’s stool, a spinning wheel or a folk costume is significantly lower today. In Czech, the word homeland is now far less used than before. We are not saying that the concept of homeland museums should be completely rejected, but rather gradually changed. One of the ways is a strong specialization of regional museums.

The term cultural heritage was first used by Leibniz in 1690 and is used as a more general term, over and above museum collections. However, within so-called ecomuseology, it was as if everything from the cultural heritage was a museum, such as chapels in the fields, entire landscape layouts, etc. We use not just the term cultural, but also natural, technical, archival, architectural heritage, etc. Surely everyone understands that an early modern book can be stored in a museum, château library, archive or in the historical collection of a public library, but on the contrary, few people understand that in all these cases other laws apply to its protection and to overall operations (at least in the Czech Republic). However, is a written document in the archive archival heritage and the same item in a library, book (library) heritage? The actual place of storage of an object, which can, after all, be changed by administrative decisions, is not enough for a deeper analysis of the phenomenon of heritage. Not only more effective legislation and bolder administrative steps, but also more sophisticated, scientifically justified terminology in the discipline would help to resolve these discrepancies; and last but not least, a well-founded grasp of the discipline(s?) on the theoretical side.
The effort to break free from the grip of discipline-specific approaches has led to the promotion, here with more success and elsewhere with less, of a number of, as it were, overarching disciplines in the area of heritage. Whether it is heritology, monumentology, monumentistics, sozology (sozos – I protect), mnemosophy (Tomislav Šola), testimoniality (Dragan Bulatović), etc. Polish geologist Walery Goetel (1889–1972) first came with the term sozology in 1965 and understood it as a theory of nature conservation. Associate professor Stránský never advocated heritology, but was in favour of cultivating museology, monumentistics and sozology. Thus, the overarching field will not be heritology, but this role could be taken over by cultural anthropology or, even more broadly, the general science of memory, mnemology or mnemosophy (Stránský 2001).

In the former Czechoslovakia, museology had to resolve primarily the issue of monument care. A completely different theory of each discipline was captured in the essentially artificial division of the practical organization of care for this part of our heritage into monument care (castles, châteaux, etc.) and museums, something with which we cannot agree (Dolák 2009a). At first glance, the layman will be surprised that some objects are „museums“, while others, extremely similar, are „monuments“. However, the environment of monument care has worked mainly on the basis of professional disciplines (architecture, art, etc.) and has mostly defined itself against nascent museology, while not cultivating a theory of monument care.

We believe that such a steep boundary exists only in the Czech Republic. With the abolition of the National Monuments Institute, Slovakia (the Czech Republic’s closest neighbour in terms of the administrative management of culture) achieved the transfer of objects to the Slovak National Museum. In short, Modrý Kameň castle has become a „monument“ museum with its exhibition of toys, which is undoubtedly correct. Stránský tried to bridge these barriers by dividing the objects, the bearers of museality, into „in fondo“ (in the fund, in the artificial metaworld of the museum) and „in situ“ – that is, at their original place. (e.g. the original furniture of the château in its original form). An imaginary line could be drawn here between the monumentalist and the museological approach.

Thus, a monument is also a potential museum object, because if we cannot keep it in its original context, it also becomes the object of musealization. Max Dvořák wrote correctly in 1918 – a monument is not a museum object: „Museums are only an emergency way out for monuments.“ Thus, monuments must be left in their original existential contexts, where this is possible. However, construction work, as well as archaeological research, forces us to move objects from „in situ“ to museum collections. It should be remembered that there were many collections, transports, or even losses in the castles and châteaux in Czechoslovakia after 1945 and 1948, so most of their exhibits are far more of the artificial museum „metaworld“ than the preservation of something „in situ“. Many of these buildings were operated by the state, virtually without the original furniture.

61) Stránský draws attention to the presentation of L K. Šapošnikov in 1968 (Stránský 2001a, 143).
62) In monument care, we also encounter the term „in loco“. 
In the Czech environment, the most important representative of monument care theory was the art historian and conservationist Ivo Hlobil (1942–2021), who, from a general point of view, came to very similar conclusions to Stránský (Hlobil 2008). He focused not so much on the institution, but on evaluation. He emphasized that “with the help of the interested scientific disciplines of special museology, it is not possible to understand one’s own museum tasks and, above all, to get acquainted with the subject of museology” (Hlobil 1979). According to Hlobil, both the conservationist and the museum identify value and carry out the evaluation process. This evaluation is methodological, it contains elements both of a general philosophical nature and from the discipline. Ivo Hlobil therefore advocated an independent theory of monument care, which he did not want to entrust to specialists from the disciplines (art and architecture historians, archaeologists, etc.). Hlobil’s views can be summarized as follows: “A monument deprived of its authentic function is subject to musealization or is doomed to extinction” and “Respecting the authentic function of a monument distinguishes monument care from museums” (Hlobil 2000, 295). Hlobil rightly criticizes the export of some sacred works, arguing that they have no „gallery value“. Hlobil expressed himself similarly later in the controversy, particularly with Václav Richter (Hlobil 2004).

Miloš Solař also expresses himself in this spirit: monument care draws much from the history of art, but it is not part of it. The main objective of art history is knowledge; monument care seeks to preserve the physical and spiritual essence of works created in the past. The subjects of interest of monument care are, for example, landscape layouts, the value of which lies in something other than an artistic act. He sees similar differences in the difference from architecture. The objective of architectural creation is to create new values (often in line with the individual interests of the architect), whereas the goal of monument care is to protect and preserve existing values. After all, knowing a work is not more important than the work itself (Solař 2004, 139).

In 1999, the Slovak expert Ivan Gojdič wrote: „between practical conservationists, educators and architects we are not able to come to a similar view, even for the most basic terms, such as cultural monument or monument environment and its values“ (Stránský 2005, 181).

Museums, castles and châteaux are not generally accepted as being something negative; a conservationist involved in the decision-making processes of other owners restricts property rights, for example when repairing buildings, thus entering into the complex ties between investors and other stakeholders, often skating on thin ice, and often being considered a kind of „brake“ or „trouble maker“. The core of the problem is the question of whether it is enough to be a good architect, art historian, archaeologist or natural scientist with the right experience, or whether other knowledge and skills, of course in one of the theories of this discipline, are essential or at least appropriate for this work.

From the legal point of view, the term inheritance expresses a change of ownership in chronological order. It is not the consigner who decides what becomes heritage, but the recipient. So what we receive can have a dual nature: a conscious
legacy or taking over an estate. Both can become heritage; it depends only on the recipient. In the field of museum culture, this is a dynamic process, which is primarily conditioned by social changes. We are all born into a milieu and into conditions created by the previous development of society and nature. We use the term legacy for these conditions. According to Stránský, humanity, through its conscious activity, decides what it will retain from this legacy and what it will reject. This is in effect a continuous process of evaluation and comparison. Nothing that our ancestors have passed on to us, for example in museum collections, has the right to be automatically counted as having value for „ever and ever”: Value criteria change, depending on our knowledge and emotional ties, as recently pointed out by the Swiss museologist Martin Schärer (Schärer 2008). In the true sense of the word, we are not primarily concerned with the preservation of houses, buildings or objects. We wish to preserve the values that are hidden behind these realities. From this point of view, in fact, all heritage is intangible, although very often preserved through material goods. What we gain from a legacy can be both positive and negative. The negative, for example, an unusable or surplus item in a museum can be easily excluded, although in most cases, unfortunately, we fail to do so. But how to deal with negative forms of legacy in other spheres? Do we mean the chronic inheritance of human poverty in some communities or areas with a heavily polluted environment? Here it is not possible to „select out” and „exclude” these. We can fight them, but we cannot fail to accept them within the overall heritage of humanity.

Within human cultural manifestations, we include selected artefacts, naturefacts and mentefacts, we defend them against the natural course of extinction and disintegration, and make use of them as a culture-building factor. In terms of terminology, for these systems we often use the received terms cultural and natural heritage. The term natural monument was used as early as 1819 by Alexander von Humboldt (Stránský 2001). Let us ask the question: who is the heir to this so-called natural heritage? It can hardly be nature. Only man has a culture, only man decides that this or that natural thing is worthy of protection, so in fact all natural heritage is actually also cultural heritage. In the same way, products of nature in a collection are a naturefact cultural good. We do not protect animal genotypes at the zoo in order to eat; we do not protect arboretums in order to create a chair. Both are somehow important for our current culture. Thus an unknown beetle living somewhere in the depths of the Brazilian rainforest is not heritage. It becomes this through the knowledge and adoption by the person who places it into his value system (Dolák 2008). The Czech philosopher Josef Šmajs has long dealt with the relationship between nature and culture, and especially with ontological issues (Šmajs, Krob 1994).

Jiří Patočka and Eva Heřmanová define the extremely frequent term cultural heritage as „the configuration of cultural elements that, as permanent collective property and the generally shared result of the material and spiritual activities of members of a certain culture, are passed on to the following generations as a specific type of heritage“ (Patočka, Heřmanová, 2008, 199).
The biggest critic of the concept of cultural heritage was Stránský; he preferred to use the terms naturefact, artefact, mentefact. However, there are sometimes various misunderstandings when trying to understand these concepts. A naturefact – an object created by nature – is the most easy to understand. An artefact, then, is a material creation of man, and mentefacts are manifestations of the human spirit. It is at the connection between the creations of man and of his spirit that there is a misunderstanding. Every creative person has in his or her head a project that he or she implements more or less accurately when creating a material object, whether it is a machine or a statue, an artefact. The project itself is unrecordable, only as a statement of the creative person. However, a person can have a project in his or her head that is realized intangibly – dancing, kneeling in front of the altar, berating the referee at football, etc. We call these manifestations mentefacts, of course they have their bearer – man, but in themselves they are intangible. Tibor Dite tries to subordinate the term mentefact to the term artefact, which has a certain logic (both are products of human hands or wit), but it does not help us to accurately grasp the issue (Dite 2013). For the sphere of information transfer and storage (databanks, archives, libraries) a focus on mentefacts is characteristic, the nature of the media is almost of no consequence. For museology, however, the information media (bearer) itself is absolutely fundamental.

The growth of the study of historical memory is most often associated with the name of the French historian Pierre Nora, who based his theory on works from the inter-war period (we are thinking in particular of the work of Maurice Halbwachs). Nora uses the term „places/sites of memory“. According to him, „memory, centred on the inheritance of what it is intimately acquainted with, gives way to the ephemeral veneer of topicality.“ (Nora 1998, 8). According to Nora, memory and history are not synonyms, but stand in opposition. Memory is life; it is in constant development, in the dialectic of memories and oblivion. History is then a problematic and incomplete reconstruction of what no longer exists. Nora even maintains that the real mission of history is to destroy and suppress memory (Nora 1998, 9). If there was no distance between memory and history, we would not need what Nora calls „places of memory.“ However, according to Nora, those places are not just literal places, but also museum objects, songs, educational trails and documents (Maur 2015, 142). We can accept Nora's distinction between memory and history, but his approach should be seen as a kind of „individualization of the perception of the past.“ Memory is always variable, varying within groups of people, while history is science. Museums, as well as places where important events took place, undoubtedly are „places of memory“, but on the other hand, museums must through their collections contribute primarily to the scientific study of past phenomena. Nora's monumental seven-volume work, Les Lieux de Mémoire was published between 1984 and 1993 and is extremely significant for the so-called new cultural history and its study of „social memory“ or „cultural memory“. 

63) The term „mental fact“ is also used by Piaget, with reference to Husserl (Piaget 1977, 115).
Somewhat closer for us are the approaches of the French historian Jacques le Goff, who concerned himself extensively with the relationship between memory and history and wrote: “Today’s naïve approaches have as it were made the first identical to the second. They even emphasise memory as primary, as more authentic and truthful than history, which is allegedly artificial and consists chiefly of the manipulation of memory (Goff le, 2007, 9). Jacques le Goff writes persuasively that “Memory is the raw material of history”. “… it is the well from which historians draw”. Since memory works for the most part subconsciously, it exposed to the greater danger that it will be subject to the manipulations of time and society which shape it to their thoughts more than the actual discipline of history. For that matter, this discipline itself feeds memory and thus enters into the great dialectical process of memory and forgetting, as experienced by individuals and society. The historian must be here so as to point out these memories and forgettings, to convert them into that imaginable raw material and make of them a subject of study. To give too great a priority to memory means submerging oneself in the unmanageable stream of time! (Goff le, 2007, 10). Le Goff however further maintains that in non-literate societies collective memory forms around three substantive interest circles – myths, the prestige of the ruling dynasties and technical knowledge (Goff le, 2007, 74). We can see that even this great of French historiography did not think museologically in the wider content.

Nora’s concept was close to that of the Bulgarian philosopher living in France, Tzvetan Todorov (1939-2017). While Nora wrote about the „tyranny of memory,“ Todorov uses the term „cult of memory.“ He also believes that memory is the basis of every relationship to the past and has become the opposite of „history“ in recent decades. In particular we remember the good we have done and the evil we have suffered. Events in which we are neither heroes nor victims fall into oblivion (Todorov 1998, 38). Elsewhere Todorov draws attention to the fact that the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century fought hard to control memory, worked against memory, putting control of information in first place. Today, however, the situation is different, seemingly the opposite, but similar in its result. Todorov writes: „Today, we often hear criticism of western European or North American liberal democracies, accusing them of contributing to the extinction of memory, to the rule of oblivion. By being driven into an ever-faster consumption of information, it is as if we are doomed to an equally accelerated elimination; cut off from our traditions, dulled by the demands of the leisure society, deprived of spiritual foresight as well as familiarity with the great works of the past, we would be doomed to joyful celebration of oblivion and being satisfied with the vain pleasures of the present moment. Here memory would no longer be threatened by the erasure of information, but by an excess of it. In this less harsh way, which is ultimately more effective because it does not arouse our resistance and makes us indeed voluntary agents of the march towards oblivion, democratic states would lead their people to the same goal as totalitarian regimes, i.e. the „rule of barbarism“” (Todorov 1998a, 93).
We do not believe that memory should be strictly defined against history; rather we understand that man moves in a space first of historical awareness, then of historical consciousness and then cultivates the science called history. In the approach of both of these French greats we sense concerns about the shift of memory from the historical to psychological, to individualization and subjectivization, which entails a claim to one’s „own“ history and thus room for possible manipulation. France has promulgated several laws „of remembrance“ (for example, the Armenian genocide); the European Parliament, in fact a grouping of laymen, „ruled on“ who started World War II. Germany and the Soviet Union were put on the European „blacklist“. In the French literature we even find the term „wars of memory“, in which museums also play an important role. Memory is not „autonomously inertial“ in any way, but rather we observe attempts to „restructure“ or „relabel“ it. The French law of 21 January 2021 on the protection of the rural sensory heritage, intended to protect the sounds and smells of the rural and urban environment, which characterize „terrestrial and marine spaces, resources and the natural environment“ as components of the „common national heritage“, is meant quite seriously. The Czech journalist Petr Žantovský advises of the activities of the French parliament in his book with the very distinctive title: News from the madhouse (Žantovský 2021, 247–248). It is evident that neighbourhood disputes over the „sounds and smells of the countryside“, the basis for shaping this law, cannot be resolved within the agenda of the concept of heritage.

In this respect, however, we do not advocate restricting the dissemination of information (e.g. censorship of the Internet), as this would only be the other side of the same coin. We advocate rendering the social sciences more scientific, and fighting constantly against the relativization of the past. It is on this side that museums could and even should find their field of activity and help with the preservation of reality. On the other hand, let us admit that any memory is selective, not only individual but also group (national). For example in Italy, there is only a limited number of exhibitions on Italian fascism and we do not claim that an increase in the number of such exhibitions would be automatically positive. Museums are and will be only a glimpse into the past, just like rear-view mirrors for car drivers. The main thing for both society and the car driver is the windscreen, i.e. the way into the future. Here, museums have only a limited scope. Endless emphasis on the past, especially of our position as a „martyr“, could today make full understanding between nations difficult. Todorov rightly writes that uncovering the past is necessary, „but that does not mean that the past should control the present.“ There is also a right to forgetting (Todorov 1998b, 98). The process of radical victimization – making oneself or someone else into a victim – is detrimental to society, and thus to museums. After all, museum exhibitions cannot describe the role of every person in society simply by identifying what he has been the victim of in the past and is the victim of in the present. Hannah Arendt wrote and lectured more than once on the need for forgiveness. In his book of The Madness of Crowds, Douglas Murray writes: „However, the Internet has slowed down forgetting, keeps memory running and helps people look at the past from
the perspective of an omniscient expert. The past becomes hostage to the avenging archaeologist. Long-forgotten scandals are being dug up” (Murray 2021, 228).

The French philosopher Paul Ricoueur (1913–2005), in his late work Memory, a History of Forgetting, 2000, also examines not only the need to remember, but also the forgetting of the past. A very familiar and popular motto today is the statement from 1905 by the American-Spanish philosopher George Santayana: „Where experience is not preserved, as with the savages, there childhood is perpetual. Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” This statement has however often been misunderstood or misinterpreted. Santayana deliberately used the word “cannot” because he had in mind that that cannot “in writing”. This is the case of children and savages, who according to Santayana are incapable of historical thought. However museology knows that the preservation of the memory of past events need not necessarily be dependent on expressions of a literary (written) nature. The author did not mean remembering past atrocities or injustices or criticizing forgetting. Santayana worked from the belief that knowledge and faith do not arise through mental activity, but through the interaction of our minds and the material world, that is, the ability to learn from past experience. According to him, culture is therefore cumulative and builds on what came before.

The current turbulent times have, perhaps surprisingly, their „musealization nature“. We are witnesses to efforts to remove statues of Christopher Columbus, the alleged prime agent of the oppression of the indigenous peoples, to the removal of General Lee’s statues as the representative of the pro-racist part of Americans, the removal of large numbers of Red Army statues from Poland as exponents of Stalinism, Bolshevism and totalitarianism. In this context, a serious question needs to be asked, which must affect the museum sphere. Should these statues remain on the squares, or should they be moved to exhibitions with appropriate explanations, or should they remain in museum depositories without any direct contact with the general public, or even destroyed?

If we disregard the extreme and meaningless iconoclastic idea of destruction, then we must state that when erected every monument has its unquestionable significance in connection with the place to which it belongs. For it, a museum would only be an artificial, largely unnatural world. Every society has the right to recognize only those values that it decides are genuine values, including statues on the squares. However, society should be informed about all the contexts, and here museums undoubtedly have their place. The basic principle of the historical sciences is the assessment of facts within a temporal and geographical conception. It is a basic mistake to project current attitudes, problems, often conceived in a utilitarian fashion, into the past. Crossing the Atlantic Ocean and discovering a new continent for Europe was a great deed; if Columbus had not done it, it would have been achieved by someone else, and the famous Genoese probably did not harm any natives himself.
If we agree that Hitler’s fascism was the crystallization of evil, then everyone who fought against it deserves respect, perhaps even a statue. We do not agree with all the decisions of the Red Army leadership, but the average Red Army soldier, often lice-infested, poorly armed, poorly dressed and malnourished, was on the side of right. A statue to a Red Army soldier is not a statue of Stalin. By projecting the present into the past, we would have to accuse Czechs of the fact that the founders of their modern state in the 10th century were mass murderers, the Přemyslid dynasty. In addition to projecting the past into the present, we are making another fundamental mistake. For friendly entities, we deliberately or subconsciously select their good deeds, while for unfriendly entities we do the exact opposite. Perhaps it is here that we can recall Hannah Arendt’s fundamental recommendation that people not lose their judgement and their own thinking.

Is heritage to be chosen by the professional or the public?

An on the whole well-intentioned attack on the elitism of monuments and museums, against their closure to the needs of the public, in many cases becomes an attack on professionalism in our discipline. Simply put, some theorists are serious about the idea that what should be protected as heritage should be decided by the public itself, based on its individual attitudes. One inspiration is the endless number of voting competitions, where we use mobile phones to select the best singer, talent, dancer, etc. An example is the competition in 2007 for 7 new Wonders of the World, the organizers of which did not hide their aversion to museums and „dry academic corners“. This approach might be accepted as a clever marketing move to render some monuments more visible, but people who voted via SMS and the Internet still chose only what they already knew, without any deeper expert explanation. Put simply, monuments in the countries with the largest number of mobile and internet connections, or well-known monuments, were the winners (Dolák 2008). A competition for 7 new natural Wonders of the World was similar. Readers of the American magazine Men’s Health chose Homer Simpson as the personality of the decade – a comic figure from a cartoon series, who overcame the seven-time Tour de France winner Lance Armstrong. As part of „opening up to the public“, for example, the Montreal Museum of History and Archaeology has enabled the city’s residents to store some „personal heritage“ items in twenty copper containers on display, with these containers not be opened for another hundred years. We have noted a case where the Historical Museum in Stockholm has made it possible to store in its collections items of personal property that are important for the person concerned (e.g. an urn with the ashes of a tragically deceased young man). These are undoubtedly attractive marketing moves, but they will not lead to the considered creation of collections. What if these approaches also penetrate the practical implementation of heritage protection? What if the laity were to decide by vote on the care of monuments or on which archaeological site will be investigated? Despite requisite and very necessary intensive cooperation with the public on the creation of collections, or more exactly on heritage protection, the final decision must remain a task for the professional.
6.1 Intangible heritage

Because the future is unknown and the present is so terribly short, we are all primarily concerned with history. With its help, we try to understand who we are and where we are going. Whether we also make use of oral history depends only on the decision of a professional. In the current eruption of work with the visitor, it is as if sometimes museologists were more concerned about contact with that person than about creating a real heritage. The methods of our work depend on the level of our knowledge and the development of technical possibilities. These are often the bearers of our memory, and the associated information, material possessions, authentic witnesses of reality. Since the invention of photography, video and other technical achievements, we have naturally documented facts using these means as well. These are manifestations of the human spirit (dances, theatre, folk customs, manifestations of religious or political thinking, etc.), which we often document in this „intangible way“, capturing what we call mentefacts. This is actually nothing new, and not at all new for the so-called central European school of museology; nor do ethnologists strictly divide heritage (traditions) into the tangible and intangible. In the world of museums, it seems to be different. The current explosion of the term „intangible heritage“ is enormous. In 2003 UNESCO adopted the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, and the 2004 ICOM General Conference in Seoul, South Korea was dedicated to intangible heritage. If the criteria for the selection of physical documents are difficult to define and sometimes even variable, we believe that this is an even more complex issue for the areas of intangible heritage, customs, traditions, past and present.

The very division into tangible and intangible heritage is deceptive. A violin without sound would be a piece of interestingly worked wood; the sound of a violin is impossible without the instrument. Slovakia has also included wirework in its national list of intangible heritage, in practice a project in the head of a person who can work with wire. But this mental project would be elusive without the wire product itself.

Extreme examples are „museum“ projects, especially in western Europe and America, that seek to capture personal memories and stories and recast this difficult-to-verify information as a fixed legacy. These are, for example, the Yellow Arrows projects, the Brussels belongs to us projects, the Amsterdam Memory of the East project, etc. (van Mensch 2005), where anyone can designate any place they have visited with a tag with an access code to a website, where the person in question can then store their memories. This is about capturing „psychogeography“ and „social software“. Today such „memories“ have become part of museum exhibitions and even of collections, which then claim to be part of the intangible heritage of mankind (Dolák 2009b). Projects of this type can be described as appropriate activities of a marketing nature, but without a proper evaluation of these personal memories we can hardly consider them a relevant source.
Here we need to ask fundamental questions about the meaning of the existence of the museum. Museums, and their predecessors, have always been the „materialized world.” The items stored in them must have some „accompanying documentation”, i.e. they are associated with an experience, situation, fact, location or scientific description, etc. Records of why an object is in a museum must accompany the object, as for that matter we show in several places in this text. Without them, the item would lose much of its value, or might even be worthless. On the other hand, the endless expansion of the scope of museums needs to be moderated somewhat. Renowned expert Martin Schärer, for example, considers all intangible heritage to be a matter of fashion. We also usually document a contemporary folklore festival with a film shot or two-dimensional posters and invitations. But that is because we have already had the „tangible” from the festival (e.g. The costumes) in the museum for a long time. In the event of a tragic event that led to mass demonstrations and the subsequent fall of a government, we are not competing with television crews for a better film shot. It documents these events with what television crews neglect, such as hastily made three-dimensional souvenirs. These will one day become the „added value” of museums in commemorating past events.

6.2 Digital heritage

Another popular term today is digital heritage, and it is good that UNESCO, for example, is also dealing with this context.64 We can even obtain a PhD in the field of digital heritage in Leicester, UK. Many articles and extensive anthologies are being published on this topic (Cameron, Kenderdine 2007). The relevant UNESCO charter states that digital heritage has either originated digitally, or is converted to digital form from existing analogue sources. In both cases, it is actually a kind of signal or record. The most common activities in museums, making records of collection items (maps, books, and other three-dimensional objects) in digital form, then probably go beyond the intention of the relevant UNESCO charter. However, this is not as important as the question: who, how and by what criteria will the digital heritage be selected and where it will be stored? The relevant UNESCO charter encourages the selection of what has „lasting value”. But what is that? In the selection of „traditional” museum collection items, despite all our efforts, we did not go much further than the criteria of exceptionality (something extraordinary) and frequency (the most common, most routine items). Obviously, we should apply these criteria to digital heritage as well. And then one of the very common everyday emails has that „lasting value”, just as certain high-quality web pages. There are a number of other perhaps somewhat provocative questions: by whom and how will this heritage be recorded and an inventory taken? Who owns the original in today’s infinitely wide dissemination, as well as modification, of everything that has been digitized? Is it possible or expedient to have legislation covering permits to export this type of heritage abroad? The relevant UNESCO charter characterizes digital objects as „data stored in the form of computer files that require software applications to view, listen to, etc.” We have absolutely no

doubt that some of these can be of irreplaceable importance in the field of cultural heritage, but they can be managed by multiple institutions, they are archival items rather than museum objects. We have addressed these problems ourselves more than once (Dolák 2008a, 2018).

We believe that we should give a simplifying, basic guide to the current explosion of work on digitization and museums. Museums should do what is specific to them and what others cannot do. The very documenting of what was „digital born“ is not the central focus of the museum’s attention. Museums usually address this issue only as part of accompanying documentation. In the field of presentation of any kind, modern technologies, including digital ones, are welcome. We have in mind their use in expositions, at exhibitions, in museum teaching activities, virtual tours of expositions on the web, etc. The same applies to the conversion of older recordings into digital form (e.g. arranging the digital recording of a glass photo plate). In the vast majority of cases of these activities, one cannot speak of acquiring or creating heritage. A question remains as to whether to make extensive pictorial records of collection items accompanied by a brief text (description), which is the main output of the most extensive projects, which include, for example, Slovakiana. Museums publish their collections through printed catalogues, which have had a certain impact, especially among researchers, for many decades. Indeed, digitization projects are also „collection catalogues“ and their impact is much greater due to remote access, but should be evaluated. So this is a technological revolution, which some thirty years ago could only have been foreseen by a true specialist, and much less a museological revolution.

In the past, the museum worker took standard photographs as negatives and made use of this material and, at his discretion, even considered it a regular collection item. Today, he does the same thing, but with the help of digital technology, he uses these acquired images daily for the entire range of his activities and values the easier handling of digital photos than classic ones. The difference is that in the case of a classical photograph, the material carrier of the recorded reality was acquired, while in the case of digital photography, a „set of bit sequences“ is acquired. Even now, the museum can acquire material carriers for these photographs (CD, flash disk, etc.), which can be registered in the main register of a collection. Neither Slovak nor Czech legislation considers a photo on a computer to be a collection item, and caution is, of course, appropriate in this regard.

It is positive that museums are trying to publish their collections on the Internet, on their websites, etc., but these are mainly communication and promotional activities. This does not create new museums. Therefore, all thoughts of a „cybermuseum“ or a „museum without collections“ are aimed in the wrong direction from the very beginning. The very best of catalogues with a large number of photographs of collection items does not represent a „book“ or „printed“ museum. All the so-called „cyber museums“ can be immediately called a cyber (digital) archive, database, maybe even a library. The cybermuseum and virtual museum are also distinguished by renowned authors from the Francophone world. According to
them, the word „virtual“ is not the opposite of „real“, but the opposite of „true“ (actual real, present), in the sense of „what now exists.“ So an egg is a virtual chicken. According to this approach, the cyber museum is only one part of a possible virtual museum. The virtual museum can be defined as a concept which globally identifies the problem areas of the museal field, that is to say the effects of the process of decontextualisation/recontextualisation; a collection of substitutes can be a virtual museum just as much as a computerized database; it is the museum in its „exterior theatre of operations“. Thus, a virtual museum can be a collection of substitutes, but also a computer database (Desvallées, Mairesse 2011, 41). This concept, based in fact on the „potentiality“ of something, seems too broad to us. We believe that any considerations of the digitization of museum collections should be based on the standpoint of the Czech theoretician of science Břetislav Fajkus (1933–2021): „Text is always a system of signs that are more or less „artificial“ in nature. These are identities that have been excluded from the realm of reality for the purpose of designating other entities and processes, and which in themselves represent only dead incomprehensible entities (auditory, visual, graphic), which in themselves represent only themselves. Only within culture (language) and purposeful human activities do they acquire meaning and purpose“ (Fajkus 2005, 268). In other words, if we know a language, know its structure, its system, then „we see inside the message“. However, digitization (visualization) of a beetle or a coin is something else. We must therefore distinguish between facts that have already been given meaning (texts) and natural and social events that one encounters for the first time as unknown processes, which have yet to be assigned, for example by one’s research activities, to the meaningful context of some discipline. Anyone who sees the image usually knows that it is a coin or a beetle, but does not see the structures around them. It is necessary to distinguish between facts that have already been given meaning (texts) and natural and social events and their products (naturefacts and artefacts), which one encounters as certain unknown processes and which one only assigns in the meaningful context of one discipline or another.

6.3 Universal values

This brings us to another frequently used term, that of universal values. It is a very pleasant term; it has a strong overall humane charge to it. So these are evidently values that in some way unite us and certainly do exist. Everyone needs to breathe, eat, wants to live in peace. The Christian „thou shalt not kill“, „thou shalt not steal“ are also acceptable in other cultures. However, in the field of heritage, this is not such a simple matter. Heritage has its own self-identification, integration and representation significance. We believe that in many cases we show our heritage and monuments in order to define ourselves in relation to our surroundings. Heritage is then our shield and arrow. As a shield, we defend ourselves against attacks on our alleged immaturity; we define ourselves as an arrow in relation to „others“, those who are apparently culturally backward.
We gave two examples, one from Argentina, the other from Canada (Dolák 2015). The Argentinian city of Alta Gracia is the location of the „Estancia Jesuítica”, listed by UNESCO. From the architectural point of view, this is an building that would probably not attract any special attention in Slovakia. For Argentines, it is a major source of pride, tied to the positive elements of colonization and the emergence of university education, and it is certainly good that this building has been included in the list. But on the basis of what universal values? Hardly architectural ones. Another example is Head Smashed in Buffalo Jump in the Canadian province of Alberta. The essence of the site is one of the many breaks in the prairie, where Indians have been chasing bison for centuries as a major part of their diet. Today, this place is on the UNESCO list and we can view a very well-prepared museum exhibition. The site is not interesting in terms of the natural sciences, significant historical events or archaeology. It was included on the UNESCO list because the locals, the Blackfoot tribe, have a sufficiently strong, historically grounded relationship to the location. But which scientific discipline can assess such a relationship? Sociology, psychology or even psychiatry? Hardly. At a part of the locality not open to the public, and as part of special initiation rites, the Indians pass on a tradition inherited over centuries, telling stories of the sun, the moon, and hunting. We Central Europeans may admire this locality, we can contribute to its protection in some way, but we can hardly fully understand it. After all, the initiation rite of the Indians is not a universal (holistically valid) value of humanity. We consider it very questionable whether the simple summing of national values can lead us to certain universal values. However, this is the first undoubtedly positive step towards understanding the enormous diversity of what individual cultures may consider to be their heritage. The current explosion of UNESCO World Heritage List entries raises serious concerns as to whether this is not just a well-thought-through marketing effort and not a careful selection of all that is most valuable that individual states or nations have in their heritage. While globalization is considered by most thinkers to be a revelation of the whole and of a new way of thinking and acting associated with it, universalism is more of imposing a way of life, organization and thinking of one national culture, one national circle or of multinational companies on other national cultures or cultural circles.
7. THE MUSEUM COLLECTION AS A STRUCTURE

7.1 The thing as a philosophical problem

Motto: Let us make museums a living and far-seeing social memory and not a storehouse of cultural objects. (Gunilla Cedrenius)

The museum is undoubtedly a „world of things“. But what exactly is a „thing“ in modern philosophy? There is no doubt that when philosophers wrote of „things“ they had mind “things” in the most general sense, but on the other hand, the collection items in a museum are also undoubtedly things. Most philosophers do not understand the „thing“ as something isolated, self-defined, but as part of broader systems, mostly of thought. Henri Poincaré and Bertrand Russell (Russell 1993), Willard Van Orman Quine and Richard Rorty, for example, have thought in this direction. An interesting „division of the world“ is brought by Hans Reichenbach. Husserl comes up with the motto „to things themselves“. French museologist Marc Maure correctly wrote: „An isolated item is a hypothetical construction. An item is never experienced in a vacuum; it always exists as part of something. It always exists in relation to other items and other elements in its environment“ (Maure 1995,159).

„Isolating an item from any physical and social bond and asking what it means is as meaningless or reductive as isolating a word in a sentence, book, or lecture, and asking what it means“ (Maure 1995,160). Perhaps M. Maure was influenced by L. Wittgenstein, who thought similarly, and for him the world is a collection of facts, not of things.

7.2 Structure

The task of the museum is not to collect things, but to create a collection, that is, a system, or rather, a structure. But what actually is a structure? A biological species is implemented through many individuals, a card game is implemented through many specific plays. We see here a „common structure“ (we can say deep), which is realized through many individual cases. Both of these planes interact. This view allows for an independent understanding of both „universal“ and „logical“ forms. Thus, there are various „realizations“, „interpretations“, models and variants to the invariants. While structuralism was seen more as a methodology of the humanities, post-structuralists are reviving a classic line of philosophical thinking.

We can say that there are two basic conceptions of the term „structure“:

1) The structure of a whole – an internal orderliness, an internal form, a sum of the relations between the parts of the whole, the form of the whole. This is the concept from which holism derives on the one hand, and a systemic concept on the other.
2. Structure as an invariant (immutable property) of various units – hidden, deep relations, which do not depend on elements or parts, but rather predetermine

65) For more on the concept of the thing as a philosophical category, see Chapter 4.
these elements in some way. Thus, in music, there are, for example, (various) compositions by Antonín Dvořák (1841-1904) and their structure is the composer Dvořák himself. The structure does not depend on the specifics of the elements: the specifics of the elements are based on the structure as its variation. The elements act as intersections of the relationship of the deep structures. Hidden, deep relationships do not depend on the elements and parts, but rather predetermine these parts in some way.

The French philosopher Jean Piaget (1896-1980) is usually also included as one of the structuralists. If we read him carefully, we perceive a double concept in his understanding of the word structuralism (Piaget 1971, 11). Otherwise, it is the philosophical concept itself, but also where he writes about the special sciences, we understand this concept more as a structural method, as structural procedures, etc. This also includes the setting of the collection, or more exactly, the concept of the collection from a museological point of view.66

The Czech museologist Z.Z. Stránský also accepted the concept of the collection as a structure. „The systematisation of the collection is therefore not identical with the system of knowledge of engageable scientific disciplines, as many still believe, but depends on the structure of musealized reality. However, it is not only the structure of the musealized phenomenon as such, but of the structure that results from the identification of evolutionary factors and the value of the musealized reality.” (Stránský 2005, 125). Although Stránský himself did not identify himself as a (post-)structuralist, he quite frequently used the word „structure“ and references to the Czech aestheticist and structuralist Jan Mukařovský (1891–1975).

The Stránský conception within thesaurification is more interesting (second phase, following selection): „Musealization in its second phase is moving towards a system. In accordance with systems theory, the function of a system is to create its own structure of elements and their relationships, by which we reduce the complexity of the world so that we can distinguish the system from its surroundings. This is also the nature and significance of the creation of collection systems. Through this system, i.e. generally speaking the museum collection, it is possible not only to represent the reality being monitored as comprehensively as possible, but also to create a relatively isolated meta-reality, which is a prerequisite for the long-term preservation and use of such concentrated representatives of cultural values” (Luhmann, 1984) (according to Stránský, 2005. 124).

From structuralism in ethnology Stránský has repeatedly applied the ideas of Claude Lévi-Strauss: „If we confront this historical knowledge with a living and completely spontaneous musealization tendency, as we encounter in some ethnic groups (Lévi-Strauss, 1971), or in contemporary life and in developed communities (UFO-museum), then this is a general phenomenon which is an expression of a special appropriation of reality and forms an organic part of the cultural development of a man and of the whole of mankind“ (Stránský 2005, 138).

66) In another of his books, Piaget fondly recalls his childhood under the influence of a zoologist from the museum in Neuchatel (Piaget 1977, p. 46)
Perhaps the knowledge of comparative ethnology can bring us closer to understanding this appropriation, even if it is only an analogy. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009), in his book *La pensée sauvage*, when he described the function of the special churinga totems, stated that “they are accumulated and stored in natural hiding places, far from visited pathways. They are taken out at regular intervals for the natives to inspect, and on each occasion they are polished, greased and dyed, while prayers and various incantations are made to them. With their role, and in the special way in which they are treated, they are strikingly similar to our archival documents… “The reference to the archive is only comparative here” (Stránský 2005, 143).

According to Lévi-Strauss, the unconscious activity of the spirit manifests itself in giving forms to a certain content. These forms are basically the same for all thinking beings, whether ancient, contemporary, primitive or civilized.

7.3 The museum item and its museality

Things have a structural and a cultural component. The first relates to the material nature of the thing, the second to the context of its application and use. The world is revived through things, and the other way around. Thus, the meaning of an object exists only in the interaction between an observer and the object. No human creation is exclusively utilitarian and none is exclusively non-utilitarian. The museum item itself can be conceived from several angles, especially as a document, a semiotic sign and at the same time as a carrier and source of information, as summarized by Žaneta Marešová (Marešová 2011).

Paul Otlet (1868–1944) is considered to be the founder of documentary studies; he also classifies three-dimensional objects among documents, which we do not consider to be entirely correct. A document is therefore any material medium on or in which knowledge or experience, i.e. potential information, is recorded in signs. For us a document is a deliberately created record of something, such as a chronicle, a medieval document, etc. The medieval potter made a jug to draw water, not a document. That jug becomes a document only today as part of archaeological collections, when it is evidence (a representative) of life in the Middle Ages and with whose help we can document life in the Middle Ages. Ivo Maroevič (Maroevič 2004) also commented on the concept of the item as object or document, with reference to Croatian sources. From a museological point of view, the object (collection item), an authentic witness of an earlier reality, is not entirely identical with the same item in another (earlier) reality (Dolák 2015).

The Polish museologist Jerzy Święcimski (Święcimski 1996) has dealt with the issue of the museum item more than once. Święcimski (1927–2012) was very precise, dealing with the „truth” and „untruth” of an item. He correctly writes that it is difficult to talk about the truth in the case of, for example, an image that depicts an evident falsehood, as well as in the case of an image that the author may only have completed or even just signed. Also, a restored item is still considered „authentic”, even though this is not entirely true. We usually associate the authenticity
of an object with its material originality, which is not clear in all cases. For example, Prague’s Charles Bridge is authentic only for some of the stones of the foundation pillars, and the Ishtar Gate at the Pergamon Museum in Berlin was actually larger, and was reduced in size in order to be exhibited indoors. In these cases, the decisive factor is not material authenticity, but authenticity of form, which has a symbolic function.

Conceiving a museum item merely as a source of information was rejected not only by Z. Z. Stránský (such a simplification would deny the item its individuality and its right to exist) but also by other theorists, such as the Austrian Fridrich Waidacher (Waidacher 1999, 100) or the Japanese Soichiro Tsuruta (Tsuruta 1984). Tsuruta saw the specificity of the collection item in its properties as a source of primary information. We encounter secondary information in books, for example, and tertiary information is collected, analysed and synthesized from information from primary and secondary sources.

Sometimes we encounter somewhat frantic efforts to divide collections up, for example, into „exhibition“ and „reserve“ (e.g. J. Beneš also ). According to Peter van Mensch, the most modern attempt is to combine educational and system strategy in the division of museum collections into three parts: exhibition, depository and depository open to the public (van Mensch 1992). We believe that in the history of museums, such a distinct dividing up of museum collections has never taken place. The proposed „three-part museum“ would be a communications nonsense, both in terms of organization (e.g. record-keeping), and even in terms of the individual sciences cultivated in the museum. It is impossible to determine in advance which item will be exhibited, which will be in the depository and which will be in the depository open to the public (sic).

The Czech museologist Josef Beneš wrote: „Authentic creations of nature and man, deliberately taken from their original environment and programmatically concentrated in collections as scientific models of the original reality are the working basis of museology.“ (Beneš 1997a, 29). Of particular note is the passage „deliberately taken from their original environment.“ In this way we take a beetle or a plant from nature, a weapon from the army, etc. and place them in the artificial environment of the museum, which Stránský called the metaworld. Even a completely authentic room at a château, left in its original state, is torn from its original world, torn from its functional ties, no longer serves for the nobleman’s rest, but is now a museum, showing something that is no longer lived in. This suggests a way towards today’s frequent considerations as to whether or not to consider a living animal or a living plant (a tree planted a hundred years ago, i.e. not torn from its original environment) as a collection item.

Collection items then form a collection, but what exactly is a collection? From the perspective we emphasize in this text, a collection is a set of things that belong together. It is this „belonging together“ that causes the value of a collection to be not just the sum of the values of its individual items, but to be higher.

Therefore, it is more appropriate to replace the simple term „collection item“ (something in a museum collection) with the term museum content (musealia),
bearer of museality. Of course, the level of museality (value) of particular museum content can grow, weaken or even disappear over time. With the help of a collection, we document as fully as possible the musealized reality, but at the same time we create a relatively isolated meta-reality, which is intended for long-term preservation and use in culture-forming processes. The creation of a collection must be based on in-depth knowledge of the field as well as of museology, i.e. the concept of the collection as a living organism, which we are systematically changing to a higher quality. In the case of a collection, we assess the significance of the collection as a whole. Let us assess the items located here as individual ones, but especially on how much they complement and enhance the entire collection. Intention is important for the creation of a collection. A carefully compiled collection is not just the sum of the values of individual items, it has something extra. It is a complex with a high informative value. The world is not just passively documented in a collection, it is also actively recognized and interpreted. Not only is the value of the „created“ shown here, but also the value of the „creative“, i.e. the manifestation of the curator’s personal creativity. It is no coincidence that some authors consider the creation of a collection to be a certain kind of „intangible“ heritage. The right selection must be among the most complicated and professionally demanding of museum activities. The curator must always consider which item fits into his collection and which does not; he must be able to „see the world through the items“. A shift in our knowledge may reveal that some previously collected items have ceased to supply their informative value, or have never had any and were incorrectly included in the collection. There is no doubt that from the point of view of time we examine 99% of the history of man and nature’s past only through items of a museum nature. That is by no means little (Dolák 2018a). Rightly, like a structure, the implemented collection should call out: there is an empty space here. Conversely, in other places it would call out: here there is too much. We therefore conceive of the collection as emergent, which means that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. It only makes sense to measure pressure on multiple molecules; a cell is not yet a tiger; an atom is not yet yellow. Slovak museologist Richard Senček aptly writes: „In order for a given reality to be captured by the relevant museum, it is necessary to create an imaginary network of museum content around the documented phenomenon, which will be equally dense around the whole of the documented phenomenon, i.e. all relevant aspects will be documented axiologically equally (at approximately the same level). The maximum density of this network is equal to the original reality, but this can only be considered hypothetically. Therefore, the new meta-reality (reconstructed reality) cannot be so densely documented. The network cannot be too sparse either, as in this way it would lose its informative ability, i.e. only from a certain density can it point to the mirror of the specific original reality“ (Senček 2019).

67) We will explain at the end of the book in the chapter on terminology
People can be shown to have been surrounded for centuries by things that have a specific value for them and Stránský introduced the term museality for this value. Let us add that although Stránský expanded the explanation of his term over time, using various phrases, he did not fundamentally change it. A detailed analysis of the use of the term museality is given by Václav Rutar (Rutar 2012) and recalls van Mensch’s sigh that it is confusing that the term museality is used for both “the intention of the ‘user’ and the properties of the object”. Milan Popadič recalls the same statement of the Dutch museologist (Popadič 2017, 7). We believe that these considerations somewhat miss the point. If we talk about evaluation, then we are only thinking about the relationship (i.e. evaluation) of a person to something (in this case to the item). The item itself never has any value, this is attributed to it by a more or less informed, perceptive or otherwise oriented subject (human being). So it is man who, in Gluziński’s words, throws a “spotlight” on the item. The shot-up ID card of a man from the Czech village of Lidice, murdered on 10 June 1942, will always be just a piece of dirty paper for the uninformed observer.

Popadič develops interesting considerations as to whether Stránský was not inspired by the concept of museality in Tzvetan Todorov and his concept of “literality” or even by the Russian linguist Roman Jakobson, a member of the Prague Linguistic Circle. These considerations will always remain just hypotheses, in our opinion weak ones at that. Popadič also states that the Gluziński M factor owes its origin to the concept of museality which, according to Popadič, can be considered a response to man’s need to organize and represent his need for man and his reality.

We dealt with modern trends in the collection activities of museums in a recent monograph (Dolák 2018). Inter alia, considerable space is devoted to the “topographical turn”, i.e. a greater emphasis on the landscape, on the places where monuments originated or are located, i.e. the urban and rural context. Reference is made to the works of M. Heidegger, W. Benjamin, G. Rooijakkeres (cultural biography), P. Nora (places of memory) and S. Reijnders (places of imagination), T. Meder (marked places, narrative heritage), etc.

7.4. Musealization

The term musealization is frequent in central Europe, under the influence of French and German philosophy. Probably the first to use the term, in 1963, was the German historian and philosopher Joachim Ritter. Musealization is the special (“museum”) appropriation of reality and does not focus only on “things as such”, nor is it satisfied with their “source potency”, but is conditioned by the memory cultural value of reality. This leads to efforts to preserve witnesses and representatives of this value against the nature of change and decay. Through museum appropriation,

68) In 1945, George Murdock defined 67 cultural universals that are common to all cultures. Interestingly, he mentions art, but not collecting.
69) The Polish great of museology would certainly not agree with that, but we are trying to show that despite these seemingly irreconcilable attitudes, the creators of the so-called Central European school really thought very similarly.
there is a shift in meaning: reality as such becomes cultural meta-reality. It is, as the Austrian Eva Sturm puts it simply, a conserved world. The anthology compiled by Wolfgang Zacharias (1941–2018) Zeitphänomen Musealisierung (Essen 1990) also had a major influence on museological thinking.\(^70\)

Stránský often relied on the German philosopher Peter Dirk Jan Sloterdijk, who even published a book Museum – Schule des Befremdens (The Museum – School of Concern) in Vienna in 1988. Sloterdijk writes: „Museology is a form of resistance against the strange, the unknown. The museum sphere belongs to the phenomenology of the cultural strategy of dealing with the foreign“ (Stránský 2005, 119).

In addition to Jean Baudrillard, the German historian Hermann Lübbe also contributed to the promotion of the concept of museification. Lübbe deals in detail with the concept of history and in his works presents a functional form of hermeneutics. According to him, innovations of all kinds come at us at such a pace that routine takes the place of understanding history, making historical self-identification difficult. Thus, history has no „laws“, it is just a number of small singular stories from which no general lessons can be drawn. It is in religion that the author finds the need for understanding (Slouková 2000, 13–14). Lübbe’s term museumisation is used, for example, by the Dutch museologist Jan Vaessen (Vaessen 1989), but also by many others. The term muzeefikacija (museification) is widely used in the Russian environment.

Musealization is thus a manifestation of the distinctive human tendency to preserve against the nature of change and decay the elements of objective reality that man needs in his own interest as a cultural being. It is a specific appropriation of reality (from the spheres of nature and society). Not all storage is musealization (stored things in the cellar awaiting „their time“). The factor that is decisive is the transformation of reality into the level of cultural reality. According to Stránský, this is: „the appropriation of reality in respect of the memory significance of their authentic representatives“ (Stránský 2005, 256).

The Czech philosopher Josef Šmajs also intervened in the problems of musealization from the ontological perspective. According to him, Stránský’s conception is too narrow, and is limited strictly anthropologically (Šmajs 2008). It acknowledges the musealization the status of accidental being, not substance, „It is a derived being, it must always have a bearer in and of itself.“ Šmajs’s hypothesis of a musealization which can also be reported in the pre-human sphere (revived and un-revived nature), is based on a general resistance of various beings to their reduction and is too broad for our argument. Somewhat more interesting are his remarks on ethological research of territorial behaviour, which give defenders a „mysterious“ stream of power. We believe that man and his culture are for the most part tied to a certain territory. Because culture also includes a heritage with which man is integrated and identifies, this is also a heritage that we tend to defend against an attacker. This may be not only a physical attack, but also attacks from other cultures by non-military means.

8. MUSEUM COMMUNICATION

Man is a physically relatively weak being, but he compensates for his shortcomings with his ability to communicate, as J.G. Herder has already pointed out. The essential features of human culture are a capability for symbolic communication, the ability to institutionalize one’s behaviour and to create legitimate structures of organized power. One of the basic factors of anthropogenesis is the evolution of symbolism. Apart from biological needs, man lives not in the universe of things, but in a universe of symbols. The influential American journalist and philosopher Walter Lippman (1889–1974) wrote that: „Museums and books on folklore are full of dead emblems and spells, because the symbol has no other power than that which it gains by association in the human mind ... if we had the patience to study their circulation in detail, we would have the whole history of mankind in front of us“ (Lippman 2015, 180). Symbols are representative (they represent the thing that is symbolized), they are passed down by tradition (unlike innate instincts) and are freely formed. The invention of writing creates the possibility of storing information very efficiently, and nowadays is a matter of mass communication resulting from the technological revolution. However, man has communicated since the earliest beginnings of mankind, when it was so-called capillary communication (C. Braga), where the store of information was the human memory.

However, we believe that it was not the only one. People communicated through works of an artistic nature (murals, statues, etc.), but evidently also through three-dimensional objects, either found or created, and these also had a communication role, including the transfer of their associated intangible heritage. The Russian museologist S. V. Pshenichnaya sees the original sources (istoki) of the museum’s „language“ in objects that are objectively visual and objectively acoustic (Pshenichnaya 2001). Today’s museum communication is associated with its technical and instrumental content (a guide to spending leisure time), general cognitive content (instruction and entertainment) and its normative content, teaching what is good and what is bad. To reject the wisdom of the ancestors once meant exclusion from society, exclusion from the group, that is, certain death.

Well-known, and often used by museologists, is the concept of the hermeneutic circle from the German philosopher Gadamer (1900–2002), „the creator of modern independent hermeneutics.“ Hermeneutics was originally a guide to interpreting texts. With the neo-Kantians (W. Dilthey and others) it aspired to become the methodology (epistemology) of all the spiritual sciences. The contrast between the explanation of nature and the understanding of the spirit led to hermeneutics being forced into the realm of psychological intuition. Gadamer worked from the assumption that we are trying to understand the world through interpretation. However, this always takes place within a specific period of time, which postulates certain prejudices and partiality, a certain „knowledge of the problem“ in advance, i.e. so-called pre-understanding. We cannot understand things without this pre-understanding, from which Gadamer concludes that history does not belong to us, but that we belong to history. This then is a process of deepening our understanding.
of reality, always based on what we already know. We cannot stand outside our own history and culture, so we can never attain a completely objective point of view. When viewing an exhibit in the museum, our own history and traditions whisper in our ear. However, all this is not a bad thing, it is a certain starting point. Even if we were (theoretically) able to get rid of all these prejudices, we would not see things clearly and distinctly. What would we actually see without an interpretive framework?71

So-called double hermeneutics applies to museum communication. This term was introduced by the British sociologist Anthony Giddens and applies in full to museology. In short: scientists study nature, but the latter does not study itself and does not respond to the results of scientists’ research. However, museology examines not only what people do, but also how they understand the world and how their knowledge affects their behaviour. Thus, participants themselves somehow interpret their own activities and try to understand them. This duality of hermeneutics in museology (as indeed in other cultural sciences) lays two traps. The museologist can attribute to the actions of the actors the same meanings that the actors themselves give them. Then museology only tells them what they already know, making it somewhat superfluous. It communicates what everyone knows without an expert. The opposite trap is when the language of the museologist is so different from the language of the actor that no collector or exhibitor can be familiar with it. Excessive expertise, often only affected, and masked by a quantity of foreign expressions, is harmful. Or the uttering of total banalities using many foreign words, occasionally „leaning“ on world philosophers, connecting museum culture with all the worlds of science, and preferably directly with the cosmos.

The term „dialogism“ has also entered into museology. We consider the Russian philosopher Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1895–1975) to be the father of dialogism and we can replace this word with the term inter-textuality. This is the relationship of a text to other texts, the presence of one text in another, sometimes compared to a palimpsest. Bachtin understands a literary structure not as a given, closed, but as taking place in a „dialogical relationship“. Thus, every small speech genre (a conversation during shopping) has its own rules; they are nationally conventionalized; they serve to quickly orient the actors; and of course they limit communication to a priori patterns (Slouková, Kunca 2001, 23). Vitaly Ananiev warns against the mechanical idea that museums’ efforts to communicate with the visitor are a development of Bakhtin’s dialogism (Ananiev 2016a).

Much has been written about redundant communication, where the quantity of a message far exceeds the ability for it to be received; this trend is increasing, and each message risks the possibility of getting lost in the drabness of everyday. This state does not lead to a growth in knowledge, but to a loss of orientation; the balance between private and public is lost. If we are increasingly subject to the means of mass communication, then this is in terms of quantity rather than

71) For more on the application of Gadamer’s hermeneutics circle to museum presentation – Doldk 2015.
of knowing more. The possible absence of museums in the private space may have its advantages. A person is forced to be away from home, to visit a museum and perhaps to trust the museum discourse more, to consider it accurate, or more exactly, more carefully compiled than the total chaos of the Internet. The museum is a cultural practice and cultural practices have the task of defending against chaos. Evolutionarily, it is moving from natural markers (pheromones) to artificial markers. We go from the marking of things to marking about things – diagrams, charts, models. All this reduces the cognitive burden of perception and memory, which simplifies our lives. The one who decodes and interprets better, survives. No museum in the world was founded just to collect and preserve something. The purpose of the museum is the most complete, scientifically correct, but at the same time understandable opening up of collections to the public. We must therefore take the collections used in the exhibition as the basic programme approach; this need not be the case one hundred percent. In these days, characterized by an explosion of information, it would be baffling not to make use of the enormous information potential hidden in collections. However, collections are not just information carriers. Appropriately exhibited collections transform man’s consciousness, expanding his abilities and cultivating his qualities. It is the personal contact of the museum user with the items that is a specific feature of a museum’s work. Original collection documents are both the bearers and at the same time the direct sources of information. Their presentational use is based on the fact that authentic testimony is immanently contained in the item and as such can be determined by scientific research as objective knowledge of reality (primary knowledge for scientific purposes) and the visual perception of the external features of items communicated, i.e. adopted by the visitor (secondary knowledge of reality). Original documents, witnesses of human life and the development of nature that has surrounded him, are the working and expressive means of museums. Ostention is the basis of museum communication. Ostention is therefore a kind of signless communication; it is actually the most typical form of presentation, because it is about showing things that are here and now, i.e. „praesens“. From a semiotic point of view, we can document two basic modes of human communication and cognition:

1. representation = a non-presentative type: communication via signs; “communicating with the help of representatives”, models, i.e. a type presenting the original, but re-presenting or pre-presenting (pre-presentating) it as a cognitive substitute,

2. ostention = a presentative type: communicating through things themselves by showing them, i.e. “the type of communication that presents (“ makes available “) the original itself to the cognitive activities of the other” (Osolsobě 2007, 96).

Museum expositions belong to both types. There are exhibits (presentational type), but these often represent a whole class of similar things, so they are representatives. Of course, ostention is inherently limited by definition. At least to what is present, here and now and is therefore observable. „Ostensive language, vocabulary
and grammar, however, is poverty itself, completely incapable of expressing the negative, the future, the past, the transcendental and the general” (Osolsobě 2002, 36). Grammatically, it is actually a matter of using only the „indicative mood“.

Duncan Cameron (1930–2006), a Canadian, is considered one of the first museologists to use the term „museum communication“, thanks to his key article in Curator magazine (Cameron 1968). However, the museological community addressed communication much earlier and also used this term. For example, as early as 1963, another Canadian, Harley W. Parker (1915–1992), published a work in the pages of Curator magazine entitled “The museum as a communication system” (Parker 1963) with a critique of the linear way of creating expositions.

However, museum communication is not just about visualization. “The mission of museums is not only to visualize the cognition of certain phenomena and to show a few items, but through the ontic authenticity of these also to demonstrate the truth of our cognition and the evaluation of musealized reality.” (Stránský 2008, 8). This is an important reminder. The task of museums is not to exhibit things. The task of museums is to use items to present past worlds, i.e. to guide items into communication positions so that they communicate the issues we are following. At the same time, we need to observe that each item has a different communications ability. The image or sculpture was created as communicants; their creator wanted them to communicate something. In this case, their being „guided into a communication“ can be pushed significantly into the background. The medieval potter producing a container or nature creating the beetle did not produce a communicant, i.e. an exhibit. Such items must be carefully arranged for the role of communicating something.

Elsewhere, Zbyněk Z. Stránský draws attention to the factors specifying a museum presentation:

1. On the side of both the sender and the receiver, we need to take into account the historical and social constellation in which both participants were brought up and live. Their mutual historical-social constellation need not be the same.
2. The medium cannot be identified with the reality it reflects, or represents. The medium is therefore a new reality, expressing that original reality. There is a shift in meaning between the original and the new reality.
3. The medium bears testimony about a certain reality, but this testimony is formulated by the sender and depends on his scientific and professional erudition. The medium is a distinctive work that is the result of a specific creative effort (Stránský 1983, 193–194).

Later Zbyněk Z. Stránský adds: „Media are therefore not just any means of communication, but means that are created for this purpose, or put more precisely: they are shaped into a communications role. A stone might be a good example. If I point to a stone and say: this is a stone, then I only associate the term with what I am pointing to. If I take this stone and show it to someone while weighing it in my hand, I am telling them that it is heavy. In this case, I have
encoded the message – that the stone is heavy – into the medium – showing the stone being weighed in my hand. Only in the context of being weighed in my hand does the stone become part of the medium” (Stránský 1995, 4).

Items can be instruments of communication because their value is communicated through signs and symbols. Thus, an exposition can be analysed according to the three main parts of semiotics. Semantics examines the relationship between exposition units and the things (realities) that the units discuss; it is the relation of the exposition to reality. Syntactics addresses the relationship between individual exposition units. Pragmatics examines the relationship between the exposition and people, i.e. the visitor’s (non-) acceptance of the exposition.

Martin R. Schärer (Schärer 2003) also understands the exposition as a sign system, but distinguishes between:

1. conscious, intentional signs (Zeichen)
2. unconscious, unintentional signs
3. indicators (Anzeichen).72

Signs are always planned; indicators are always unplanned. A poorly dressed, rude museum guide, a bad directions system, text with too small a font, etc., can all be an indicator. An intentional sign can be anything generally known (used) in the communications process (for example, a map of a prehistoric settlement). Clutter in an exposition room can be an indicator of a shortage of money or lack of interest from museum staff. However, it can also be an intentional sign of a simple way of life in ancient times. A fingerprint on a murder weapon is an indicator, but the same fingerprint used in the communication process (for example in an exposition) is a sign, is part of a communication message, which may also contain a false message. Indicators are welcome in the scientific study of an item; signs then play an important role in the visualization process. The use of expensive display cases can be an indicator of a sound museum budget, but also a sign – „there is an extremely valuable item here“. Grey walls of an exposition room can be an indicator of a lack of aesthetic feeling. However, if they match the exposition (for example, about prisons), they become a sign. The difference between a sign and an indicator is sometimes mutable.

Josef Beneš, for example, deals with different means of communication, according to different sources (for example, a container can be communicated as an original item, its representation, a verbal message about it or a coded record about it) (Beneš 1981, 103). A photograph can be understood (conceived) as an original, as an explanation of how a camera is used or as a background, completing the atmosphere. It depends on the context in which we place the item. A sword can be understood as a weapon from ancient times (icon), it can remind us of an important owner, such as a ruler (index), or it can portray justice (symbol).

72) We believe that Schärer’s distinctive concept can be inspiring for museology and easily understood in practical areas.
So what exactly is good „exhibition language“? It is the optimal mix of science, exhibition knowledge and knowledge of the needs and possibilities of the visitor. A museum's presentation language has its own „vocabulary“ – space, items, texts, graphs, colours, sounds, lights, movements. The product of exhibition language is not so much prose as a rather intermittent staccato text, essay or fragmentary presentation.

Visitors come to museums and somehow accept (or do not accept) museum communications. The issue of visitors' associations has been addressed by several authors. These chains of associations and connotations are sometimes referred to as dreamland (van Mensch 1992). Then galleries for the most part present rather an implicit dreamland, where the visitor literally enjoys the exhibited objects without interventions, assistance, in a discursive, unconnected concept. However, we would call most museum expositions more explicit „dreamlands“.

The basic, most proper form of museum presentation is the exposition. According to Zbyněk Z. Stránský, what are its main features?

1. It communicates the content core of the holding, thus identifying with the basic documentation focus of the institution,
2. it is not a mere display of collections, but an explanation of a known reality,
3. it is a special kind of illustrative communication, which is based on authentic documents, after careful selection the collection item becomes an exhibit,
4. it is a long-term form (Stránský 1984, 105).

An exposition (permanent) should be compendial in nature; an exhibition (temporary) should in turn respond to the current situation and be shorter in duration. The exhibition is undoubtedly more dynamic than the exposition, in two respects. It can respond more flexibly to the needs of the public and can be mobile (touring). While a permanent exposition must include a scientific, popularization and leisure approach, in an exhibition we may emphasize only one or two of these elements, having regard to the expected audience. The creation of an exposition and an exhibition depends on professional knowledge, but to some extent also on talent. The essence of this creation then lies in the ability to „visualize the imaginary“ (Stránský 2005, 128). The ability to create good expositions therefore depends not only on professional knowledge, both from the discipline and from museology, but also on talent, to some extent of an almost artistic kind. The essence of the museum presentation is the transformation of bare facts into signs that we visually adopt, classify, assign in the hierarchy of values and rank in a system.

Museum communication always takes place in a specific space and the issue of the museum environment is related to this. Museum buildings are often exhibits in themselves, but are mostly unsuitable for the activities of the museum, and not only the presentation activities. Thanks to these, museums have been given a certain elitism, sometimes even sacralization, which they then had to get rid of over a long period, often inconsistently. Museums played an important role
in the development of regional and by extension national awareness, so they also became „temples of the national“. Today, museums strive more to be „temples of leisure“, „palaces of entertainment“, perhaps even „temples of communication“, again with all the benefits and inherent traps. In the literature, we come across the terms museum contemplativum (the temple of the Muses) and museum activum (a living institution „for the people“), with terms such as introvert and extrovert museum or even happy museum.

Extensive discussions about the use of modern technology in museums can be summarized in a single sentence. If this technique is not self-serving and suitably complements and expands the museum’s discourse, it is always welcome. A significant shortcoming is the absence of well-founded museum exhibition criticism. Monographs (Dolák 2015, Šobáňová 2012), (Dolák, Šobáňová 2018) as well as methodological materials (Dolák 2018b) have recently been devoted to the theory and practice of museum communication.

Of course, expositions and exhibitions are not the only forms of museum communication. In addition to other forms, these are mainly museum-pedagogical activities. It is the current emphasis on working with the visitor that has led to the enormous efforts from museologists and museums to develop museum pedagogy. Despite the still large number of emerging constructivist-behavioural „conclusions“, we can state that museum pedagogy, as an integral part of museology, has taken perhaps the biggest step of all in recent years. In the Czech environment, we must first name the „Olomouc school“, represented primarily by Petra Šobáňová (Šobáňová 2012), but also by her successors (Šobáňová, Lažová 2017; Jiroutová 2014). From the Brno environment, let us name at least Vladimír Jůva and Lucie Jagošová, and the very active Museum Centre of Museum Pedagogy at the Moravian Museum.

Trends in the post-war museum sphere and museology can be partly compared to the development of pedagogy and the school. Over the past decades, pedagogy has taken a number of indisputable steps, but these have only been partially reflected in the school curriculum. Czech expert Ondřej Šteffl claims that our schools are still „guardians of tradition and stability“ and compares them to Prussian cadet schools, which once produced the best soldiers. For over two hundred years, the school seemed to be based on the following resources: the army (unthinking performance of one’s duties), the manufactory (precise performance of activities, everyone taking their break at the same time) and the church (thought control) (Šteffl 2018). However, if the school must not be a Prussian cadet school, then the museum, as a place of non-formal education, cannot be in the slightest. But we must allow ourselves to be confused by the slogan “learning by play”. Children cannot just play aimlessly at school, and the same is true at the museum. There are a number of misunderstandings between museum educators and more conservative museologists from not understanding these contexts.
9. MUSEUM CULTURE OR MUSEUM MULTICULTURE?

Some of the most frequently used words today are the terms multiculturality and multiculturalism. The understanding and acceptance of the cultures of „others“ undoubtedly has its positive aspects. Real, not only proclaimed, respect for all possible cultures based on non-violence and observance of fundamental human rights is an imperative for today. Nor did Slovak culture originate in some kind of „sterile environment“. At every step we come across the influence of pre-Slavic ethnic groups (e.g. the names of some rivers), the influence of Hungarians, Jews, Roma, Poles, Germans, Czechs, etc. It was in this „melting pot“ that Slovak culture was formed and is still being formed in relation to what we would call multiculturality (the requisite multiculturalism). To conceal or distort these influences would not only be rude, but would be a gross distortion of history. However, some authors understand multiculturalism to be something else. As the end of this word suggests – ism – it is an ideology.

In the 1960s, a wave of cultural liberalization came to Europe and included the slogan „difference enriches“. Various new social movements have been using this since the 1970s, fighting for the rights of those who have been discriminated against because of their differences. Since then, these demands have become more radical, otherwise the right motto will run into its own barriers. The unconditional acceptance of Islamic culture, for example, would run categorically into our conception of women’s equality; we cannot fully tolerate freedom of religion for those who would not allow it to us (according to Keller 2016).

The Canadian sociologist Mathieu Bock Coté considers multiculturalism a political religion (Mathieu Bock-Coté 2016), as an attempt to establish universal emancipation, not sought in the sphere of economics, but in the field of culture. Carriers are sought among those who remain outside the dominant normative Western system. They are sought in victims of social exclusion. We therefore encounter criticism of Western civilization and its institutions. The deconstruction of the majority normative system is intended to open it up to socially and culturally marginalized groups. Instead of having a vertical hierarchy that is built on subordination and on equality, give space to equality in complete diversity. Real wealth is in diversity, because every difference enriches humanity in some way. Everything is borne by the ethos of rejecting the past with its oppression. Man is to be liberated from a society that corrupts, controls and alienates him. He is to be freed from all power relations, from every authority and from any kind of hierarchy. All the the social roles of man distance him from himself. Authority must be denied and egalitarianism must be brought into all relationships, including the relationship between teacher and pupil, doctor and patient, parents and children. A truly free society must not determine the individual in anything. It may only offer him the opportunity to shape himself without any kind of external determination. Man can maintain his dignity only if able to become someone else, traditions and all institutions are henceforth considered only as masking the oppressive relations of dominance. No institution should seek to subordinate diversity to a common standard. It is a vision
of paradise unlimited by anything than that is shaped by existing institutions. One of the entities that needs to be deconstructed on this path is the nation. The nation is just a fiction maintained for the benefit of the ruling class. History may no longer be a school of patriotism, it may not teach continuity and it must not strengthen any sense of being rooted and belonging to a nation. It does not make people heirs of any patrimony. Nation is just another word for dominance. National culture is nothing but the culture of the majority, that is, those who abuse their demographic dominance to force their views on others. Countries with the least history have the greatest future. Nations should no longer define themselves by their heritage, but as a project for the future. They will no longer be bound by history and culture, Europe is not based on protecting its heritage, it is a project that distances itself from the past, that is, from divisions and wars. Anyone who is against a democracy of diversity, who values memory, tradition, legacy, being grounded, is a populist. Every conservatism is basically dormant fascism.

According to a Canadian sociologist, a new totalitarianism is imminent. The totality of the new religion does not seek to maintain a balance between heritage and the future, but without hesitation sacrifices the former to the benefit of the latter. The Canadian sociologist's view of the problem of multiculturalism is very critical, but if true, it would be very bleak for the museum community. The museum sphere is undoubtedly an institution, a traditional institution, an authority, a bearer and submitter of social norms. It is a reflection, albeit often an incomplete or distorted one, of local, regional and national identities. And in our opinion, it should continue to work in this way. Not in the position of a strict, despotic, omniscient teacher, but in the role of a kind and understanding explainer of the complex vicissitudes of historical development. Museums can and should represent (for example through their exhibition activities) even very distant cultures, but museums will always be (especially in permanent expositions) about „ours“, i.e. about our history, nature, customs, etc.

The renowned Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori recognizes de facto cultural pluralism as a value that must not threaten the jointly shared world of politics and the democratic and liberal traditions of Western society. The role of the state and its laws then consists of defending this cultural heritage from immigrants full of cultural and religious hatred (according to Přibáň 2006). On the other hand, R. Rorty, for example, admits that every culture is ethnocentric and it is important that these cultures are not exclusive but inclusive. Even the most technical and seemingly universal civilization is, after all, a certain culture creating its own narratives and traditions (Přibáň 2011).

In the Invention of Tradition Eric Hobsbawn (1917–2012) came out with the provocative view that traditions that are said to be very old often have quite recent origins and are sometimes even fictional (Burke 2011, 110). Answers to this argument can also be found in museums. Transferring culture to the new generation must necessarily be a process of reconstruction, or the creation of the „new“ from randomly selected or accepted parts of the „old“, for which Lévy-
Strauss used the term bricolage, DIY. We do not doubt the fragmentary nature of museum collections as images of past worlds, yet they are authentic witnesses to realities, and in spite of their limitations, they are or at least may be more true than other kinds of records of the past. Like any scientific text, no exposition is “complete”. However, their total rejection due to apparent “incompleteness” is completely invalid.

We do not believe that the purpose of any nation is to merge with others in some kind of multicultural unity. The exposition of history, local or national, must be, in the words of Brno philosopher Radovan Rybář, a “common horizon of being”.

According to this author (Rybář 1996), in all spheres of culture there is a dualism of the opposing tendencies of human thought: the tendency towards stability (tradition) and the tendency towards change (innovation). At any given time one of these may prevail. It is our task to find a balance between the classicist phase associated with the tendency to unity, wholeness, rules and, on the other hand, the romanticism associated with the heroism of free will, experimental creativity, uniqueness and individuality. Let us add that most of the output of certain social sciences, including museology, is now “romantic” rather than “classicist”. Let us also add that the Romantic era in Europe was certainly not a time of peace.

Culture as a system of values does not consist of a static equilibrium, but of constant fluctuation, in the search for new, but at the same time continuously stable states. Even in museums, especially in the most advanced countries of the world, there is a kind of “anti-totalitarianism” that promotes “freedom at all costs, freedom not as a voluntary civic responsibility, but as a right to self-realization in any form.” (Durman 1998, 265). More and more authors get the impression that today’s times are post-factual, when it is believed that every opinion is equally valuable. In this context, the Director of the Jewish Museum in Prague, Leo Pavlát, expresses the following idea: “These are, unfortunately, all the signs of the decline and disintegration of a liberal society that is giving up the basic elements of its existence. Post-factual times are associated with the advent of electronic media and social networks. This is a crucial element in the disintegration of critical thinking in a democratic society. A time of the deformation of historical memory has arrived, the abandonment of the rules of education, morality and law” (Břešťan 2018). The Czech anthropologist Jaroslav Malina writes: „We are selling out our cultural heritage and worse, we apologize for it.“ „We apologize to anyone and everyone for destroying foreign cultures, although looking back, we find that this is how all cultures that were expanding and had material or ideological superiority behaved.” (Malina 2010). It is no coincidence that opponents of these trends are already expressing their concerns in the titles of their books: How to save Western civilization (Shapiro 2020); The self-destruction of the West (Klaus et al. 2020); The strange death of Europe (Murray 2018). According to Murray three trends can be observed in contemporary art: parasitism, catastrophism and artificiality. The first lacks self-reliance, the second is depressing and the third has nothing at all to with art (Murray 2020, 249). In his emphasis on the significance of traditions
Murray references the 18th century British philosopher Edmund Burke, according to whom culture and society are an unwritten agreement between the dead, the living and those yet to be born (*Murray 2020, 268*).

We consider dealing with the issue of multiculturality and multiculturalism as one of the key tasks of today’s museology, as well as with the manifestations of so-called cancel culture. We conclude this chapter with the idea of Zygmund Bauman (1925–2017) according to whom multiculturalism is an ideology of the end of ideology (*Bauman 2006*) and the idea of the Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsin (1918–2008), who claimed that whoever wanted to destroy a nation would strip it of its historical memory.
10. DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF MUSEOLOGY

In the chapter on the formation of museology, we reached roughly the 1980s, the culmination of efforts to shape, establish and self-define museology as an independent scientific discipline. This stream of museological thinking was associated with the names of Bauer, Šola, Maroevič, Ennenbach, Swiecimski, Waidacher and others. In our opinion, most significantly with the names of Stránský and Gluziński. We call this the Central European school, which is not very accurate, because the Russian Razgoň, the Brazilian Russio and the Argentinian Rusconi and many others also contributed to its development. However, Western Europe and the pragmatic American continent have gone their own way, and these approaches have quickly met with a strong response around the world and need to be further explored. The basic problem of all „new museologies“ is the complete mixing up of the concepts of museology (theory of the discipline) and the museum sphere (a practical field of human activity).

10.1 New museology and ecomuseology

The so-called new museology was established in the early 1970s together with its most visible aspect – ecomuseology or the ecomuseum sphere. These concepts were soon transformed into the establishment of specific museums, articles or publications. However, novelty is a cultural asset that rapidly losing its value. „New museology“ is already decades old. We believe that this movement already has its most creative stage behind it and the time has come to take stock and consolidate. We should answer the fundamental questions of whether the „old“ museology is dead and belongs only to textbooks of the history of the discipline, or we are witnessing some kind of convergence of the new museology with traditional forms of museology, or whether what is following or will follow has or will have an even more radical, i.e. a „newer“ form.

The 1960s marked a change in the theoretical thinking in our field. The first independent departments of museology are beginning to emerge, and the professional public is not looking at the practicist aspects of things, but rather is solving general problems. If in May 1968 Parisian students attacked museums as well, as symbols of something old, cold, and lifeless, as part of their „great rejection“ of the current way of life (as put by Herbert Marcus), this attitude of the public could not fail to be reflected in the theoretical thinking of museologists.

73) The acknowledged author Barbara Kirschenblatt-Gimblett believes that the emergence of these currents is linked to the English language and the Anglo-Saxon space, as well as to the publication of Verge’s book The New Museology, and to the fall of communism (Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 2015). In practice, the term was used by André Desvallées at the latest in 1981 (Desvallées 1981). Peter van Mensch mentions the use of the term, albeit in a different context, as early as 1971 and even in 1958 (van Mensch 1992).

74) Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) accuses humanity, for example, of owning fast cars, which we use to gain recognition. Man „finds his soul“ in these and becomes their mere appendage. Another member of the Frankfurt school, Erich Fromm (1900-1980), also comes to similar critical conclusions, which we can find in the title of his most famous book To Have or to Be? (For more, see Dolk 2018).
However, former Czech President Václav Klaus recently pointed out that something completely different was at stake for the students of Paris and the actors of the „Prague Spring“, both from 1968. The Czechoslovaks were calling for a return to the liberal values of the West. The Parisians (like Americans and others at the time) were calling for radical changes in the free world (Klaus 2020). Let us add that the banners in the hands of Parisian students were significant, with their inscriptions: Mao, Marx, Marcuse. From that time, a broad, often contradictory direction of „New Museology“ began to form, which with the „new“ prefix wanted to differentiate itself from the old approaches. It arose from dissatisfaction with the slowness of how museum workers were responding to cultural, social and political developments. At the heart of the new museology is the effort to bring people together to know themselves, to develop their abilities, to express their strivings and to lead them to a responsible attitude towards their own cultural and natural heritage. According to Peter van Mensch, a second museum revolution is taking place at this time, which goes hand in hand with the new museology movement. We have dealt with this issue earlier in more detail (Dolák 2002, 2004, 2018).

The basic elements that should guide museum work in the present and the future were formulated in 1972 at the „The Importance and Development of Museums in the Contemporary World“ conference in Santiago de Chile, setting out the principles of the so-called integrated museum (museo integral). From 20 to 31 May 1972 meetings, field visits and encounters were carried out, which culminated in resolutions that were followed by the signing of the Declaración de Santiago. According to Andrea Hauenschild, the objective of the „new museum“ is to create identity, manage everyday life, and develop socially. The basic principle is a comprehensive, radical orientation towards the public. The basic features are small institutions, local funding, decentralization, participation, equal-rights teamwork. The new museum strives for: complete reality, interdisciplinarity, thematic orientation, the connection of the past, present and future, cooperation with local and regional organizations (according to Waidacher 1999, 80).

In central Europe, and not only in the part behind the Iron Curtain, the methods of this museum work were recognized, but the whole concept of „new museology“ was rather called into question. According to F. Waidacher, it was not yet clear whether „the new museology will really provide new starting points for dealing with the museum phenomenon, or whether its motivations come from non-museological sources“ (Waidacher 1999, 95). Leaving aside possible individual motives, it seems that the main desire of this movement was rather the social moment of handling objects rather than the ethics of conservation (preservation). Some radical „New Museology“ theorists even go so far as to directly question the museum’s obligation to retain items permanently, demanding that collected items be consumed, for example, as part of educational programmes, something which at the very least requires extremely in-depth analyses. There would then be the danger that our descendants would be left with only depictions of certain items or discussions of them (Waidacher 1999, 95). This would be a complete denial
of the museum as we have so far understood it, as a place where objects are collected as a legacy to future generations.

The decisive presentations by these theorists took place in London in 1983, then in Quebec and a year later (exactly on 13 October 1984) at the international seminar on the Ecomuseum in New Museology and in January 1985 in Lisbon. The Declaration of Quebec points out that museology should include the audience (consumer) in its activities and increasingly rely on interdisciplinarity, modern methods of communication and management in order to attract consumers. New museology is meant to be a way for people to learn from themselves and from each other. There was also a call from Quebec (the leader was the Canadian Pierre Mayrand) to set up a committee on ecomuseology within ICOM. The movement is critical of traditional views, striving for the fastest possible response of museums to social change, something which can certainly not be rejected. According to Peter Vergo (Vergo 2000, 3)75 old museology is too much about museum work methods while the new is about the meaning of museums.

Within the broad current of „new museology“, so-called neighbourhood museums were established as a new type of museum, as part of the civil rights struggle in the United States in the 1960s. Museums dealing with gender issues, so-called community museums, etc. went in a similar direction. In many museums in the USA the so-called outreach idea developed, with the slogan „not only a museum“, etc. Jacques Hainard is committed to the museology of the coup (Hainard 1987).

The current of „new museology“ also includes eco-museology, the development of which is associated with the names of two Frenchmen, Hugues de Varine-Bohan and Georges Henri Riviere (1897–1985). This is the development of a new type of museum, which puts at its focus the relationship of man to the environment, presenting the impact of industrial development on the economic, social and cultural conditions of a certain area. The ecomuseum is a cultural institution that with the participation of the population systematically secures research, protection of the presentation and evaluation of a set of natural and cultural values representing the environment and the related way of life in a given territory.

Thus, an ecomuseum collects, documents, researches, preserves and presents an extensive natural and cultural situation, but works in an interdisciplinary fashion, applying to a supervised defined territory, in which it is represented by so-called antennas, involves the population in various activities, while the community maintains the museum. This is a direction that seeks to use museum means to capture the documentation of nature and society in a given territory, while gathering together its historical, monument and scientific aspects, with the direct participation of the community.

---

75) Vergo’s comparison here of museums with the coelacanth is elegant; during its development from embryo to adulthood, the brain shrinks significantly in relation to the size of the body, until it finally takes up a negligible place in the whole volume of the body. The museum body (the number of museums) is undoubtedly growing, but what about the brain?
Of course, such a broad definition allows for different interpretations. The founding fathers themselves (de Varine-Bohan) had to say with regret that the term „eco-museum has started gradually to be used by too many people for too many things“. At first glance, there are clear parallels between the ecomuseums and the so-called homeland museums in Central Europe, but they do not have the same approach. So what is so innovative about ecomuseums? It is precisely that immediate connection with the environment and interests of society. Society itself directly dictates what the museum will do, members of society with an interest in the matter are direct curators of the museum and the museum professional is only a professional translator, implementer or conciliator of sometimes conflicting interests! The ecomuseum must cleverly balance between those activities aimed at intensifying social life and promoting the scientific interest (meaning history, ethnology, etc.) and we could formulate even more, similar problems. If there is a „water museum“ in Gemont – Italy (Dolák 2018), which deals with the documenting of everything related to water (streams, rivers, bridges over rivers, etc.) and the communication of these facts (e.g. by building nature trails, through excursions, etc.), this is undoubtedly a positive activity, as are the activities of the vast majority of ecomuseums. In this case, the famous sentence from de Varine-Bohan that the ecomuseum does not have visitors but residents, is very true. We can put aside the question of whether this eco-museum is still a museum. However, it is definitely not the result or application of a new field of science called „ecomuseology“. It is a new concept of working with the public, one which, however, does not conflict with existing theoretical principles.

One summary of the issue is Peter Davis’s book: Ecomuseum. A Sense of Place (Davis 1999), which was not very well received in the Francophone environment. Peter Howard (Howard 2003) rightly points out that today’s visitors to ecomuseums are almost exclusively tourists and not locals, and that ecomuseums have obtained considerable resources from local sources for their establishment, but the next generation has almost lost interest in them. Kateřina Štěpánová is positive about the “new museology”, especially the “active component of collection presentation” (Štěpánová 2016, 117–118). A certain „loosening“ of the social sciences, observable in western Europe since the early 1970s, may have affected all the social science disciplines. The leading Czech archaeologist Prof. Vladimir Podborský (Podborský 2003) has more than once heaved a sigh over the „new archaeology“, „post-processual approaches“, the departure from their own research traditions, the loss of its own identity. Approaches have found their way even into archaeology, saying that the result of scientific cognition is not the truth, but only a paradigm or even just a scientific myth, there is a penetration of essayism or even free imagination into the specialized text. „You can also learn from paths that lead nowhere,“ says Professor Podborský (Podborský 2001, 11). Another Czech archaeologist, Professor Evžen Neustupný, has also distanced himself from post-processual archaeology, which contains unacceptable theses about the subjectivity of all archaeological knowledge, linking the progress of archaeology with liberal, left-wing or directly socialist ideologies (Neustupný 1991, 368). This author also calls for „a synthesis of structures“ (Neustupný 2006).
How to conclude this wide-ranging discussion on the „new museology“? The basic problem is the mixing up of the phrases museum sphere and museology. If „new museology“ were to replace „old museology,“ then it never existed. After all, new forms of work in an education centre are not „new culturology“. In the works of the „new museologists“ we do not find adequate arguments for the basic features of a new science, completely different from other sciences. The actual scientific system of the „new museology“ is not significantly in conflict with the so-called „old museology“. If we accept the term „new museum“ with some reluctance, then the term „new museology“ is even darker. Rather, we should understand the „new museology“ as a specific branch of the field of museology as such, of museology without attributes. There is one science called physics, but within the specialization it is divided into a number of fields – nuclear and applied physics, astrophysics, etc. In all these branches, there is a kind of „basic physics“ and its laws, such as gravity. At most in this way can we further divide museology into sub-fields, one of which is the „new museology“, at the focus of which are the social functions of the museum. „New museology“ addresses work with the visitor and the topics it sets before him. The „old museologists“ wrote about working with the visitor in general, but did not address the detailed topics of presentation. They tried to grasp the theory of the discipline.

At first glance, it is clear that the adjective „new“ itself is less than a happy one, can also be confusing and was partly understood by its creators as a marketing move; however this also applies to all the „new sciences“, such as new cultural history, etc. According to Peter Burke, one of the main slogans of the so-called new cultural history is „practice“, i.e. everyday practice. Thus, the history of religious practice instead of theology, the history of speech instead of the history of linguistics, etc. Burke also includes collecting among these practices and demonstrates the growing interest in this phenomenon of culture (Burke 2011, 81). Historians' interest in material culture has been evident since the 1980s. We need not doubt the growing need to research museum collections in this context, nor the deepening of ties between the museum and society. Nevertheless, we conclude this chapter with a reference to the classics of world philosophy.

Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592), in his essay „On Solitude“, emphasized the ability to resist the temptation to agree thoughtlessly with the crowd, so this was not just about physical solitude. He condemns our desire to obtain recognition at any cost from those close to us. According to him, too much attention to the opinions of others harms us either because we will eventually imitate those who are evil, or hatred towards them will devour us so much that we lose our minds (Buckingham, W.; Burnaham, D.; Clive, H.; King, J.P.; Marenbon, J.; Weeks, M.; 2013, 108–109). Friedrich Nietzsche was also against any mindless following of the crowd. Nietzsche is referred to mainly by those who hate any authority. It should be noted that every museum should be a kind of professional authority. Full acceptance of the view that what the public wants is always the best would lead to the complete destruction of the field of museology.
10.2 Critical museology

Changes in “western” society in the early 1970s caused not only a boom in „new museums”, but also in new directions in the thinking of many of the social sciences (sociology, cultural anthropology and many others), which resulted in the establishment of many schools, even university facilities with the word „critical” in their title. The representatives of these try to differentiate themselves from the previous approaches and sometimes do indeed bring about new perspectives and knowledge, but sometimes they question everything achieved so far, the alternative nature of their approaches is sometimes without bounds. While in common parlance we use the terms good, correct, in scientific speech words such as „empirical”, „rational” and „critical” are used. We must interpret the term„critical studies“ as „correct studies”. Then this expression acquires a certain ideological nature, it is not neutral, the expression does not serve to clarify reality, but to suggest positive or negative feelings. It would be worth examining whether these „critical studies”, by (in some cases) their departure from science, which must by its nature be critical, are in fact „non-critical”. The representatives of the so-called Frankfurt School are considered the spiritual fathers or direct founders of all possible critical studies (critical pedagogy, critical psychology, etc.); with these debated a wealth of not only more conservative thinkers but also sociologists from the opposite viewpoint, such as Zygmund Bauman (Bauman 2002, 69–86). Critical theory reproaches science for a lack of self-reflection leading to technocracy and manipulation and contributing to the birth of totalitarianism. The representatives of critical theory considered themselves „non-dogmatic Marxists.”

The instrumentality of reason, which examines not to understand but to master, is described in Max Horkheimer’s book The Dialectic of the Enlightenment as the dark side of the legacy of the Enlightenment. We recall this argument because the creation of the earliest museums was linked to the Enlightenment. How do significant authors comment on this situation in the field of culture? „Intellectuals have rejected the current notion that only what persists for centuries can be a cultural object, or that there is a clear line between art and life.” „The sensibility of the 1960s is only relevant as proof that the aesthetics of shock and sensation have eventually resulted in a dull triviality,” writes Daniel Bell (1919–2011) in his book The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (Janďourek 2001). Maybe this is why some artists, not unlike drug addicts, reach for increasingly provocative depictions and performances.

The Czech philosopher Václav Bělohradský writes: „Unrestricted information flows in an age of communication excess have caused the current collapse of the opinion-forming function of public spaces, since they have fragmented historical groups of opinion.” (Bělohradský 2016). According to Bělohradský, post-modern society is internally united in that only solidarity, and not objectivity, is believable (Bělohradský 2011). As Claes Oldenburg put it harshly a long time ago: „I'm for art that can do anything but sit on your ass in a museum” (Petříček 1995).
It is not without interest that the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk, in his famous defence (partly against Jürgen Habermas, a generation older), warned against a muzzled society and declared critical theory dead (Sloterdijk 1999).

The establishment of critical studies did not pass museology by either. According to Peter van Mensch, we can divide museology into the empirical-theoretical and the praxeological. The second is called applied museology or museography. The third approach is the so-called philosophical museology, the cultivation of which began in the early 1970s under the influence of the Frankfurt School and its “critical school”. Its proponents speak of a new museology, ecomuseology or “community museology”. According to van Mensch, this new approach is a symbiosis of both of these approaches. Pavel Šopák places the emergence of critical museology in the late 1970s. The starting point for him is the lack of the obvious existence of the museum. For him, museums are a place of disenchantment for him (a reference to Max Weber). The consequences are twofold: the museum articulates authoritative interpretations and thus ceases to be attractive (most of all in eastern Europe in the second half of the 20th century), and further, the museum promotes depersonalized to sanitary principles looking inwards, leading to managerialism and bureaucracy at the expense of expertise. If critical museology understands the museum as a tool for the specific repression and manipulation of people, then the principles of managerialism and bureaucracy make the museum a place of repression for the museologists themselves, thwarting their creative efforts and work. According to Šopák, the concept of today’s museum, based on technical elements, does not disturb the centuries-old idea of the museum, because people will always come to the museum (as before) to enjoy things in their magic, mysterious closedness and at the same time in their openness to numerous associations of meaning. In this way, “a separate phenomenology and museology and hermeneutics of the museum” could be defined. Šopák does not see a crisis of the museum in its bureaucracy, but that the museum as an institution reflects the crisis of modern science (Šopák 2012, 12).

So how is it with this critical museology? Petra Šobáňová noticed the social dimension of this concept in the Czech environment (Šobáňová 2012a, 2015); in the Slovak environment Petra Hanáková and Dita Csütörtökyová worked on this concept in their dissertations. An anthology edited by Mária Orišková (Orišková 2006) devotes considerable space to the issue as does her own article written in English (Orišková 2015).

It is not at all easy to come up with a simple definition of critical museology; this is a very eclectic and sometimes contradictory movement. Geographically, it is most prevalent in the Anglo-Saxon countries, Spain and Latin America; in Canada, there is even a journal entitled Critical Museology Miscellanea. From the discipline point of view, these are constructions created mainly by museum workers (museologists) in association with artists, architects, art historians, cultural anthropologists and ethnologists. This association is not accidental, these are ethnologists (cultural
anthropologists) who see their collections partly through the prism of art. Their criticism is, among other things, addressed to the fact that seemingly higher „white“ art is collected in galleries, while „non-white“ art is stored in ethnological museums. This may be true, but we would certainly find not only negatives but also positives in this approach. An Indian mask stored (exhibited) in an ethnological museum may, in the context of other facts, have higher informative power than an isolated image (or the mask itself) in a gallery.

We believe that a fairly sophisticated explanation of critical museology is provided by Laurajane Smith, a professor from Canberra, Australia, and a long-term collaborator of the Reinwardt Academy in Amsterdam, in her book All Heritage is Intangible. Critical Heritage Studies and Museums (Smith 2012). One needs to reflect on the title of the book. Is all heritage truly intangible? Seen from the „top floor“, then yes. Everything that is protected is protected by humans, is selected and evaluated by humans, so the reason for that protection is somewhere in the human mind, or in the higher functions of the central nervous system. However, this fact was pointed out earlier, for example within the ICOFOM commission (Martin Schärer, Jan Dolák). However, it is undeniable that many heritage bearers are material in nature, and this will now be the focus of our attention. Smith relies on the often quoted author David Lowenthal (1923-2018) and his now classic text The Past is a Foreign Country (Lowenthal 1985). The already provocative title of the book evokes a number of questions. Is the past really a foreign country? If so, for whom, for everyone, for all or only parts of the past?

Smith honestly „encloses“ his concept within the Anglo-Saxon countries, by which he distinguishes a double heritage. The first is the so-called authorized heritage (houses, archaeological sites, etc.), which is finished, non-renewable, even downright false, inherently conservative, very fragile, since it needs the constant care of museum curators, archaeologists, etc. It is torn out from active use, it is unchanging. However, there is another legacy alongside this – personal perception, projection of protected objects and customs. So what visitors do in museums is, according to Smith, heritage making.

According to Smith, (real) heritage is something vital and alive, it is a moment of action, not something frozen in material form. Heritage is not one definitive event, but a whole set of activities involving remembrance, commemoration, transfer of knowledge and experience, the application and expression of social and cultural ranks and meanings. Heritage thus creates and restores social relations. Heritage is a cultural process or an embodied performance. So, according to Smith, professionals want (unfortunately in her view) to create „heritage stories“ and they are looking for locations and objects as representatives through which they want

76) Prof. Smith is even the co-founder of The Association of Critical Heritage Studies, which is “A network of scholars and researchers working in the broad and interdisciplinary field of heritage and museum studies. Its primary aim is to promote heritage as an area of critical inquiry”. Quoted from: http://www.criticalheritagestudies.org/
to document their stories. So this is where a „critical rethinking“ of the whole area of heritage begins. A basic element is pointing out a certain dissonance between formal practices on the one hand and the community, use and interpretation of heritage on the other. Some authors even write about Heritage that Hurts (Staher-Wagstaff, also Uzzel and Ballantyne).  

This is an obvious mixing up of history and heritage, which is certainly not the same thing. Atrocities undoubtedly took place at Auschwitz, which is not one of the bright points in human history. But today, we want to protect this former camp, a museum, as heritage to be a warning, literally to educate. So heritage is something we want to protect, something we want to remember, whether it relates to light or dark events. It should be noted that only a minimum of events in history can be understood in black and white, it is difficult to apply any optics of „good and evil“ to most scientific processes whose documents are also stored in museums as heritage (geology, zoology, etc.).

One important circumstance needs to be pointed out here. The museum has always been thought of as a device of memory. Memory is something that our brain (or our culture or civilization) considers it important to preserve. Heritage is not created by our imaginings over buildings, archaeological sites, etc., or by the implementation of museum pedagogical programmes in museums.

Laurajane Smith describes the situation in the Anglo-Saxon world until the 1960s, which we can additionally explain by saying that the United Kingdom had colonies, let us call them territories with subordinate („lesser“) nations, Canadian Indians did not have full voting rights, in the USA the signs „only for whites“, „only for blacks“ were common, and the children of Australian Aboriginals were taken away from their parents for re-education. Until this time, „non-white“ hardly ever went to museums. Thus, subordinate, social, cultural and ethnic groups were either not represented in museums or were portrayed as invisible, as politically marginal. To a certain extent, we can also include Africa and a large part of Asia in this. Although museums did exist here, they were created from a „white man’s perspective.“ After the overthrow of colonialism, the locals wanted to present and explain their history not as the history of ethnographically „others“, meaning exotic or even inferior people, but as their own heritage, based on their own discourse. Since the late 1960s, heritage here has become not only a major social element, but no less a political element, an argument in the acquisition of political and civil rights. Property relations, i.e. determining what they actually belongs to whom, has also played an important role. The situation in Latin America was somewhat similar. After the independence of these countries, society, and thus culture, were being formed as part of the „developed Western world“, in practice derived from the culture of the former colonizers, and not from the traditions of the natives, Incas, Aztecs, etc.

---

77) In 2014, a conference organized by Andrea Rihter in Ljubljana, Slovenia, was dedicated to so-called dissonant heritage, pointing to the limited number of exhibitions in Italy dedicated to Italian fascism, to the problematic monuments created in the former Yugoslavia after 1945, etc. The author of this text also dealt with the attack on the whole system of consonant x dissonant inheritance (Rihter, A. Huremovich, T. 2013).
In the 1960s, there were major changes in museums associated with generally democratic processes. Thus, "subjects“ become equal citizens, whose voice and view of history, should be heard. Indeed, the 1960s can be considered a significant milestone in the world of museums.

But how to evaluate and understand these changes? If the heritage of minority groups was marginalized, these were political influences that had little to do with museology. If until the 1960s elements of heritage were insufficiently known and interpreted, then this was more a failure of historians and archaeologists than of museologists. Honest criticism of sources and their placement in the contemporary framework, in the culture of the time, have always been the cornerstone of any historical science, and therefore cannot be considered a entirely revolutionary project. However, we do not underestimate the level of historians or ethnologists of the time, for example in Australia. They knew that the truth was different from what the official positions required, but there was no interest in this „different truth.“ Here it is necessary to realize that other parts of the world went a different way; in the 1960s, for example in Slovakia, but also in the USSR, China, India and elsewhere, no „new nations“ were discovered, that is, the Anglo-Saxon (including French, Belgian, etc.) concept of museums is not fully transferable to the whole world and has only a minimum in common with museology.

The American Professor Douglas Crimp (1944-2019) is considered to be another prominent figure in critical museology. Following Foucault and his pair of madness shelters, disease clinics and prison crime, he defines the museum as another prison institution with the discipline of art history. He compares the efforts of museums to explain the world to the main characters of Gustave Flaubert’s novel Bouvard and Pécuchet, two scribes who, after moving to the countryside, devoted themselves to all sorts of things, including archaeology and the study of nature (Crimp 1998).

However, because in practice they were dilettantes at everything, all their efforts failed.78 “The museum has been a discredited institution since its inception,” writes Crimp (Crimp 1998, 135).

We do not believe that we would have to evaluate the history of museology so strictly, i.e. as the sum of only amateurish, in practice ridiculous practices, but with ridiculous results. However, most of Crimp’s text is not about the museum, but about photography, a key post-modern medium; photography is a museum without walls and stands in opposition to modernism as a museum art. He relies on the well-known concept of André Malraux (1901-1976) „the museum without walls“, which is again mainly about photography and its place in the current museum discourse.

The British museologist Eilean Hooper-Greenhill writes that museums have always operated under the imperative of power games, social, political and economic imperatives, have danced according to all kinds of whistles, and the result

is a history of errors rather than a history of truth. In relation to museums, there are a number of incompatible and mainly conceivable rationalities, none represents a lower evolutionary stage, we live in post-historical times (Hanáková 2005, 22). This view cannot be accepted either.

One of the most cited authors in critical museology is Donald Preziosi, author of Rethinking Art History. According to him, the museum is an omnipotent, influential institution filtering perceptions and cognition of the modern world. Preziosi puts the museum, art history (he calls art history museography) into a relationship with the very Enlightenment project of modernity. Art has become a model for all output, art history has retold history itself, Europe has become its own museum display case. History is a museographic artefact. The modern museum and art history are two sides of the same coin, firmly welded together by the concept of museography. According to Preziosi museums divided the world into the museological and the non-museological, into objects worthy and not worthy of a museum. Similarly, Stephan Bahn asks: Has history created the museum or has the museum created history, is art history a consequence or the cause of art museums? Today, art projects inspired by proto-museum forms of exhibiting and their seemingly pataphysical exhibits are emerging, the artistic strategy is mystic – a fusion of historical and mysterious and pataphysical (satirical, absurd) objects, today’s artists are interested in the bizarre, pathological, in favour the miraculous and obscure, cultural-programme mystifications, e.g. Jan Svěrák’s The Oil Guzzlers (Dolák 2016a).

What position to take on these statements? At first glance, there is evident here an aesthetic „artistic vision of the world”, i.e. a hypertrophy of the influence of art on everything, on the entire history of mankind. From museological positions, the mention of „objects worthy and not worthy of museums” is interesting. Here is (according to critical museologists) is that influence of the museum, filtering, etc. On this we must say that the vast majority of museum curators work differently. The palaeontologist examining a locality takes objects from the creator (nature or God) into the collections, mainly according to their „added value” (museality). In many cases, it is a matter of the integrity, the preservation of that object. An archaeologist, for that matter, works in a similar way. This curator is not manipulating the future visitor over what is worthy or not worthy of museums from artistic positions. It almost seems as if the artists represented in the museum (gallery) have an understanding of this institution; but not those who are not represented.

A significant phenomenon of current museological considerations is the issue of decolonization and the so-called under-representation of minorities, etc. Critical museology also draws on postcolonial studies, i.e. what role the museum played in colonization as an allegedly exceptionally effective tool of the Western cultural hegemony.79

79) At this point, it should be recalled once more that during colonialism (in Africa) and until the 1960s in Australia, the natives (Aboriginals) for example, did not go into museums. If museums were the „effective tools” of any hegemony at all, these were only projections in the minds of the conquerors, colonizers about the subjugated peoples. The influence (hegemony) of these museums on the natives themselves was minimal.
Leading Czech gallerist, associate professor Tomáš Pospiszyl, gives an example from Baltimore, where into an exhibition dedicated to presenting the lives of upper middle class whites, the artist, black himself, placed the shackles of slaves and a Ku Klux Klan hood and named his project Mining the Museum (Pospiszyl 1996). If we reject the somewhat lofty name of the exhibition project, we must state that if this museum wanted to present the life of whites, it worked well. With the addition of „non-white“ artifacts, the exposition has become far more graphic in terms of showing life in the United States. However, we still remain on museum grounds, the performer does use a form of museum discourse to communicate, there is no „undermining“ of the museum, indeed quite the opposite. This gallerist may „undermine“ some stereotypical conceptions about history, but not the essence of the museum and its manner of discourse.

The refrain of today is to let different cultures, often racial, ethnic, sexual minorities etc., tell their own stories. That certainly cannot be rejected. However, Petra Hanáková has correctly noted that otherness is becoming a cliché, an opportunistic category, abused by artists and curators in an effort to comply with the current trend. What if the range of those marginal groups is really just a response to Western demand, to its desire for otherness? Thanks to artistic nomadism (organizing various biennials around the world), we meet the top fifty artists and their mentors everywhere. As if stepping out of the colonial paradigm was not possible, as if through trying to escape, paradoxically, the colonial gesture was further confirmed (Hanáková 2005, 31).

Dutch literature theorist Mieke Bal airs extraordinarily radical views. According to Bal the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York understands our culture as the highest form of human endeavour, artefacts are dated and authorized. The culture of the „others“ is exhibited in the American Museum of Natural History as products of a timeless culture, as traces of civilization on the path of man to civilization. This museum is a victim of its own colonial history, but also a culprit and accomplice of dominant cultures. According to Bal, it is necessary to set the mirror to a view of oneself. She directly suggests placing mirrors in the expositions, which would not only allow a simultaneous tour of the colonial museum and its post-colonial self-criticism, but would itself embody self-reflection, mislead the viewer, confuse pedestrians who would then lose their way across evolution, but this panic, this roaming would undoubtedly have a certain pedagogical content for them (Hanáková 2005, 36–38). Forgetting for a moment the museographic aspects (visitor safety), the idea that the purpose of a museum or pedagogy is to confuse a person is entirely wrong.

Let us focus on language realities for a while. A number of misunderstandings also occur through the use of different languages. Francois Mairesse (Mairesse 2015) has rightly pointed out the fact that the contemporary world is markedly English-speaking. In particular, the two World Wars in the 20th century have made English a lingua franca, and the collapse of the Soviet bloc also led to an exchange of Russian for English. Central Europe also began to speak (perhaps even think)
more in English. No one can deny the significant contribution of the Anglo-Saxon world to the development of science and culture, including museology. However, it is as if we are taking over not only a knowledge of the language, but also its conceptual vocabulary, its philosophical conception of the world, and even its terminology, and as we show in the above examples, we take over even foreign problems, often of the English-speaking world, as our own. And we see in this some major pitfalls. However, Petra Hanáková correctly asks:

„But what if the only language that can be spoken and heard is, in the end, the increasingly dominant English?“ (Hanáková 200, 36). According to her, the „western point of view“ persists in the field of art and quotes Mladen Stilinovič’s well-known sentence: An artist who cannot speak English is no artist.80

A slightly more constrained view of critical museology is offered by the Costa Rican museologist, sociologist by education, Óskar Navarro (Navarro 2012, 28–33), influenced by the Amsterdam Reinwardt Academy, where he studied briefly in the 1970s. According to him, critical museology is a scientific discipline with a system that is already theoretically structured. It does not yet have specific doctrine principles. While traditional museology addresses internal activities (registration, research, cataloguing, exhibition of items), the area of critical museology transcends museum walls and studies the place and function of museums in society, their social, political and economic roots and their potential role in improving society. In his view, critical museology studies the relationships that humanity has established in certain parts of its environment, which includes not only the material environment, but also memory and the history of civilization as manifested over time. Navarro cites María del Mar Flórez Crespo, according to whom: „Critical museology grows out of the ongoing crisis of the concept of the museum as a space of interaction between the collection and the public.“ According to Navarro, there is a dual process:

- the first is the musealization process – item selection, research, registration, depositing,
- the item becomes heritage when (as soon as) it is exhibited or used as an educational tool.

We cannot agree with this. The awkward question might suggest itself as to whether an item transferred from an exposition to the depositary ceases to be heritage. However, the situation is completely different. The universe we live in is a legacy. From it we then choose what we consider worthy of protection, what

80) In a similar case, Peter van Mensch correctly cites works by Kilie Message, Andrea Wicomb and Janet Marstine, which mention only English-language sources in the “museum theory” passages; for them, „new museum theory“ did not begin until Vergo’s book was published in 1989 (van Mensch 2016, 23). The question is whether this is a manifestation of cultural arrogance or just a „democratization of genius“, i.e. the current confidence of many authors to write at any time and about anything. We are witnessing the „democratization of genius“ in all the social sciences and not only in those. Similarly, many „museologists“ also have an insurmountable desire to create their own theories after reading a few articles, something which has a devastating effect on the entire field. Arguing with the accent on modesty or humility is beyond the spirit of today.
we defend against the nature of change or extinction, and we consider that our heritage. This “considering it our heritage” relationship does not change whether the souvenir shell brought back from a summer seaside holiday is stored in a drawer or displayed on the sideboard. The palaeolithic Moravian Venus is a heritage of Slovakia, whether it is exhibited or not. It is indeed necessary for items that are sensitive to external influences (such as archival material) to not be exhibited or otherwise used for the larger part of the year.

Óskar Navarro pays the greatest attention to the insufficient settlement with pre-Columbian civilizations, indigenous peoples, etc. According to him, visitors should be encouraged to “falsify expositions” (a reference to Karl Popper). According to the critical museology, museums are to be places where (paraphrasing Karl Marx) “everything that is solid melts into the air, everything that is holy is desecrated, and one is finally forced to face up with sober senses to the real conditions of life.” And one’s relationships with one’s own kind.

The term critical museography is also used by the Zaragoza museologist Jesus Pedro Lorente (Lorente 2015). This author also draws on artistic positions. He writes that in the second half of the 20th century, museums and galleries exhibited on white walls on which pictures hung; the museum was like a sanctuary with artificial light, the visitor followed a predetermined route according to the modernist canon. Nothing encouraged visitors towards dialogue and discussion. He likens museums to temples, to Christian pilgrimages, they were “cathedrals of modernity.” Then came ecomuseology, but the goal of ecomuseology was rural areas, so the great museums remained untouched by this trend. But then in Paris two museums were established which broke the “museum temple paradigm”. These were the Pompidou Centre and the Musée d’Orsay, both in Paris.81 These two museums have been redefined by Lorente as a forum where people can walk without predefined itineraries and can look out of the windows at the splendid city, instead of being locked in windowless rooms. According to him, these two museums broke the modernist canon. Lorente then occasionally quotes the actually used terms post-museum 82 and anti-museum 83.

So critical museology is for Lorente some kind of “ecomuseology for the city", mostly for the gallery environment. Let us now set aside the struggle of art historians against the „white cube”. We believe that, on the contrary, a neutral space (the white cube) is ideal for staging anything, if necessary, for example, a tropical forest or even a room with windows. The assumption that a gallery with windows is always better than without them is a complete mistake, as to is to categorically associate any museum discourse, including that of an art museum, with the people and houses we can see from the window. This is somewhat reminiscent of the new Slovak National Gallery building in Bratislava. At the moment, let us not resolve whether it is beautiful or functional, but blaming the architect Vladimír Dedeček (1929–2020) for there being no windows facing the Danube (the southern side, where

81) Not surprisingly, in both cases these are galleries, i.e. Museums of art.
82) A term used by the British museologist Hooper-Greenhill.
83) Swedish museologist Kristina Ahmas uses the term „transmodern museum” (Ahmas 2009).
the sun shines the most, a factor damaging collections) is a profound mistake. The architect once said quite correctly: „Yeah, if you are going to the gallery to look at the river nearby, then I'm really sorry for you“.

Lorente lists a number of young artists who are associated with „institutional critique“, but rightly adds that those who work in „mining the museum“ have made the museum an object not only of their critique but also of their desire. It almost again gives the impression that all „theories“ depend on one thing. The artists who are represented in the collections (they have the fame and the money) are supporters of museums and the rest are quite the opposite. According to Lorente, critical anthropology, critical pedagogy, critical art history, critical archaeology, etc. have all been established. He also uses the terms reflexive museology, transformative museology, etc. Lorente admits that critical museologists have no common doctrine or acknowledged leader. Lorente relies on Hans Ulrich Obrist's book A Brief History of Curating, which, however, is not a real history, merely a compilation of several interviews with several curators, obviously only of contemporary art. Lorente also mentions the book by Dewdney, Dibosa, Walsh The Post Critical Museology, with the rather unsurprising subheading Theory and Practice in the Art Museum. Lorente admits a certain exhaustion of arguments and proposes closer connections (for practical reasons) with critical museography, calling for connections with other museums, not just with galleries and anthropological museums, and also not only in Britain and North America, but also in other parts of the planet.

Lorente has correctly noticed that critical museologists cite Foucault, Derrida, Adorno and other philosophers „for anything and everything“.

Otherwise, Lorente again refers to well-known topics – native art, plurality of opinions leading to a (desired) conflict, etc.

Lorente is sympathetic to the fact that more and more museums show through photographs how the same items were exhibited as today, but in earlier times, even with photographs of visitors of the time (Mexico City, Bogotá, the Vatican, Košice). According to Lorente, the attempt to open museums of „other voices“ can be characterized by an example from Costa Rica, where one museum organized a public competition for texts for an exposition, the winning texts were then placed in the exposition, including the names of the authors. Let us add that this approach is possible and perhaps sometimes even beneficial for exhibitions of modern art, but then not elsewhere. At this point, it is necessary to ask again the fundamental question of whether museums are about communication as such, i.e. „communication for communication's sake“, or rather about a given message, if not directly about education, then at least about learning.

84) Taken from: http://www.stream.cz/gebrianvs/10006884-slovenska-narodni-galerie#nejnovejsi
85) We believe that this logical requirement would (or should) lead to the destruction of the very basic postulates of critical museology.
86) Tony Bennett is endeavouring to combine the approaches of Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci (Bennett 1988).
87) By studying the texts, we have come to the serious suspicion that some authors not only did not understand the philosophers they cite, but perhaps did not even read them. They may base their constructions only on piecemeal information on Wikipedia, or taken from other authors.
Lorente insists on the subjectivity of each interpretation. In his view, the creators of expositions must be identified. He asks for their signatures on panels, listing their names, photos and CVs. Supplementary panels are sometimes signed by celebrities, unrelated to the exposition, most often in the United States. The Metropolitan Museum in New York even has audio guides presenting not only the exhibition but also the artist. Although the voice belongs to a native speaker, short passages are introduced by the artist himself, i.e. in his voice, in his native language. Janet Marstine calls this radical transparency. The Vancouver Museum of Natural History has worked in a similar way. While in our country (Slovakia, Czechia) guest books have been abandoned rather; in Vancouver, on the other hand, whiteboards are placed in the expositions so that visitors can express their opinions and attitudes there.

In another of his works, Lorente rightly points to the great proximity of new museology and critical museology, but with the former museology owing its origin to French-speaking countries, while the latter is a product of post-modern Anglo-Saxon culture (Lorente 2012). According to Peter van Mensch, it was Lynne Teather who, under the influence of the Reinwardt Academy in Amsterdam, used the term critical museology as early as 1983 (van Mensch 1992). Van Mensch admits that the distinction between new and critical museology is unclear, as they generally deal with similar attitudes. While the new (community) museology evokes positive impressions, the critical one does rather the opposite.

Another leading figure in critical museology is Prof. Anthony A. Shelton of Vancouver, author of the article De la antropología a la museología crítica y viceversa (Shelton 2011). The very title of the article – From Anthropology to Critical Museology and Back Again suggests the paths the author’s ideas have taken. In his view critical museology calls on museums to adopt more experimental practices, transparency and support for community involvement. He distinguishes it from new museology, reproaches Peter Vergem for never specifying how his new museology is different from the old one, represented by the Brno school. However, Shelton does not make this distinction either. According to Shelton, Desvalée’s and Mairesse’s distinction between museology and museography (so close to our conception) is quite incompatible with critical museology and, conversely, he praises Jacques Hainard’s book Le musée cannibale (Shelton 2013).

According to Shelton, there are actually three museologies:

• operational, including methods and techniques,
• critical, which studies that operational museology,
• praxiological (practical) – daily practice (Shelton 2011, 31).

According to Shelton, critical museology is predicated by four epistemological positions in opposition to operational museology and by six fundamental interdicts (prohibitions). From the epistemological point of view, Shelton points out that history is not unified, it is constructed in different ways, by different societies. According to him, every history is a constructed fiction and every fiction has its own history. Thus, critical museology seeks to save museology from objectivist history on the one hand and from psychological reductionism on the other. Museums derive their authority from an uncritical acceptance of empirical methods, from the theory of objectivity, but rather the relationship between the signifier and the signified must be addressed. One needs to attempt deconstruction (e.g. of ethnological expositions in the UK) and conduct a critical dialogue. The institution of the museum must be critically analysed, the separation of European and non-European cultures (by which is meant, in France) is wrong. According to Shelton, museums have recently been confronted with three factors that significantly affect their traditional function:

a) the demand for democratization (voices of other cultures, repatriation, etc.),

b) a greater emphasis on the tangible and intangible components of culture, for overall retotalization in expositions and associated programmes,

c) new technologies.

How to deal with the many conflicting attitudes within so-called critical museology? In our opinion, so-called critical museology must itself be subjected to a critical assessment. However, this does not mean rejecting all of critical heritage studies as a whole. This concept correctly draws attention to some problems that are not always fully understood and accepted, whether this is the issues of minorities, feminism, decolonization (and the related issues of restitution and repatriation), etc. So some kind of critical museum sphere yes, but critical museology no. We agree with A. Shelton that museums should be places for critical dialogue. In his doctoral thesis Peter Van Mensch (van Mensch 1992) combines the so-called new museology and critical museology, as an indivisible duo, with which one can completely agree. Typical for both is an emphasis on the social functions of the museum. On the other hand, so-called critical museology does not display the basic methodological features of the discipline, it does not improve on the basic postulates of central European museology (Stránský, Beneš, Waidacher, Maroevič and others), nor in the fields of methodology, terminology, collection theory, presentation theory, etc. What is more, it does not define itself in any way against the so-called old museology, i.e. it does not say in what way it improves on it, it has no solid philosophical or methodological basis. Its rather practicist recommendations lose their applicability outside the spheres of art, ethnology and cultural anthropology, and to a large extent also outside the English- and Spanish-speaking world. In other words, the incomparable is being compared. The representatives of the so-called „old museology“ tried to formulate the principles of an independent field of science and never wrote about the specific topics of museum work. So they did not address whether museums
should deal with gender issues, feminism or postcolonial traumas, etc. However the so-called new or critical museology is primarily about the topics of work in museums, and therefore the discussion about old and new museology takes the form of two parallel lines that can never intersect. Museology is a clear example of so-called sociologism, or more exactly of a sociological turn in science. According to the representatives of this trend, all knowledge has a social character, a social conditionality, which affects all sciences, but especially the humanities. This determinism defines the choice of problems, the way of presenting their solution, but also represents the influences of ideologies, value criteria, etc. According to the Czech philosopher Václav Bělohradský, „all ontology is sociology“.

This marked emphasis on an individual approach to the concept of heritage has its positive aspects. Their key element is the admission of more „voices“, more truths and a strong agnosticism, scepticism and value relativization, which cannot be entirely rejected. A mistrust of big stories is typical. However, the meaning of the word is lost, the material content of events and phenomena is uncertain, only images are preferred, of necessity distorted. The imaginations of the visitor at an archaeological site can only be images, of necessity distorted. Factors of self-realization and entertainment, the so-called civilization of desire, spectacular events, the adventure industry, etc. come to the fore. Ivana Žantovská correctly writes: „We are obsessed with communication as an activity much more than with searching for the meanings of the communication messages“ (Žantovská 2012, 85). In the field of culture, there is a certain medialisation of museums, i.e. museums behave similarly to journalists, without being able to admit it to themselves. It would be advisable to follow theoretical work in the field of media, to research, i.e. to understand, their methods of manipulation, etc. Today’s society is even referred to as a „performative society“ (Žantovská 2012, 90), a number of products are presented in the form of a theatrical performance, reality is staged. We are obsessed with the desire for self-expression, the pleasure of self-expression.

Museums are sometimes criticized for their alleged canonization of „the right stories from the past“, i.e. for choosing the right and the wrong, i.e. what to believe and what not. These approaches cannot be a priori rejected, but they must be analysed from the position of museology. We believe that it is necessary to distinguish and at least set certain limits for the basic parameters. Let us allow complete freedom in an artist’s work. Many excellent works were actually created as a result of the rebellion of „the young against the old“, we will allow a completely individual acceptance of a work of art by the visitor. The world of galleries is inextricably linked to art, but we would no longer allow „total“ freedom here. A good gallery manager should distinguish art from non-art. As Vincenc Kramář (1877–1960) at the National Gallery in Prague recognized the genius of Pablo Picasso, bought his paintings (relatively cheaply) and thus did not in terms of his programme collect other (less valuable) things. Let us admit a certain, but still lesser degree of manipulation in expositions dealing with history and ethnology. Although historians select more

89) We return, above all, to the attitudes of Laurajane Smith.

90) By this is meant, for example, world religions. Expressions such as evolution or continuity are replaced by significant discontinuity. It is as if we are to hold separate snippets of knowledge, so that we can adopt the views of a like-minded person without prejudice.
or less „hard data”, the Battle of Mohács did indeed take place in 1526, but they can sometimes be interpreted differently, and so can be manipulated. But any degree of manipulation in expositions of the Neolithic or the Tertiary is absolutely minimal, if any. Then to admit here a freedom of imagination about the life of a Neolithic peasant or about the life of a turtle in the Tertiary would be to entirely give up on science as such. Towards more recent history, the Austrian museologist Bernadette Biedermann (Biedermann 2015) rightly asks whether the current democratization trend benefits the promotion of the (desired) plurality of historical interpretations or rather leads to a disintegration of historical thought. Zygmund Bauman recalls Henry Ford’s famous 1916 statement that history is ... bunk. It is tradition. We don’t want tradition. We want to live in the present. Pierre Bourdieu sighed sadly that in order to control the future, one must have control over the present (Bauman 2002, 210–211). In other words, many people today believe that progress is not the work of history, but the work of we who live in the present. Let us add that a lack of interest in history would have a catastrophic effect on the existence of museums, but humanity would probably survive. The loss of historical memory would, in our view, have completely fatal consequences for humanity. It is worth considering whether the critics of the „manipulative museum“ are actually right, but exactly 180 degrees in the wrong direction. Thus, museums do not manipulate the public, by „forcing“ it to admire Picasso’s paintings (generally recognized quality), or by stating that the Slovak National Uprising began in 1944, etc.

The manipulation may be exactly the opposite. By letting the visitor freely dream of anything, some „critical museums“ detach him from reality, from truth, from science, and thus put him at the mercy of deliberate manipulators, including political ones. It is precisely the loss of historical memory that makes us defenceless against external influences.

10.3 Reflexive museology

The most important supporter of so-called reflexive museology is the Brazilian professor Bruno Brulon Soares, strongly influenced by the positions of Bruno Latour, Pierre Bourdieu and the British cultural anthropologist Victor Turner (1920–1983). What exactly is reflexivity? With reference to Dieter Claessens (1921–1997), Jan Keller understands reflexivity as the ability to critically assess one’s own behaviour (Keller 1992, 62). The same writes about reflexive modernity with reference to Ulrich Beck (The Risk Society – published in 1986). Modernity once subjected traditional society to implacable criticism, pointing to the established conditions and practices under feudalism and under absolutist princes. However, modernity has now aged, it has not fulfilled its promises and expectations, it is necessary to subject its results to criticism, and therefore it is necessary to replace it with something else at today’s turning point – with reflexive modernity (Keller, Novotný, 89-91).91

91) Of interest is Keller’s statement that: „The state is disappearing right in front of our eyes, and at the same time sociology is still developing on the principle of nation-states in the form of French, German, American sociology, etc.“ (p. 89). We believe that the situation in museology is similar, albeit with some delay. Peter Burke also writes: „There are national styles or traditions in cultural history, just as in anthropology or even – to a lesser extent – in the natural sciences.“ (Burke 2011, 161).
According to Ulrich Beck (1944–2015), modern society is a threat to itself, by its completely normal, routine, everyday functioning. Beck therefore deals with the study of „reflexive“ i.e. the „second“ modernity.

Beck is interpreted similarly by Jiří Přibáň (Přibáň 2005). Society has lost control of the processes necessary for its own existence. Therefore, it is necessary to move towards a different modern, a so-called reflexive one, which would be able to preserve modern values while minimizing the risks caused by the modernization of society. In this context, Přibáň asks whether Beck’s reflexively apocalyptic description of society is not just another attempt to save the authority of science at the time of its disintegration by taking into account the ethics of the inner voice of the scientist and society as a whole.

According to Harold Garfinkel, reflexivity is a description of how people structure their day-to-day activities. Thus they support the assumption that the world is truly what it seems to them to be (Keller 1992, 127). These are highly routine types of behaviour.

According to Šopáč, “Museology of the 18th to the 20th centuries speaks of an autoreflex of modernity. And that is markedly ambiguous; in other words, museum activity itself has a reflexive nature, in that lies its true purpose, at the same time this reflection defines the museum sphere as such for those who deal with it (Šopáč 2012, 9).

This somewhat heterogeneous summary of the concept of reflexivity has one thing in common: the feeling of crisis, the need for change, the need for self-reflection on one’s own field, including the formation of new basic ideas and approaches. It is understood completely differently from Lynne Teatcher’s conception (see above). But let us return to the original concept of the Brazilian professor, whose focus is on the so-called new museology. Soares strongly favours the social functions of the museum and advocates experimental museology, which allegedly separated from new museology in the early 1980s. It is based on „reflective theory“, examining all the players involved in the process of musealization. Experimental museology includes:

1. individual and collective experience in the social space,
2. permanent (ongoing) evaluation of museum practices,
3. strengthening of local groups,
4. social changes leading to the development of new practices.

Soares’ assertion that it is not easy to imagine building museality without the foundations of museum practice is important for our purposes. There are no completely prepared models for museums and museology. All models are valuable because it is not our role – of museologists and social players – to judge experiences in hierarchical terms (Soares, 2017). So museologists should be interested in man and in life, and not just in objects and death. The museum is not just a neutral mirror, but also a witness and a player. A dead museum is useless, it must not

92) Evidently under the influence of Turner.
be a cancer or a cyst, but a nerve ganglia, an instrument of creativity. The aim of the museum is not to present a mould or a system of references, but to prompt individual and collective reflection.

Soares explained his concept on the pages of the Bulletin of the Czech Association of Museums and Galleries. According to him, the museum should not be a mirror, but a reflective institution. The museum worker is primarily an intermediary, so it is a great advantage not to be an expert in the field (evidently meaning, not to be an expert in palaeontology, ethnology, etc.) (Soares 2016, 13). Soares also explains his concept in an anthology devoted directly to Stránský’s influence on Latin American museology (Soares 2017a). Soares is heavily influenced by de Varine-Bohan.

We do not at all question the Brazilian professor’s appeal to the need for individual and collective thinking within the museum expositions. We only add that they should be based on true and, if possible, depoliticized information presented in the expositions. Against a hypertrophied emphasis on one’s own imagination, we can perhaps recall the main idea of the French philosopher Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), according to which imagination is the most powerful force in man and one of the main sources of error and most often leads to deception. Because our imagination usually misleads us, the beauty, justice, and happiness that it creates will also be misleading. Pascal formulated his ideas in relation to the religious conditions of his day, i.e. against free-thinkers, but perhaps his ideas are also valid more generally, that is, in the present day.

10.4. The museum as predator

The museum is considered by some theorists to be a predator, the whole meeting of the ICOFOM commission in Milan in 2016 was devoted to this very topic.93 It was Bruno Brulon Soarez who, together with Lynn Maranda, cogently described these approaches (Soarez, Maranda 2017). In short: the museum is a looter pulling collection items out of their original context and from their original communities (owners) and thus decontextualizing them. The authors pay special attention to ethnological museums, whose practices they call cannibalistic, thus accusing them of „devouring“ other cultures. Under the guise of the „human sciences,“ these museums shape their collections by depriving certain populations of their valuable cultural objects, decontextualizing them from their domestic symbolic systems, and re-contextualizing them according to European values. Thus, the natives are under the influence of the output of representations by others. In their new contexts, the original items acquire new meanings. The museum, as an organization with its own sets of values, absorbs all the original standards and symbolic meanings of things. Thus, the ethnologist replaces the original voice of knowledge with his own voice and knowledge. Both authors are similarly critical of archaeology and natural scientists. Awareness of the predatory face of the museum opens the way for us to a „reflexive, decolonized museology“ that will judge its history.

93) The entire proceedings were published: http://network.icom.museum/fileadmin/user_upload/minisites/icofom/images/ISS_45.pdf
from a critical perspective. The authors draw attention to the alienation of cultural anthropology, which has focused on self-criticism since the 1970s, because of Western imperialism. Cultural anthropology thus (partially) distances itself from museums, which do not sufficiently reflect the current situation. The authors ask: should the museum be suppressed as part of decolonization or, conversely, deconstruct its own authority? Not only the museum objects themselves, but also the information associated with them must be considered an act of predation. „Most museum objects were acquired during the clashes between the natives and the colonialists, the „non-European people“. We live in a time of „touristification“, which, however, leads us to invite the predator inside our own borders. New forms of the concept of the museum, such as ecomuseums or community museums, are not able to define their programme in isolation from private interests and political goals. The traditional „predator museum is alive and hungry.“ Are museums still able to present themselves as an „honest broker“ or has „too much water already passed under the bridge“? The topic of the ICOFOM commission meeting in March 2021 was The Decolonization of Museology: Museums, Mixing, and the Myths of Origins. How to come to terms with the opinions of currently highly respected museologists? Let us now disregard the somewhat anthropomorphizing terminology. We consider a lioness to be a predator in nature, which has evolved quite organically over millions of years, and when it hunts down a zebra, does so not only to benefit its young, but the whole of nature, in which it is maintaining a natural balance. As part of the inclusive approach of our entire text, let us acknowledge that both authors are right in part. They are expressing practical and partly also theoretical problems of a certain part of the museum world. It is worth mentioning the nationality of both authors. Lynn Maranda is Canadian and Bruno Brulon Soarez is Brazilian. These are countries with a different history, but associated with the colonial history of mankind. However, this is not unique to the entire planet. For example, Slovakia never had any colonies, but nor was it ever a colony in the true sense of the word. The earliest museum workers here were Slovaks, collecting and thereby saving Slovak objects and exhibiting them for Slovaks and within a „Slovak concept“. Today, the collections are (for the most part) stored in Slovak museums, so the Slovak public does not understand museums as predators. The situation is similar in the Czech Republic, Russia, China, and so on. This is not changed by the fact that part of our heritage has gone elsewhere from Slovakia, legally and illegally, and vice versa, we can also find foreign objects (e.g. mummies) in Slovak museums. We understand museology as a globally valid discipline. Thus, the concept of „museum predation“ is not valid for the whole world and cannot therefore be an integral part of the general museological discourse. However the so-called predation of museums is also partially accepted at home. Czech associate professor of Archaeology Slavomil Vencel writes with reference to American museum sources that „… the real robbers of the archaeological heritage are museums and collectors who with their acquisitions actually inspire and finance illegal robbing of sites“ (Vencel 2000, 438). We do not deny that
the possible sale of an archaeological find to a museum may inspire someone to carry out illegal site surveys. But just as we cannot blame a furniture company for exploiting forests, so the museum is not to blame for the plundering of archaeological sites. At least in part, understanding the museum item as something more than an item as such could help the whole situation. An archaeological find without accompanying documentation, and the illegal searcher certainly does not arrange this, significantly loses its value, and therefore its price. If museums stop just „hoarding items“ and become more interested in interactions, in items on which the „spotlight“ has fallen (see the passages on W. Gluziński), then illegal searchers in archaeological sites will have less scope for „profitability“.

10.5. Neuromuseology?

Many philosophers have dealt with the problem of the mind, with the actual concept of philosophy of mind being used first by Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976). This is the basis for the relatively current topic today, the Body – Mind relationship. Originally, psychologists were interested in the mind, the spirit, the human „I“, and the biomedical field in the brain. It is no wonder that with the development of, for example, cybernetics, computer science, etc., there are attempts to blend these views together. For example, referring to Karl H. Pribram, Egon Bondy writes that „any difference between mind and matter will disappear“ (Bondy 2005).

According to some theorists, if we have an idea, then something is going on in the brain. Thus, mental phenomena are properties of the brain. The task of cognitive science is to characterize the brain, but not at the level of nerve cells or at the level of mental states, but rather at the level at which the brain functions as an information processing system. To this day, we cannot pinpoint the location of mental activities. We cannot assert that every mental state corresponds to a unique physical state of the brain. Adam Köppel rightly asks how many cells are needed to imagine the Mona Lisa (Köppel 2001).

At present, we are encountering attempts to combine museology, especially the part that deals with museum communication, with the functioning of neurons, but we urge great caution. A neuron is a nerve cell, and so a piece of brain „hardware“. This cell can become ill, and is dealt with by neurosurgeons, etc. A person’s relationship to an item cannot have a direct link to nerve cells. For example, when a beloved being leaves us, his/her previous gifts suddenly turn ugly, we may even throw them away, without changing anything in the cell structure of our brain. We understand the efforts of „neuromuseologists“ as an attempt to render museology “more scientific”, but in this way they have failed. It is reminiscent of Josef Beneš’s efforts to measure the impact of an exhibition using mathematical formulae. This does not mean rejecting all the methods and ideas of neurobiology, ethology and sociobiology, but the founder of sociobiology, Edward Wilson, has already

94) Vencl argues (perhaps partially correctly) using an exhibition at the Slovak National Museum in Bratislava in 1993 of illegally acquired depots from an oppidum, which the museum had previously purchased.
written about the „judicious extension“ of these methods (*Keller, Novotný 2008, 104*). Czech computer sciences professor Jiří Cejpek also writes: „Processes taking place in the brain can be located, while processes taking place in the mind cannot be“ (*Cejpek 2005, 15*).

The founder of so-called neuromuseology is considered to be the British Professor of World Art John Onians, who maintains strongly that museology needs neuroscience. His view that our brains are organized like a museum will certainly please many museum workers, but only few biologists, just as the view that understanding the universal architecture of the brain is helpful to neuromuseologists. The 30,000-year-old paintings from Chauvet Cave are said to have no social context and the only context to which they can be related is the „neural“ (*Onians 2015*). We do not expect this view to find a friendly reception among archaeologists and we do not doubt at all the social context of these paintings.

Polish museologist Dorota Folga-Januszewska has also considered the possible connection between museology and the neurosciences (*Folga-Januszewska 2016*), writing through the prism of art sciences. She seeks to study museology (or more exactly, art) from the position of physics, chemistry, neurology, etc. She advocates a „visual perspective“ of given events with the complete abandonment of historical documents. She admits that Walt Disney was a forerunner (harbinger) of this phenomenon. Folga-Januszewska points out that art has had a significant effect on the actual formation of the human brain, which is quite often repeated view. She recalls Patricia Smith Churchland, a representative of so-called neurophilosophy, and the „separate fields“ of neuroaesthetics and neuromusicology. The Dutch painter Jan Vermeer, like other artists, is considered a conscious „neuroresearcher“. Aesthetic experiences are strictly neural. The author is convinced that if we were to use neuroaesthetic experience in museology more widely, museums would not be repositories of the past, but become the most important places of multisensory education. There is a call for a revolution at the visual level, but also „at the neuronal dimension“.95 After she presents compelling and completely indisputable evidence, the revolutionary concept of this Polish museologist will doubtless be accepted.

Until then, when researching the links between the natural and social sciences, it is necessary to:

• examine whether the discoveries of leading biologists and neurologists are not implanted in the human sciences too loosely or forcedly,

• admit complete freedom of artistic expression and the individual perception of surrounding reality, including works of art. However, the cultivation of the social sciences is not the creation of a work of art, both are based on completely different foundations. Although art on the one hand and art museums (galleries) on the other are connected by an umbilical cord, they are different “bodies”.

95) Kateřina Štěpánová also mentions the term neuroarthistory with reference to Lubor Hájek (*Štěpánová 2016, 56–57*).
Although we would accept some radical views as part of so-called art museology, they no longer function outside galleries and certainly cannot become mainstays of museology.

There is a difference between the physical state of the brain (grey matter, the neuron, etc.) and the thinking that comes from it and from its functions. Our relationship to things is undoubtedly the product of this “second”, thinking, perceptual part. Over the past twenty years, many have succumbed to the enthusiasm for neuroscience research, but the real shift in our knowledge has not been as significant as was anticipated. In the early 1990s, there was a revolutionary change associated with the development of magnetic resonance imaging. Cognitive neuroscience, sometimes called the biology of the mind, was born. There then came a number of sub-disciplines applying neuroscience methods to every possible area of human endeavour: neuroaesthetics, social neuroscience, moral neuroscience, neurophilosophy, educational neurology, neuromarketing, and even something we can call attempts at a neuromuseology. Then every researcher sees what he wants to see in the results of neuroscience, and this abuse is what the Czech biologist of the mind Adam Růžička calls reverse inference. He adds that studying just neurons to understand behaviour is like studying just feathers to understand bird flight (Růžička 2018). However, magnetic resonance imaging has never given us direct access to mental or nervous activity, nor is it a lie detector or a telepathy machine. We do not question the future of cognitive neuroscience, but when only we give up the vision of simple solutions for deciphering mental content.
11. SO MUSEOLOGY IS...

So far, we have gathered together a large number of theoretical approaches to museology, from perhaps all relevant authors from many countries of the world, from all language areas. In practice, however, we are in dispute with all of them, at least in part. We point out their key findings, but we also reject what in our opinion is not correct. We believe that we have thus created our own distinctive and therefore original conception of the theoretical foundations of museology, which we want to summarize in this chapter, even though many questions have already been answered in the preceding text. Our approach unashamedly follows on from central European museological thinking as cultivated from the 1960s to the 1980s.

However, we have subjected this concept to critical analysis, connecting it with current currents in philosophy, sociology, and the development of society and science. We have had to devote considerable space to what is not really museology and only poses as museology. Despite a number of successful attempts at mutual overlaps, we consider it necessary to divide the sciences into natural sciences (living and non-living) and the humanities (human) and social sciences. One of the intersections of the human and social sciences is culturology, which we understand as the holistic, comparative and interdisciplinary science of culture. In Slovakia, the Department of Cultural Studies of the Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava has been very active in this area; it has addressed a number of applied topics (Gažová Slušná 2013, Pravdová 2015, Plchcová 2015, Chomová 2015), but above all general theoretical questions (Gažová Slušná 2009, Slušná 2015). Of course, these authors have often worked with heritage, and that from the perspective of various parties, but we believe that museum culture is still a rather under-appreciated element, or at least it is not at the forefront of their interest.

Most attempts to define museology so far have failed on two basic premises. They were either based on the functions and activities of the museum (collection, preservation, exhibition) or were constructed without the inclusion of museology in the system of sciences. As we have made clear, the museum cannot be the subject of museology and, on the other hand, museology cannot be grasped in a systematic „vacuum.“ So something must be „above“, „below“ and „beside“ it.

According to the leading Russian culturologist M.S. Kagan, „we can understand the culturological approach as the basis, above which there is a more specific, museological one“ (Kagan 1994, 446). Kagan sees the whole issue of heritage as „an autonomous subsystem of a broader and more complex metasystem (Klimov 2011, 43). This concept is typical of many culturological establishments in Russia. For example, in St. Petersburg museology, including its theoretical basis, is pursued at the Department of Cultural Studies, especially by Professor Olga Sapanža, who writes that the culturological approach can be understood as „concretizing the culturological paradigm in a particular field of scientific knowledge“, making

96) For example, anthropology and geography reach into the natural sciences and social sciences.
it “impossible to follow the development of the museum as a culture phenomenon without a knowledge of culturology” and that it is necessary to proceed from the “concept of museality” (Sapanža 2011, 52).

Sapanža develops Kagan’s category (accepted by another important Russian cultural scientist T.P. Kalugina) of the „cultural form”, i.e. observing the museum as an abstract construct, monitoring the means and mechanisms of cultural activities and the products of these activities. The phenomenon of the museum thus manifests itself only in the context of the whole. In this case, this „whole” is culture as a larger (superior) system, as a form of being. The museum is a subsystem of the metasystem of culture (Sapanža 2007, 12–15). Sapanža then develops the methodology of theoretical museology in her monograph from 2008 (Sapanža 2008).

Is it legitimate at this point to ask the seemingly heretical question of whether there is only one museology, or indeed how many museologies there are? Can they be divided by nation, language or in some other way? At the ICOFOM conference in Tehran in 2018, for example, seriously meant comments were made about Islamic museology.

This is a typical mixing of terms. The so-called europacentric conception of the museum is often challenged from all sides, e.g. Latin American museologists like to lecture on their own (national) approaches and concepts. If such a thing were to exist, then museums would even be obliged to go along with their national concept. However, in our survey of museums across more than thirty countries on all continents, we did not come across any specific concept of the creation of collections and their presentation. No one thinks that, for example, Maori and Argentinian cultures are the same, but the way of materially documenting the world and the subsequent presentation are in general terms identical. We do not identify with the „national” conception of science, as Keller or Burke argue (see the chapter on Reflexive Museology), but we also work with this concept, but rather we tend to gravitate towards the concept of Martin Schärer, who writes that there is no Russian or Chinese museology, only a Russian or Chinese method of application, a specific form of practice at a lower level than global principles (Schärer 2003a, 14).

Thus, in our opinion there is only one museology, but as a science of man it is not as exact as, for example, the principles of the inclined plane. Let us therefore admit the existence of multiples „museologies”, for example, within language areas (French-speaking, English-speaking, etc.), which emphasize different parts of general museological thinking.

However, this is not a reason to reject or question the field as a whole. National schools, for example in musicology, are considered quite commonly today.

In total, there are more than 600 teaching centres in the world with this focus (Waidacher 1996). Nevertheless, we would not go so far as to say that museology is a fully accepted and established science. Every science should have its subject of enquiry. In the case of museology, we could probably define this as a demonstrably

97) As similar to W. Gluziński’s approaches, although the Polish author is not explicitly named.
permanent or human effort to extract items from the totality of the universe, to preserve them against the inevitability of extinction and present them as an expression of self-identification against others, as an expression of knowing who we are, where we are from and where we are going. We will give this effort the name museum culture. Other features of every science are a methodology and its own scientific language. If museology is not yet a fully formed science, then it certainly has its enemies, doubters, whom we do not find so much in far-removed disciplines (chemistry, physics), but rather in those nearest (many of the humanities). In the very way it was founded museology inherited some major „genetic defects.“ It was created „from below“, not by separation from another science. We can approach the problem, for example, by comparison with geology. Geology experts soon began to find fossilized plants and animals, and it was clear that they needed to train nature specialists as well. Thus palaeontology was separated off, but not as something entirely diametrically different. A palaeontologist must necessarily have a geological training, while a geologist must read palaeontological output. Likewise, an archaeologist dealing with Great Moravia must know the written sources from this period, and the historian of the period cannot be ignorant of the findings of archaeology.

However, museology does not have its „mother science“. Theoretically, it could have been culturology, but this had a generally of inconsistent quality in Czechoslovakia, and in the Czecho-Slovak environment museology certainly did not separate off from culturology, the ties of culturologists and museologists were mostly (unfortunately) extremely weak. This is one of the reasons why museology is often understood as a practical science of museums, for museums, and its status as a university discipline is often questioned. In our environment, museology is understood as part of the historical sciences, administratively affiliated with archaeology (Brno, Nitra, many departments in Russia), ethnology (Bratislava; in the coming months, museology will be linked with archival studies) and history (Opava). This even gives rise to the threat of employees of museological establishments returning to the beloved history, archiving, archaeology or ethnology which they originally studied, in the event of a crisis. Established disciplines offer far greater opportunities for career development than museology, which is still in the position of Cinderella. The situation varies across the world. It is worth mentioning that elsewhere they came to museology in completely different ways. E.g. in Zagreb, Croatia, museology is understood primarily as a part of information science. Museology is still practised, for example, in Istanbul and Perth, Australia, at technical universities. Thus, from architecture, through protection of so-called „architectural heritage“, local experts have come to museological issues.

Contemporary museology is significantly influenced by interpretative models. According to these, people act on the meanings that they attach to the things that surround them. These meanings are not properties of the things themselves, but

---

98) According to graduate of the Opava Department Pavel Douša museology is a humanities science, developed on the basis of historical sciences, focused on „recording the meanings that other sciences find… so that they do not disappear from the memory of people and society“ (Douša 2008).
are the product of the social interaction that takes place between members of society and, of course, are not permanent, but change with other interactions. So people negotiate the shape of reality with each other, the world is a creation of those who live in it. Society and its reality is the creation of its members, it is constantly being reworked. The world cannot be technically numbed or frozen. This approach is very democratic, but it also brings with it marked elements of responsibility, since each person must interpret what the world around them means to them. So people do not act according to the world, but according to how they understand it, interpret it. If they succeed in finding understanding with others, it means that their congruence is also an understanding of verbal and non-verbal symbols and gestures. However, we may encounter considerable difficulties. Symbols can have the highest power if they are arranged in the form of a struggle between good and evil, between truth and lies. In our opinion, the whole interpretative space must be put right in a major way. We cannot agree with the idea that any interpretation of the world is identical with the world itself. There must be a reality other than our ideas about it.

The endless dispute as to whether a particular person is the creator of society and to what extent he is its product can be transferred to the extent to which man is the creator of heritage, that is, of that which is inherited, and to what extent he is the product of inherited values. So, is inheritance a tool of human emancipation or a means of controlling and manipulating him? Is mutual communication heritage through the exchange of values, a way to get closer to the real state of affairs, or just a means to create and maintain false illusions and an illusory awareness?

Within the space of museology, there are a large number of truths, real truths or „truths” in quotation marks, often incompatible with each other. A scientific (possibly within this, a managerial) career consists of the ability to be at the centre of colleagues’ conversations, to be quoted as often as possible, which leads to efforts to be as „new”, „critical” and controversial as possible. This behavioural ability of theorists also includes the ability to abandon a truth which has become unprofitable. It is then necessary to invent innovations, but not so radical that the audience does not understand them, but again not so simple that they seem too familiar to readers. In the Czech (partly also in the Slovak) environment in this context we see a reaction to „Stránský” fatigue; his ideas were sometimes quoted to increase prestige, to document an author’s perspective, but already by the 1990s Stránský had simply become unprofitable. Endless constructivist-behavioural museo-pedagogical reflections, simple repetitions or „implantation” of „Western practitioners” paid off better.

In this context, it seems appropriate to quote the Czech orientalist Miloš Mendel, who writes: „Since the 1970s, the post-modernist conception of the social sciences has been characterized by giving up on: a clear definition of methodological rules; the establishment of a semantically defined terminology; thorough heuristic preparation through working with sources and the relevant literature; serious verification of historical facts and the results of empirical field research. But most typical was and remains a very low level of caution and responsibility when
interpreting obtained data. Common methods of scientific work (deduction, induction, probes, periodization, comparison, empirical measurement of data, etc.) are often replaced by perceptions, feelings, subjectively constructed visions and models. “(Mendel 2002). Research is subject to ideologisation and the sciences are being replaced by „impressionology“. Science is not just any old way of knowing the world, it cannot be confused with experience. Unfortunately, we must admit that even within museology, we sometimes encounter a reduced threshold of criticality within the scientific community, leading to a weakening of self-purifying mechanisms. If some museologists feel that there are a number of „debts“ in the theory of the discipline (Kaulen 2010, 5), a substantial number of authors do not even admit to anything of the sort and do not even think in these terms.

From many meetings of museum workers and museologists, one might conclude that these are not an exchange of views nor a dialogue leading to reaching conclusions. It is more about dominating the other, about gaining respect. With reference to Berger and Luckmann, Jan Keller uses the almost vulgar term „stick length“ (Keller 1992, 147). In the field of museology, it would be difficult to find a few essential „sticks“. Rather, as if everyone had their own stick, their own conception of museology and heritage. At best, „dialogue“ is more like a series of monologues, that is, parallel lines that have no chance to intersect. In the worst case, there are deep misunderstandings and even animosities, which in the field of museology exceed the usual level of non-cooperation within a scientific field. J. K. Feyerabend himself pointed to „dirty“ means of fighting within the scientific community, such as ridiculing the adversary, using violent means of persuading, or rather silencing, opponents. At the same time, it is far from the case in museology that what is new is automatically good. Not even the frequency of occurrence of certain concepts or opinions in texts (monographs, articles) cannot in itself serve to understand changes in scientific knowledge.

Mass culture works similarly to mass production of goods, it serves consumption. Museums seem to be pushed to abandon the individual approach, to standardize production and look for the lowest common denominator in terms of demands and taste. Therefore a constant task for museums is to maintain a balance between true elitism and sacred templeism on the one hand and pandering to the public on the other. Even museums are affected by the levelling (down) of taste, by the emphasis on quantity at the expense of quality, by the fight against the „tyranny of the average“. Therefore, contemporary museology is itself a product of mass culture, demand, practicism and empiricism on the one hand, while on the other hand many theorists are juggling with time- and space-sterile non-living abstractions and constructs.

We must admit that museums have never stood completely aside from politics. We can state like Foucault that the museum is a place „where we witness clashes of knowledge and power, science and politics, and the establishment of a „regime of truth“, „a general policy of truth“, or a „political economy of truth“. There is in this a „politicization of intellectuals“. They no longer stand aside as before, but at the intersections of various interests, power relations, theoretical and practical orientations. “(Slouková 2000, 39).
In today’s – perhaps we can use the strong term “anti-scientific” – trends, museums seem to be subject not only to the topics they are to research, but also to what should happen in their research, and by extension their presentation. The museum can be viewed in two ways. What is it actually used for from the point of view of the whole or for whom is the existing state actually functional, who is the museum to serve?

In their pluralistic view of the past, museums should actually play out a whole range of smaller conflicts, in practice marginal. Otherwise, its one-sidedness would help lead to the outbreak of major conflicts. However, museums, on the other hand, should not allow the breakdown of traditional values; this leads to a permanent state of anxiety.

The museum is also associated with the issue of the museum profession, which has long been addressed by, for example, Peter van Mensch, and in the Czech environment, Oto Kirsch and Lucie Jagošová.

According to van Mensch, museum professionals must follow a set of scientific principles, the theory of museology. The same author characterizes the Netherlands (but also meaning other countries) as a country of preachers, teachers and businessmen. These principles have gradually transformed the museum sphere as well. At first, museums had a certain missionary status, which was underlined by an architecture of high-walled buildings without windows. In the 1970s, however, „teachers“ won. The principle of social programmes prevailed, including programmes for all types of minorities, the „integrated museum“ is being built. Over the next ten years, however, there is a turnaround in museums towards marketing, fund-raising, public relations, etc. Social relevance has been redefined as economic relevance, in short, they turn to „businessmen“ (Mensch van 1989, 20–23). If this leading Dutch museologist was right, then this would not be a favourable development either within the museum or for the cultivation of museology.

11.1 Methodology and methods

In the passages on the methods and methodology of museology, we will again use a cultural vocabulary. Given that there is no generally acceptable definition of culture, Zuzana Slušná writes: „Culturology is one of the disciplines where the subject (culture) is not clearly defined and demarcated“ (Slušná 2015, 10)

„Culturology is one of those disciplines that has not developed its own specific methodology. It uses the mutual cooperation of individual disciplines, methods, theories, theoretical concepts“ (Slušná 2015, 11).

We understand methods to be the tools of scientific research, and methodology as a reflection on the suitability or applicability of these tools. Methodology therefore deals with methods, their creation and application.

According to pedagogist Josef Maňák (1924–2019), „methodology also includes the theoretical foundations of research, its philosophical, ideological and scientific background, its theoretical directions and hypotheses, as well as critical evaluation of research methods and results.“ (Maňák 1994, 18).

99) If we adopt Maňák’s concept, then most of this book is strongly methodological.
In general, we need to distinguish scientific methods working with real objects from scientific methods working with ideal objects. The second case is relevant to museology. Museology is certainly a social science, it belongs to the set of anthroposocial disciplines, inconsistently referred to as the humanities, social sciences or cultural sciences. Their subject is man, his society and culture. The main elements of research are observation, hypothesis, experiment and verification. Scientific observation, unlike ordinary observation, has a predetermined goal of systematic observation, it is determined in advance how many observations will take place, their time and place. In doing so, we always observe only what we are ready to observe. Intentionality in scientific observation stems from a hypothesis, which we then test in subsequent observations. At the same level as the basic procedures in scientific methodology, induction and deduction, we place abduction, which can be explained as „the explanation that seems most likely“\textsuperscript{100}. In addition to induction and deduction, abduction is another type of judgement. It is usually a reduction from several possible explanations, so-called selective abduction. In addition, creative abduction is possible, which creates possible explanations. Of course, there are different kinds of judgemental distortions:

• timeliness – we favour newer facts over older ones,
• models and authorities – we unreasonably rely on experts,
• seeking supporting evidence – these relate to solutions that we ourselves believe in
• generalization – the unjustified generalization of one phenomenon to a whole class of phenomena,
• availability – we rely on easily accessible facts and do not take others into account,
• conservatism – does not allow us to change our mind in the light of new information or evidence (according to Pstružina 2002).

According to Eliška Kočí (Kočí 2014):
1. surprising fact C is observed (e.g. collecting activity – adds JD),
2. C would be self-evident if A were true (A the immanent tendency of man to understand and explain the world by means of material proof – adds JD),
3. therefore, we can assume that A is true.

In museology also there are applications for standard research methods.\textsuperscript{101} Thus, in the cognitive process, we have discovered a phenomenon, the immediate result of sensory perception. The next stage is the fact, a generalized phenomenon, general knowledge. Facts are scientific data and depend on scientific theory. „An essential element of scientific thinking is the hypothesis that unites isolated facts into a whole.

\textsuperscript{100} Irregularities in the orbit of Uranus led astronomers to make the abductive judgement that there is another planet behind it, and this judgement would later be scientifically proven. By abduction, we therefore mean deriving the best explanation based on the available material.

\textsuperscript{101} We can imagine this, for example, in research into the influence of modern technology in a museum exposition, on its (an)organic nature within communication of the exposition. Or on research into of the actual circulation of visitors around an exposition, i.e. finding out which part of the exhibition is the most attractive, etc.
Specific demands are made of scientific hypotheses:

a) adequacy and substantiation of the hypothesis,

b) preference is given to a hypothesis that explains simply a larger number of facts,

c) the aim is to formulate as few hypotheses as possible in the narrowest context,

d) a hypothesis must in principle be verifiable and rebuttable (Maňák 1994, 26).

So we start with the method of observation, we can consider observation as an activity comparable to an experiment, and we continue with exploration, for example in the form of conversations, questionnaires, interviews, etc. In some aspects of museology (collection creation), as in many other sciences, it is difficult or impossible to apply the method of experimentation. In some aspects, however, experimentation is not only possible, but its use is also appropriate (the impact of the collection on the visitor). We verify the findings by qualitative and subsequently quantitative research and we can also use historical comparative methods. We consider survey to be a lower form than scientific research, but both are absent in Slovak practice. The Czech theoretician of science Břetislav Fajkus admits the possibility that „... the „cultural sciences“ are diametrically different from the natural and social sciences, so their approaches are incompatible and there is no room for a common philosophy and methodology“ (Fajkus 2005, 48).

11.2 Terminology

The question of the exact definition of terms, the creation of precise (correct) sentences has plagued philosophers for centuries, and for many it forms their principal focus. Otto Neurath was also in favour of a unified language of science, convinced that: „Thanks to unity of terminology, it would be possible to link all the testimonies and use the testimonies of many sciences in a single context (for example, if a forest fire is spreading, and if we want to predict further events including the behaviour of indigenous tribes, it participates in geography, meteorology, botany, sociology, ethnology are all involved in the prediction)“ (Slouková 2003, 59). It should be added that this ideal situation has not been achieved and the current trends science do not even aspire to this, it is evidently not even possible.

According to Rudolf Carnap, we achieve higher precision by moving from classification terms (warm), through comparative terms (warmer) to qualitative terms (temperature). Carnap’s reminder that language tempts one to look for problems where they do not actually exist remains valid.

Stránský also was well aware of a certain weakness of museological terminology and repeatedly emphasized the need for a specific language of museology, i.e. a normative language of science, which would be built on exact logical principles in order to eliminate all ambiguities and meaninglessness. In this, he was closer to neo-positivism and the analytical philosophies that arose from it, than to the Oxford school of natural language. In other words, his call was purely modernist.

102 We believe that the evaluation of really large projects in the museum sphere (large-scale expositions, digitization projects, etc.) from a museum point of view happens only extremely rarely. This also applies to pre-project preparation.
We consider it necessary to first clarify what the individual terms actually mean. By terminology we mean both the science of terms and the set of terms from a certain field. We understand the creation of terms and their organization in the form of dictionaries as terminography (Schwarz 2003). A definition is a precise, unambiguous and binding delimitation of the meaning of a term, here we are talking about prescriptive terminology. Interpretation is the explanation of the meaning of a term that is not clearly defined and is determined by a consensus accepted by the professional community (Schwarz 2003, 3). Then we speak of descriptive terminology and this includes most of the terminology of the social sciences and humanities.103

We recently drew attention to the applicability of Carl-Gustav Hempel's (1905–1997) approaches to logic and definitions in museological output (Dolák 2017). Hempel promotes the so-called deductively nomological explanation. The scientist should answer the question „why“ rather than just the mere „what“. According to him, the scientific explanation of a fact is a deduction, a statement called an explanandum. Premises (assumptions) here called explanans are both satisfactory initial conditions as well as scientific laws. His other models are the inductively statistical and the deductively statistical (Hempel 2015).

It is instructive for us that strictly scientific, logical approaches are not fully feasible in the social sciences, in which we apply the stipulative method, i.e. the consensus of the scientific community. Just as there is no precisely scientific „computable“ definition of a planet (Ceres or Pluto were, but no longer are planets or more exactly, are not considered to be planets), nor, for example, is a scientific „computable“ definition of a museum possible.

We considered it important to emphasize these approaches, because, in our opinion, the museological and by extension the museum community is too concerned with the endless finalisation of definitions and redefinition of the terms museology, museum, etc., and gets nervous if someone adds or removes a word here or there. Such nervousness wastes our time and our energy. Therefore, despite all its criticisms, our text is on the whole inclusive, we are trying to incorporate the ideas of similarly thinking museologists into one theoretical system, which was most significantly demonstrated by the approaches of Stránský and Gluziński.

For example, in the search for the correct definition of a museum, it is necessary to distinguish between the museological concept and one which is strictly administrative. The collecting instinct and materialization of the world took many forms, and therefore the answer to the question of exactly where the museum begins and where exactly it ends is not the paramount problem of museology.

From a museological point of view, therefore, the central question is not what is and what is no longer a museum. Legislation or national and international associations of museums are in a somewhat different situation, i.e. the legislative and administrative view. Here it is necessary to know exactly who or what can be a member of these associations, to whom or to what the relevant laws apply, or who or what can obtain funds from public sources.

103) Václav Rutar thinks similarly (Rutar 2009).
Probably the first attempt at a comprehensive solution was the Russian Short Dictionary of Museum Terms from 1974, which was published in a revised version in Moscow in 2010 (Archangelov 2010). Beneš’s short work was published in 1978, (Beneš 1978), there are Dutch, Japanese and other terminological dictionaries. However, most of these attempts try to define individual concepts without interconnecting them, without any logical system, with a certain absence of the logic of science itself. Articles in journals or anthologies often try to render museology “more scientific” by forceful application of theorists of science, sometimes verifying, other times „falsifying” in true Popper style. The results of these efforts are not great. The museum public then somewhat foolishly expects that a „correct and true“ definition of something will eliminate its chronic problems. Let us state at the outset that the mere translation of a foreign term is not yet a definition.

When creating definitions, we can rely on the methodological work of Václav Rutar (Rutar 2011), in terms of the logical form of definitions, on the work of the Bratislava professor Marián Zouhar. Zouhar distinguishes six basic types of definitions. According to the criterion of materiality, it distinguishes between expressive, conceptual and object definitions. The criterion of illocutionary power then makes it possible to distinguish descriptive definitions from prescriptive definitions in each of these three groups (Zouhar 2015, 166). With this approach, we show that the creation of definitions is not a simple matter, where everyone sits down unprepared at a PC and formulates how they „feel“, which is not uncommon in museology. On the other hand, we must admit that in museology, terms cannot be calculated or converted into formulas, as is the case, for example, with physics, or translated into some mathematical language. A common mistake is mechanistic adoptions, translations, of terms from foreign languages, nowadays most often from English.104 Anyone who wants to deal with concepts and terms must not only know the relevant scientific field, but also probe the depths of their mother tongue. Many misunderstandings in museology are caused by the difficulty of translating some words into another language, or by a different understanding of the word in other languages.

What concepts, terms and definitions do we consider to be key in the field of museology? It is demonstrably true that man has taken objects from the universe for centuries and protects them against the nature of change and decay, because they have a certain cultural significance, a certain value for him. Why not adopt Stránský’s notion of museality for these values and why not use the notion of muzealization for the processes associated with the identification, selection and preservation of these values? Both terms, museality and muzealization, are invariant (not subject to change) expressions. Stránský’s terms „museality“ and „muzealization“ are simply the naming of something. This is not a concept in the true sense of the word.

104) While the term “museum visitor” is correct in English, the mechanical translation “muzejní (museum) návštěvník (visitor)” is not. A woman living in Bratislava is a Bratislava woman, she is from Bratislava. Thus, by analogy, a “muzejní (museum) návštěvník (visitor)” is (has come) from a museum, which would completely change the meaning of the texts. Thus, where English uses left branching of (noun as) an adjective, Slavic languages sometimes have to use right branching. Thus “návštěvník (visitor) muzea (to a museum)” is correct.
Museality
An item, but a whole field situation (archaeological, palaeontological, etc.) also, can be recognized by man as having museality, which is the value of a sensory-specific aspect of reality which has such cognitive and value significance for society that it is in the objective common interest to preserve it against nature of change and decay of its bearer and apply it in terms of this new quality in the scientific-cognitive and culture-forming process.

Musealization
Musealization is the process of (mostly expert) activities by which an object of a museum nature is transformed into a document of a collection nature, in the case of expert activities into a part of museum collections.

Václav Rutar has dealt in greater depth with the development of the concepts of museum content, museality and musealization (Rutar 2012). Musealization takes place in a much wider space than just the museum. „Musealization – the appropriation of reality in respect of the cultural memory significance of their authentic representatives“ (Stránský 2005, 256). The expression heritagization (memorization) preferred by other authors expresses practically the same thing. In the Slovak environment musealization has been dealt with most deeply by Marcel Lalkovič (Lalkovič 2007).

Museum content (Musealia)
In this book, we for the most part understand the terms „thing“ and „item“ as synonyms, in order to make the text easier to understand, although we are aware of other concepts (Desvallées, Mairesse 2011,43).\textsuperscript{105} However, a musealia, unlike any regular item, is something else. This is, according to Krzystof Pomian’s vocabulary, a semiophore, or „carrier of significance“. Museums focus on items (things). An object is superior to the concept of an item. The object is everything outside the subject. The sun or a digital photo on a PC are objects, but not items.

A factual, unmediated bearer of museality, mostly kept in a museum, can be called museum content (musealia), which most authors identify with the term museum collection item. The specificity of the musealia, which is always the source for a relevant scientific field, lies in the fact that it has something extra, is a proof of human selective, preservation activity and therefore represents a cultural asset, including the creations of nature. Products of nature, selected from the universe and stored in a museum, which we in some way deal with, are a manifestation of human culture. That is why we consider these products of nature to be a cultural asset. The museum collection is the museum’s working medium.

The terms museum collection item and museum content (musealia) are usually understood as synonyms. A slight difference will be apparent in a deeper analysis, since during the first phase of a survey the collection item is only potential museum content. In the case of museum practice, unfortunately, randomly and non-programmatically acquired objects that do not enrich the collection often

\textsuperscript{105} E.g. Francophone authors understand a tool as a continuation of the hand is a thing and not an object.
get into museums. They are usually recorded as collection items according to valid legislation, so there is no legislative difference between them and an absolutely unique item. However, we cannot consider such an item museum content. It becomes this only through a permanent assessment and evaluation of its place in a museum collection. In other words, we sometimes recognize museum content (musealia) during selection processes immediately, sometimes the process of identifying an item as museum content takes a long time. We introduce the concept of secondary selection for this process. Thus, a collection item becomes museum content only after expert research and assessment of its place in the collection. The museum content (musealia), together with the entire documentary apparatus (the museum’s knowledge system), forms a set, which we call a collection. Part of the musealization processes is, of course, not only the acceptance of museum content into the collection, but also its disposal. We call museum content selected for communication purposes an exhibit. For other museologists, everything that is exhibited (for example, a model or mock-up) is considered an exhibit.

The museum sphere

Museum sphere is the whole area of museum activity, both theoretical and practical. This includes not only museums and galleries, but also theoretical facilities focused on museology and cultural heritage as well as the relevant authorities and parts thereof dealing with the practical or methodological issues of museums. This also includes the relevant museum methodological centres. It is not happy for international communications that it is difficult to find an equivalent in English or French for this term (Czech: muzejnictví, Pole: Muzealnictwo).

Museology

According to Stránský, we divide museology into general and special (Stránský 1984, 39). General museology: a scientific discipline whose subject is to learn about museality, its division and specific roles in society. The subject of museology is not the museum, just as the subject of pedagogy is not the school, but the educational process. The subject of medicine similarly is not the hospital, but the processes leading to the maintenance or restoration of human health. Museology is not the science of museum content, just as the theory of librarianship is not just the science of books. Many attempts to determine museology one-sidedly overestimate the institutional aspect.

According to Stránský, museology does not need its „science of the book, archival science“, because in terms of source exploitation it makes use of the relevant scientific disciplines (archaeology, numismatics, entomology, etc.).

Special museology: arises from the integration of the general museological and professional approach with a specific reality. It is applied in relation to individual types of museums. Later Stránský writes: „museology – a scientific field dealing with the musealization of reality“ (Stránský 2005, 256), adding that museology falls: „into the field of the humanities, more precisely, into the field of cultural sciences or culturology“ (Stránský 2005, 117).
In our opinion: **Museology is a part of general culturological knowledge and deals with museum culture, its creation in the form of musealization and use, in both diachronic and synchronous contexts. Special museology can then be derived from it.**

**Museum**

Museum culture has manifested itself in a large number of ways and forms over the centuries, and it will undoubtedly continue to do so. Its current institutional expression is the museum sphere, which is manifested primarily by organizations (organizational units) called museums. We do not believe that these institutional and organizational manifestations are an integral part of human culture, so it is possible that in the future museums will no longer exist. On the other hand, we are convinced that museum culture, the need to materialize the world, as evidenced from at least antiquity, is an integral part of human needs and manifestations and is therefore timeless. We do not want to speculate about humanity's institutional and organizational manifestations in the future.

Internationally, the most used definition of a museum is according to ICOM: A museum is a non-profit institution in the service of society and its development, open to the public, which acquires, conserves, researches, communicates and exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity for the purposes of education, study and enjoyment.

Slovak legislation defines a museum as follows: “A museum is a specialized legal entity or organizational unit of a legal entity which, on the basis of research and scientific research, acquires objects of cultural value in accordance with its focus and specialization, which it professionally manages, for the purposes of study, cognition, education and aesthetic experience by specific means of museum communication”.

These two definitions alone demonstrate significant differences. Both are currently under pressure for change, but these attacks are conducted from practicist rather than museological positions. Almost every word in the ICOM definition has been challenged, sometimes more thoroughly (Davis, Mairesse, Desvallées 2010)\(^\text{106}\), we ourselves have actively intervened in the issue (Dolák, 2009, 2017, 2017a). In our texts, we have avoided the word institution and worked more with the term organization, or rather just the organizational unit. Even a very small facility, just an organizational unit, without an official statute or charter, may be considered a museum. A museum must be permanent, which does not mean lasting forever. If this facility fits all the characteristics of a museum, there is no need to examine its accounting, i.e. whether it is a non-profit or a profit organization. A museum must be open to public, but we consider the “in the service of society and its development” passage to be completely superfluous. After all, everything that man has ever created was created for the benefit of society, or at least for that part

\(^{106}\) In the imprint of the book, the authors thank the author of these lines for their help. Part of the latest output defining the museum is available on the ICOFOM website: http://network.icom.museum/icofom/publications/the-monographs-of-icofom/
of society that that person belongs to. In our opinion: The museum is a permanent organization that communicates its collections. The museum is open to the public and as a rule does not make a profit.

Research
A museum conducts research in four basic categories. The first, the most extensive, is connected with the research into collection items, involving the scientific disciplines represented in the museum (history, ethnology, natural sciences, etc.). The second kind of research mobilizes sciences outside museology (physics, chemistry, communication sciences, etc.) and is linked to the development of museographic tools, such as equipment, procedures and standards for the preservation of objects, restoration, public opinion, management methods, etc. The third kind is the formulation of thinking about the mission and operation of the museum. A whole range of approaches taken from pedagogy, psychology, etc. is used here. Finally, we work with purely museological research, reflecting on the nature, mission and role of the museum in today’s society. The philosophical, sociological, cultural anthropological sciences, etc. help us here.107

11.3 An explanation of certain terms
Museality
While the term musealization is quite common in literature by museologists and specialists in other fields, with the term museality it is different. Abandoned by many museologists, for others it is unknown. Peter van Mensch sees this as a reason to put this term in the museological research archive, as it is only good while standing in line for the coffee machine at the office (van Mensch 2015). We do not believe that the professional public distancing itself from a term automatically means that the term is wrong. That man takes objects from the universe and defends them against the nature of decay is a completely undeniable fact, provable going back many centuries. If man does this, then these objects must have some meaning for him, some sense or value. Stránský called this value museality, which is a word derived from the Greek Muses, whose mother was the goddess of memory Mnemosyné.

Of course, the gallery curator chooses items mainly by their aesthetic value. We would probably not acknowledge the aesthetic value of the vast majority of items in the collections, for example, an entomologist is interested in the value of a beetle for science. But we need a more general term for these different values, expressing all the possible relationships. We cannot find a more appropriate word to express these relationships than Stránský’s museality, which covers not only aesthetic, but also scientific, historical, and other values.

107) The passage on research was partly inspired by the concept of Jean Davallon, which, however, was significantly modified (taken from Desvallées, Mairesse 2011, 52).
We must understand the bearers of museality more broadly than just the collection item in a museum. This relationship and the whole process of musealization takes place in a wider space than just museum collections. Thus, not only private collections have a museality, but so do buildings (castle, château, church, bridge, etc.) or a whole location (for example, a scientific or archaeological one). Thus, museality is neither a state nor a property nor a function, but a value (Šuleř 1981). If museality is a value, it must be addressed from an axiological point of view. Karel Boženek, an associate professor at Opava, is the person who has dealt most with the relationship between museology and axiology in the Czech environment and has correctly noted: „An item of value becomes museum content not only because someone created it, but also because someone evaluated it. Museality will not only be an axiological category, but also an anthropological category where it overlaps.“ (Boženek 1997, 207; 2003, 167). The problem of axiology is also encountered by other social sciences (aesthetics, the art disciplines, culturology), „which cannot do without the concept of culture, the analysis of which is impossible without the concept of value“ (Boženek 2003, 166). A museum item is a bearer of museality, but the latter is a human value, because items do not have value of themselves. According to Boženek, „the value of an item is conditioned by its objective qualities as well as by the qualities of the evaluating subject.“ The qualities of the object and the subject are not yet values. Only in their mutual correlation can value be defined. Man is the „creator of „second nature“ – the culture of the human world of items“ (Boženek 2003, 166).

St Petersburg associate professor L. M. Shlyachtina writes in this context of „social information“ (Shlyachtina 2005). A. M. Kulemzin also understands the museum as a socio-cultural institution, warning against the ideologisation of museums and sees the mission of museology in freeing humanity from political, ideological, nationalistic and other wandering (zablužděnija), based only on credible facts (Kulemzin 2012, 32). S.I. Sotnikova thinks similarly (Sotnikova 2010). The questions of axiological approaches and questions of values have been addressed by many authors from many different perspectives.108

Museality is not an integral part of an item. Values often fluctuate, not least in the area of heritage. However, to question museality with reference to its fluctuations and changes would be wrong, it would mean denying axiology (the study of values) as such. However, current philosophy is based more on acts of evaluation rather than on predetermined values. Although a person is constantly evaluating something, it is difficult to describe exactly, why he decided in one way and not another. If we follow the approaches of the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka, for whom values are something secondary, „the sediments of evaluation“, then museality would not be a value, but the result of acts of evaluation.

108) For example, Olomouc associate professor Pavel Zahrádka recently dealt with the so-called Heteronomy of Aesthetic Value (Zahrádka 2015).
Museum

A worldwide debate is currently under way in an effort to change the definition of a museum for the needs ICOM, which is only partially relevant to museology. ICOM had even set up a standing commission for this purpose. In 2017 alone, several international conferences aimed at redefining the museum took place in Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Beijing, HuangNan (QingHai Province), Buenos Aires, and St Andrews in Scotland.¹⁰⁹ We are convinced that fulfilling a documentary-communicative role is characteristic of the existence of a museum. Those facilities that do not fulfil both roles are not, in the true sense of the word, a museum. It should be noted that the nearest disciplines – archiving and librarianship – certainly do not have such an intense debate about their own definition. Two premises follow from this.

1. The museum world is so specific that the definition of a museum must still be intensively addressed for decades to come.
2. The museum world has succumbed (not for the first time) to an endless desire for gnoseological self-definitions and methodological manifestations that do not bring much that is useful.

The common argument that the ICOM definition is an inspiration for national legislation is easily broken down. I do not know of a country that has adopted the ICOM definition without change into its legislation. The fact that the words museum, collection, public appear in almost all definitions does not mean inspiration by the ICOM definition.

The text of a new definition was prepared for the ICOM General Conference in Kyoto; fortunately it was not adopted. It was not about the definition being good or bad, it was just not a definition at all. According to those submitting the “definition”, the museum should be democratic, polyphonic, inclusive, in favour of critical dialogue and planetary well-being. Such words can hardly be part of any definition of anything. Which current museums fulfil the meaning of these words, or rather, which do not? Museums often recall very tragic facts and a mentally healthy person does not have a feeling of well-being here. A museum does not have the power to measure the planetary well-being. The terms used in the “definition” are primarily those of the Euro-Atlantic civilization, or at least some of its members. In other parts of the world, the vocabulary is different. Polish museologist Magdalena Lorenc (Lorenc 2020) also considers the proposal for Kyoto to be a political manifesto.

In the “definition” for Kyoto, museums are no longer non-profit, but not-for-profit. This is probably a response to the so-called “Declaration of Calgary”, adopted at the ICOFOM meeting in 2005. We are not at all sure whether this minor difference is understood by all native speakers in English nor how exactly we might translate it into other languages. For example, the Czechs solved the problems of non-profitability in their own way, and the Slovaks did not address this issue at all in their Museum Act of 2009. Considerations about the required non-profitability of museums seem to have the same basis everywhere. We want to exclude

from the museum family various commercial galleries on the one hand, but on the other hand to include museums of production factories or specific facilities such as the Jewish Museum in Prague. That is why I use the expression from Czech legislation: **not making a profit as a rule.** The Czech Museum Act has been in force since 2000 and I do not have a single signal that there is any problem with this concept.

But what should a possible definition look like? It must be concise, non-offensive, rigidly apolitical, sufficiently broad and definite, and at the same time cogent.

The museum must be open to the public, as one of the main features of the museum. At the same time, the word „public” seems to me to be a broader, i.e. a more cogent term than „society“. The term „society” could be taken by some to mean some closed society (only the members of a particular religious community or members of a certain tribe). However, the museum must be open to anyone.

But what is the museum? Rather, we should avoid the word institution and use the word organization instead. Economists (Thorstein Veblen) and sociologists (Jan Keller, Jan Sokol) write that the institution is an established way of acting, problem solving, a sphere. So a duel or usury were an institution, now it is marriage, banking, healthcare, the museum sphere (cf. Chapter 5 – Museum and Society). Therefore, one can never be an employee of an institution. Within institutions, there are organizational groups – organizations – so in the museum world, these are above all museums. The museum worker is then an employee of the museum (organization), not the museum world (institution). At this point, we recall that at the ICOFOM meeting in Liege in 2009, there was a wide-ranging debate on what an institution is, which Peter van Mensch concluded at the time by stating that we were unable to agree within basic limits what an institution really is. Let an awareness of this accompany us in all attempts at definitions. Even if the whole world were to vote that the museum is this or that (such as an institution or organization), a different interpretation or understanding of this particular word in different languages or different parts of the world is very likely.

A museum must be permanent, which does not mean lasting forever (eternal).

The museum is therefore a permanent organization. However, we know very well that many colleagues take the word organization to mean something quite formal, with a charter, statutes, etc. and they want to have as the museums some smaller, say private, facilities, less formally enshrined in legislation, etc. That is why I have used the unappealing phrase “organized unit” at several conferences. I used the comparison with a shoemaker who repairs his own shoes. We probably do not take him directly to be an organization, but it is an organized unit, subject to trade and tax laws, occupational safety, etc. The museum is therefore a permanent organization (in the broadest sense) or an organized unit.

But what sets the museum apart from other organizations? The list of museum activities in some definitions is often rightly challenged – it chooses, selects, preserves, restores, conserves, prepares, exhibits, communicates, etc. Even a facility that holds a fixed collection (such as the interior of a château) and does not collect a single object for another hundred years still remains a museum.
Then I suggest the wording: **it communicates its own collections.**

If someone has **collections**, it is quite clear that they have somehow selected them earlier and that they perform „maintenance“ work on them (conservation, restoration, preparation, preservation, storage, etc.). The word **“own”** must be in the definition in order to exclude from the museum family some exhibition halls that do not have their own collections and exhibit everything possible, including collections occasionally borrowed from museums. This decidedly does not rule out the option for the museum to communicate anything outside its own collection.

The word communication covers all activities of the museum in the direction of the public – expositions, exhibitions, museum pedagogical programmes, collection catalogues, anything about the collections on the web, etc.

It is necessary to distinguish between the philosophical concept and justification of the museum (from, for example, Stránský or Gluziński) on the one hand and the practical definition of the museum for the needs of national or international museum associations. It also needs to be clear to an official providing a grant whether or not the applicant is a museum. For example, „space for critical dialogue“ never asks for a grant or membership of a national or international museum association; this is sought by someone (something) that has an address, name and signature on an application, a bank account number, etc.

We acknowledge that for the ICOM definition, the connection between the museum and collections alone might seem too narrow. All over the world, historical buildings and sites (palaeontological or archaeological) are also considered museums. Many ecomuseums consider entire territories to be „their space“.

As H.de Varine-Bohan says – the ecomuseum has no visitors, but residents. But we cannot consider every important building or site a museum, but only those that can be considered heritage and serve primarily museum purposes. Thus, an opera house or theatre building is not a museum, although it is in itself very valuable and is undoubtedly considered part of our heritage.

**The ICOM definition could then consist of three parts:**

1. The first step would be a kind of philosophising preamble that would formulate the position and importance of museums in society. Some terms from the current ICOM Code of Ethics or frequent terms from research currently being conducted by the ICOFOM Commission under the leadership of Bruno Brulon Soarez could be used here. I have in mind terms like „space“, „knowledge“, „memory“, etc.

2. The second part would be the actual definition of a museum. Simple, factual, rigidly apolitical and in its way „eternal“: **The Museum is a permanent organization that communicates its own collections, the Museum is open to the public and usually does not make a profit.**

3. The third part would be a commentary to or more precisely an explanation of the second part, which would explain what is meant by certain individual words, such as „permanent“, „collection“, „communicates“, etc.
Museum content (Musealia)

The museum therefore accepts museum items into its collections. Slovak museologist Richard Senček prefers the term *object* over the term *item*. Because the term *item* evokes a relationship only to material objects „while the object of collections may also be intangible and imaginary objects“ (Senček 2017, 203). Another Slovak museologist Marcel Lalkovič has previously taken this direction, preferring the term „museum object“, which he understands as a general and unbiased designation of the objective of our intention, while an item is only a passive counterpart (Lalkovič 2006). This Slovak (respectively Czech) term „objekt“ would fully correspond to the English „museum object“. Rather, we incline to the conservative concept of the item, a concrete manifestation of the materialization of the world that can be enriched and supplemented by any recording technique. In other words, the museum deals with the materialization of the world and collects mainly three-, sometimes two-dimensional, especially material, items. In the vast majority of cases, records are made for the accompanying documentation for items, using any technique (e.g. digital photographs). These records are an integral part of the collection, in some cases they are more important than the item itself. Some of these recordings may be of such value that they may themselves become a significant part of the heritage. However, Senček's „intangible and imaginary objects“ may also be somewhere else than in museums, e.g. in libraries, archives, various databases, etc. From this point of view, we do not consider them to be the core of museum work. We have no doubt that much of the museum's documentation will increasingly take place using modern techniques, even those that have not yet been invented. In the case of research at an archaeological site, for example, it will be about the accompanying documentation. But even in the case of documenting society, all photographs, film records, etc. should rather be a supplement to something that other documentation centres, archives, libraries, film archives, etc. – do not have, i.e. a material document.

Thus, man has realized museality through musealization, which has consisted of the selection of material documents, human or natural creations, of their storage in places designed for this purpose and of the use of these collections for a better understanding of the world. While individual pieces of museum content have quite a limited narrative capacity, the set of these individual pieces (the collection), if well formed, has a much higher capacity. It should be recalled that the vast majority of our knowledge of our planet's past and of life on it, as well as the vast majority of knowledge of all stages of man's sojourn on this planet, we have only in museum collections. In many cases, collection items clarify the knowledge gained from written sources, which are often full of errors, of intentional and unwanted mystifications.

---

110) At the moment, we do not address their administrative recording according to current Slovak or Czech legislation, which does not consider that digital photograph on a computer to be a regular collection item.
From the gnoseological point of view, the difference between collecting and musealization is that in the first case it is about the thing as such (the cult of the thing), in the second case it is a representation, i.e. the representation of phenomena, of the something that is „behind the thing“. The simplest definition of a collection is that it is things that belong together. It is that „belonging together“ that is the most distinctive feature of a well-assembled collection. With the help of a collection, we document as fully as possible the musealized reality, but at the same time we create a relatively isolated meta-reality, which is intended for long-term preservation and use in culture-forming processes. Slovak museologist Richard Senček aptly writes: “In order for a given reality to be captured by the relevant museum, it is necessary to create an imaginary net of museum content (musealia) around the documented phenomenon, which will be equally dense around the whole of the documented phenomenon, this means that all relevant aspects will be documented axiologically equally (at approximately the same level)” (Senček 2019:34). Let us add that this net should not have a large mesh, empty areas where we lack objects that capture reality. On the other hand, this network should not be too strong, too thick, because duplicating objects no longer helps much in capturing reality.

The museum collection is undoubtedly also a documentation system, but what distinguishes it from other systems of this type? Information science also works with the term document, which is a deliberately created source, i.e. information fixed on a carrier. Of course, scientifically based musealization has documentary elements, but we must take into account the difference between museological and IT approaches. The level of the museum is ontic (in relation to being), while the level of information is data. Museums authentically document reality, computer scientists fix information on media and are not interested in the nature of media. We usually associate authenticity with material originality, which is not clear in all cases. As we have stated, for example, Prague’s Charles Bridge is authentic only for some of the stones of the foundation pillars. In these cases, the decisive factor is not material authenticity, but authenticity of form, which has a symbolic function. The preservation of an object in situ must be based on the assumption that this object is a convincing document of cultural and developmental benefit for society and not just a manifestation of antique status or nostalgia. We must convince society that preserving the past is in its interest and to its benefit. Recently, we have witnessed the renovation of many historic buildings, which, however, we sometimes failed to adequately integrate into the current life of society, into its current needs. Due to a lack of inventiveness, we then turn them into new “museums“. In the future, it may happen that the museum sphere will be described as a field that is very expensive and not very efficient.
Museology

As early as 1979, Stránský wrote that museology is a final science, not a causal science (Stránský 1979, 7). We can illustrate this „finality“ with the following examples, where sciences as diverse as political science, theoretical physics or ecology can be used. A theoretical physicist does not spend entire nights observing the universe. He makes use of astronomers’ knowledge that the universe is expanding (some energy is needed for this) and that the coherence of the galaxies does not correspond to our concept of gravity. On the basis of this knowledge (but also many others, e.g. from the microworld), the theoretical physicist then constructs theories about dark matter and dark energy, which leads to a knowledge of the basic principles of matter. A political scientist also does not spend entire days in the archive researching history. He makes use of the knowledge of historians (but also of other disciplines, such as sociology) to formulate theories about political systems, political party systems, etc. An ecologist is not an expert on the cell structure of plants. Using a number of sciences, he examines, describes, analyses and studies the relationships between organisms and their environment. It is this „relationship“ aspect that is close to our conception of museology.

Associate professor Stránský had a significantly observable shift in his theoretical thinking. At first, he tried to rigorously define museology as a science, separating it out within the human sciences. Towards the end of his life, on the other hand, he inclined towards a cognitive science combining various sciences into one science examining cognitive processes, looking for a way almost to a „Theory of Everything“ or „the Final Theory“.111, in which museology would play a significant, perhaps even a leading, role. Most other theorists went in the opposite direction, that is from the theory of the discipline towards solving practical problems.

How to summarize today’s conception of museology in the global context?

1. Museology is understood to be part of the historical sciences, dealing with the history of museums, important representatives of the museum sphere, examines the research history of archaeological and natural sites, etc. We do not question at all the significance of these research activities. The history of the museum phenomenon is part of museology. However, cultivating psychology or sociology, for example, is not only about discovering the history of one’s own field. The classification of museology as one of the historical sciences often leads to basic “genetic” shortcomings in the field. However, this approach seems to be very narrow and it would be difficult to consider such a museology as a separate university discipline or even a separate science.

2. Museology as a set of methods, techniques and work practices in museums, in other words museography or “museum studies”. It develops basic methods of conservation, registration and storage of collections, appropriate use

111) Expression of the British science theorist Mark McCutheon. We do not call into question everything that cognitive sciences have brought about, but we do hesitate over Stránský’s concept. The term “theory of everything” comes from J.D. Barrow. The American philosopher R.N. Giere understood the cognitive theory of science as a cultural activity whose subject is science itself.
of presentation methods (e.g. whether to use serif or sans serif fonts), basics of museum management and marketing, basics of working with the visitor, etc. There is no doubt that most of a museum worker’s activities are focused on these tasks and he should first be educated and then trained in them. We do not consider the boundaries between museography and museology to be sharp, separate edges. We do not consider this approach to be a university discipline either.

3. Museology not as a causal, basic science, but as a final discipline within the social sciences, or more exactly the human sciences, the cultural sciences. Using knowledge from related disciplines (the basic sciences cultivated in museums, theory of communication and informatics, psychology, sociology, culturology, etc.) it fills its irreplaceable space, its “niche”, adds its own “added value” to learning about man and society. It has its subject of research, methods and methodology, it creates its own language thesauruses. We consider this approach to be the most productive, which is why we have developed it in this text.

In an extensive internal text Alternatives to a Complex Resolution Problems of Museology dated 18 October 1998, former Vice-Rector of Masaryk University in Brno Jiří Fukač (1936-2002) characterizes museology as a field that exists „at the level of constant epistemological self-definitions and methodological manifestations”, and rarely has a defined Bachelor’s and Master’s curriculum. Furthermore, museology exists as an influential lobbying of the “luminaries” (coryphaeus) of that methodologization that gains them influential positions, for example within UNESCO.112 Jiří Fukač was a musicologist by education, but he was well acquainted with the issues of museology and we should allow his critical evaluation a high degree of relevance. One of the main reasons for writing the present book was to break down the situation that the now-deceased professor described so uncompromisingly. Our text could be a link across perhaps all directions that deal seriously with the theory of museology and to end vain methodological demonstrations. The text should be a guide for the shaping of bachelor’s, even more master’s but above all, doctoral programmes in museology. If there are still some „luminaries” in the field going around the world of conferences with messages of little benefit, then this text could also be of benefit for them, or rather, a guide for their superiors when addressing personnel issues.

112) This is an undisguised attack on Stránský and Sofka. Material In the private possession of the author.
12. MUSEOLOGY IN MUSEUM PRACTICE

In shaping the meaning of museology for society, we will use a cultural vocabulary. According to Zuzana Slušná (Slušná 2015, 15–21) theoretical culturology is a system of basic ideas about the being of culture. Applied culturology is then a bridge between theory and practice. The author cites, for example, her contribution to the development of public cultural policies and strategies as an example. Another part is “good practice“ – best practices and solutions, including elements of creativity, new ideas and thoughts. The processes of connecting museology with practice should be implemented in a similar way.

There are relatively few museologically trained or at least museologically minded museum staff. In addition to operational and technical staff, there are people in museums performing professional activities requiring special „non-museological“ training. These are not only curators, but also management, public relations staff, etc. However, in addition to this special training, they should have a certain „added value“ for working in museums, and that is a knowledge of museology. A museum is managed somewhat differently from a bank, public relations are cultivated differently than in a car company. We do not claim that all museum staff who have not studied museology are automatically wrong. Many of them have gained the necessary knowledge over years of practice in their job, which they do well. However, many cannot be described as successful even after they retire. A comparison with acting suggests. People have also established themselves in theatre and film without graduating from drama college, but this is not an argument for the abolition of these fields of study. Likewise, the occasional success of museum staff who have not graduated in museology cannot be an argument for not cultivating museology at universities.

We have seen many times that university students (archaeologists, historians, ethnologists, aestheticists, etc.) often have only a vague idea of what they will actually be doing in practice. Many see themselves as future science researchers, but universities and academies of science do not have enough vacancies for this, and the vast majority of graduates do not have the skills. The graduates are then „condemned“ to work in museums, to which they come as if they saw an inscription from Dante’s Inferno above the museum gate: Abandon hope all ye who enter here! In the museum, they then do what they enjoy at least a little or what they are suited to, or are looking for another job. This museum worker then researches and brings into the museum’s collections a favourite species of butterfly and does not think much about creating a collection as a documentary system of the region’s nature. If it becomes necessary to put together an exhibition, he then arranges butterflies (preferably more rather than less) in a display case and supplements them with a label and preferably a long text (this is how it has always been done...), in which he shows off his knowledge of Latin names and foreign words. For him, aspects of communication with the public are a far-off matter. Given the low criteria for evaluating the performance of museums (every museum must collect and exhibit something every year) there is no extraordinary „hunger“ for museology, which is sometimes rejected as something that complicates and disrupts established orders.
However, over time, some museum workers recognize that their work is chaotic, unsystematic, inefficient, etc., and seek answers to more general questions, asking "how to go about it." In this case, they try to take short-term courses, from which they expect a quickly absorbable practical "cookbook" to solve all their problems. We do not question the benefits of short-term courses or short methodological manuals, we have been involved in this area more than once, but we take them to be only an impulse to further self-education, as opening the door to a space that a course participant for the moment has no idea about. Whether or not that person goes through this "door" is very much up to them.

Course attendees very often point out that they are not interested at all in theory, that they are practitioners. But it is here that there is a major pitfall. We do not expect practical museum workers to spend long hours contemplating the definition of the museum or museology. They are the "general practitioners" of our museum system and take care of their patients (museums and their visitors) and do not cultivate "top science". However, without a knowledge of anatomy, physical and the chemical processes in the human body (knowledge of "body theory"), a general practitioner would be quite lost. Likewise, the museum worker should be able to break free from everyday practice and be able to "see past the display case." If a graduate in any field gets to be a civil servant, for example, he decides which museum project is more meaningful and which is not. If in the position, say, of a civil servant preparing new laws or cultural strategies in the field of heritage, then he cannot manage without some theoretical knowledge, at least in defining from where and how far the term museum actually goes. Here, theoretical knowledge is essential.

Museology, like all other sciences, serves the specific needs of humanity, so it is a purely practical field. However, its cultivation and development cannot take place only in the form of seminars, conferences or short-term courses in which the more experienced would teach newcomers. The preparation of museum workers for practice necessarily requires the existence of university facilities with a strong employee specialization. The era of polyhistorism is over. However, these facilities must meet all the requirements of university discipline, inter alia genuinely scientific performance, sufficient degree coverage for the needs of accreditation, three-level study\textsuperscript{113} etc.

A fundamental, massive, but in fact really an empty dispute is over whether the teaching of museology should be theoretically or practically oriented. We know a Department of Museology whose head says in all seriousness that a student who can't hammer in a nail won't get their bachelor's degree. We are not a priori opposed to teaching certain specific museographic skills, but let us not confuse the university with a vocational school! We do not know a single university historian (ethnologist, etc.) who would boast that he does not devote himself to high science, that he is mainly concerned with practicality. Unfortunately, it is sometimes different in museology curricula.

\textsuperscript{113} In the Slovak-Czech area, only Comenius University in Bratislava had an accredited doctoral programme in museology and cultural heritage.
We would like to compare the relevant teaching programme in museology to the teaching of pedagogy, which surely no one doubts is a science. Pedagogy teaching programmes are full of subjects explaining how to teach, including the methodology of the teaching process, techniques and teachers’ work methods, i.e. a kind of „pedagography“. However, the teaching of pedagogy cannot be performed without a theoretical approach to the scientific discipline in question, i.e. a clearly formulated „pedagology“.

It is necessary to realize how many misunderstandings arise from inconsistent terminology or poor translation. In many cases, the word museology is used only as a more appealing term for museum work. This is perhaps the biggest problem of today’s museological output. Museology is a university discipline. Undoubtedly associated with the museum sphere, but we would dare to use the comparison with linked vessels. We know from physics that when we pour a liquid into one vessel, this immediately manifests itself in a vessel linked to it. As part of their absolutely practical activities, museums must look for cases of best practice; work methods can then be developed from them. This is where museography begins, i.e. the methods and techniques of work in a museum. From these methods, methodologies are formed, where the theory of the field begins – in our case, museology. Immediate results from museums should therefore be reflected in museology only after a certain delay, only after methodological evaluation. The opposite is also true, on the basis of theoretical museological knowledge the practical museum worker thinks about how (undoubtedly gradually) he will implement them at his facility. Therefore, whether museum work is participatory (Nina Simon), interrogative and associated with social work (Raymund Silverman), or with social inclusion (Richard Sandell), perhaps even partially reflecting crowd sourcing – crowd knowledge (Peter van Mensch), not everything, however, can be directly related to museology. We do not know a university discipline that would be fundamentally dependent on the knowledge of the crowd. All people in the civilized world have been educated by someone for about 8-20 years, but certainly not all are pedagogy experts and university professors of pedagogy do not take to the streets to ask what to teach and what to research. Professors of culturology do not carry out similar activities, although we grant at least a minimum level of culture to every citizen.

If we go down the endless highway of the Internet, we find that output involving the word museology is huge. Slovak gallerist Petra Hanáková humorously calls this research surfing (Hanáková 2010). The vast majority of this production, however, is about museums and museum work, but has little to do with museology. A small part of the output is an „attempt at museology“. A popular theorist is mentioned and the traditional „case study“ continues. So from Heidegger, there is a quick slide into an ecomuseum with four hundred buffaloes. In practice, truly museological output is meagre in volume.

For the further successful cultivation of museology, the realization of two seemingly contradictory currents is necessary, i.e. the approximation and, in a sense, a moving away of museology towards and from museum practice. What do we mean by this?
Museology must become the theoretical basis, the principle, the “background” of museum practice. A museum professional must be able to conceive of his collection as a structure, i.e. a well-thought-out system. He must know the theoretical principles of museum communications, etc. Museology must be interspersed with practice. Universities must also help with this. The meaning of museology is not in how many certified publications a year the department staff achieve. The meaning of museology is that practitioners feel need the need for it, they require its cultivation, that they make use of museology and apply it in their daily work. Then the results of the memorial institutions will certainly be more convincing.

But what do we mean by that „moving away“? Again, we will help by comparing it with culturology. Even for the best employee of the cultural awareness centre, we do not understand his work as, in the true sense of the word, the development of culturology. In the same way, a departmental culturologist is some way away from the daily practice of a folklore ensemble. Ivo Maroevič also wrote about the tendency to separate the museum and museology (Maroevič 1998, 338). Wojciech Gluziński rightly asks whether museology is about a sphere of activities or about the science of a sphere of activities. He sees an analogy in the engineer who, when inventing a machine, is not doing mechanics, but is forming a structure to implement the laws of mechanics (Gluziński 1983). It is obvious that the manufacturer of mobile phones does not develop electromagnetism, but without knowledge of its principles he would be lost.

In the world of museology it is as if it were different. The constant call for museology to be more closely linked to practice means that museologists often comment on museographic issues, something we cannot entirely reject, we have done so many times ourselves. However, for some museologists, this is a necessity because they themselves do not see in greater depth. But the theory of practice itself is not a good theory for practice. The phrase „I’m a museologist“ and the phrase „I’m a museum worker“ are seldom uttered by the same person.

But let us re-use the observations, now more than thirty-five years old, of the Polish museologist who writes that scientists smile ironically at the word museology and museum workers laugh indulgently at the propensity of museology to theorize (Gluziński 1983). He also believes that the task of museology is not to deprive other disciplines of their own tasks, and criticizes museology’s exaggerated ideas about itself. According to Gluziński, a historian in a museum cultivates history as a science, but a museum worker does not practice a science called museology. Gluziński correctly writes that it is a mistake to think that the theory that serves practice should be a theory of practice (Gluziński 1987). So the best theory for practice is not a theory of practice! After all, „a theory of practice“ cannot stimulate any progress. Gluziński adds: the stagnation of productive practices transferred by means of such types of knowledge from generation to generation is well known in history. Let us position the views of the Polish museologist in an understandable manner. Museology does not have the ambition to replace anything or anyone. We are not
at all following a path of removing museum specialists and replacing them with „omniscient“ museologists. Museology is „added value“ for the work of a museum employee or more exactly the employee of a memorial institution. Nothing more, but also nothing less.
13. CONCLUSION

How to formulate the conclusions of our investigation? We are convinced that the core of the further development of museology as a scientific discipline is the current of thought which we have called, not quite exactly, Central European, and which was formulated in the period from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s. These ideas are still evolving, but they do not constitute the mainstream of current museological output. We have tried to identify this stream of theoretical thinking in the field of museology and to compare the main differences between the individual theorists and to prove the validity of the individual approaches of some and to reject the approaches of others. We have pointed out the connection between museology and everyday practice. However, we have put the by-now 30-50 year-old concept into the present-day situation, i.e. we have blended it with current philosophical trends, with new directions in the development of society, especially Western society, and with new technologies that earlier theorists had no idea about. We have devoted quite a lot of space not so much to „creation“ as to „destruction“. We wanted to eliminate or at least relativize many lines of thinking in museology, which are, in our opinion, dead ends and confusing thicket without the necessary attributes of a science and a museology beneficial on their margins rather than at the centre of their thinking. The whole text was, in fact, an act of renewed self-assurance that institutions of memory, and therefore society as a whole, do not need a new, reflexive, critical or even post-critical or eco-museology. They do not need a post-museum or anti-museum. They need a museum and museology.

Francois Mairesse, referring to Bruno Latour’s approaches, expressed an interesting opinion on the shaping of contemporary science. According to him, Stránský was a representative of older approaches to science, when he demanded for each science its own subject of research, methodology and language (Mairesse 2015). According to Latour, science is now conceived differently. It needs:

1. a mobilization of the world – a concentration of knowledge (libraries, laboratories),
2. a strengthening, empowering of research – the professionalization of the sector, congresses, the creation of platforms for collaboration, scientific journals in which articles are read and criticized,
3. allies,
4. showmanship – to convince the surrounding world, officials, taxpayers.

The views of the French sociologist are somewhat cynical, but perhaps realistic. Museology has more than a few libraries, but far fewer laboratories (actual research centres). There are quite a few conferences, seminars, and the output of articles and monographs is not small, either.

However, actual, genuinely scientific criticism (in the sense of evaluation) is significantly influenced by a certain verbosity within the field. There are few truly museological journals. But let’s stop at the third point of Latour’s concept.
Museology does not have many allies, friends. The pressure for real museology is not exerted either from below (from museums), nor within universities or the bodies responsible for the conceptual resolution of the entire field of heritage. Also, that „showmanship“ of museologists, convincing those around them of the need for museology, is not enough.

In his introduction to the Russian edition of van Mensch’s doctoral thesis, Mairesse interestingly describes the future of museology (Mairesse 2014), giving three possible variants:

1. Museology disappears, “as bibliology did in the 19th century (the science of the book)”, developing into the more practical library science or library studies. In Mairesse’s concept bibliology “now refers to the study of the bible”.
2. Museology will continue on a very modest and short scale.
3. In museology, the practicist tendencies of Anglo-Saxon “museum studies” will prevail, which are not based on any special methodology, are sufficiently eclectic and pragmatic, and attract much wider interest than any other concept.

It is clear from our text that we are convinced of the damage to be done by the eventual demise of museology or by its merely modest survival. However, we do not question the danger of the predominance of purely practicist approaches in museology. Then the very logical question would suggest itself of whether museology deserves to be cultivated as a university discipline. In our opinion, further developments should not lead to any of Mairesse’s predictions. However, for this it is necessary to put the whole field of museology on a truly scientific basis, which is the main goal of this monograph.

We conclude our text with a story from Italo Calvino’s Cosmicomics, where an ancient being named Qfwfg tells the history of the universe. In the short story The Aquatic Uncle (Calvino 1968, 75–88) it comes to the period when beings ceased to live in the water and began to live on land as a higher stage of nature’s development. A family living on land was somewhat unpleasantly surprised by Uncle N’ba N’ba, who remained living at sea with his girlfriend Lli, refusing to live as advanced creatures.

Perhaps museums have remained only „fishes“ and are not as attractive or advanced as „amphibians“, i.e. other communicators – film, the internet, digital technology, etc. However, we are well aware that a world without fish would lead to a complete disaster, and perhaps a world without museums also. So the task of museums is not to change into something else. The task of a museum is to be a good museum. But without museology that will not work.

114) Mairesse translates the French word bibliology into English as bibliology, which was translated into Russian as библиология. In Czech, we would probably use the term knihověda (bibliology), which, however, is still cultivated in the Czech environment as the science of book culture.
14. MUSEUMS AND TECHNOLOGY. EPILOGUE

There are now tens of thousands of museums across the world which, as documentation centres of nature’s past and man’s history, protect a wonderfully varied palette of collection items and of information systems on the collections and the milieux from which they were taken. On this basis within their communications channels museums build above all permanent and temporary exhibitions, with an understandably wide range of focus. Which topics are currently the most attractive and the most in demand? This is a complicated question which is difficult to answer in a comprehensive manner. The most well-known galleries and museums dealing with the ecological concerns of the present day all enjoy large visitor numbers; there is interest in learning the history of one’s own region or country, both as “grand narratives” as well as micro-stories of, say, an ethnological nature. However there is also great interest in technical museums.

Technology has accompanied mankind from its very beginnings. Man’s predecessors fashioned simple tools and indeed it was the production of tools that was one of the chief signs of the separation of man from his animal forebears. The first protomuseums arose, which later became true museums; in their collections we find more than one document of technology, either of the day or from the past. Often this “documenting of technology” was linked to the documentation of their own period. Nowadays we are surrounded by technology at every turn. Even items which at first sight look “non-technical” (a pet bottle, an ash tray, a ballpoint pen) were made using technology, sometimes from a mould fashioned by a tool-maker. A crucial question then arises for museums which see themselves as technical museums. What collection items to extract from the current universe and how to present them? How to narrow down today’s technological universe into museum collection-building programmes? I believe that the activities of technical museums should turn on documenting “tools and machines”; although I am aware of the range of pitfalls of this approach. Tools from prehistory and the Middle Ages will certainly engage the attention of archaeological museums, musical instruments will be collected in particular by museums dealing with man’s musical output, while ethnologists will proudly identify with mill machinery. It is clear that the actual concepts of technology will always vary, will overlap, which will always be seen in the documentation and presentation focus of museums. This overlap is logical and entirely correct. In the so-called “Czech mill layout” a technician sees craftsmanship, the ethnologist or cultural anthropologist sees social relations (including local dialect expressions and clothing) in the use of the mill, while the historian sees the economic benefit of the mill in the growth of a particular microregion, and so on. In practice a museum is not so much concerned with the “Czech mill layout” as with the philosophical considerations laid down by Jan Patočka, with the “worlds behind”, the craftsman’s workshop, his clothes, speech, habits, and also the money obtained from selling the flour and disbursed by his

115) No small number of displayed musical instruments, including demonstrations of their manufacture, can be found, for example, in the well prepared exposition in the Museo Della Scienza E Della Tecnologia Leonardo da Vinci in Milan, the largest Italian museum devoted to science and technology. See, for example, Dolák, Jan. Museums of Five Continents. Brno: Brno Technical Museum, 2020, p. 63.
family. There are many of these worlds, perhaps an infinite number, with most of them at first glance being hidden from the simple observer. The contemporary slogan “Make things different” prompts us to creativity, to a blending of approaches. To insist on the traditional form for a museum might be considered not only somewhat orthodox, but perhaps even rather rigid. In practice it would be foolish to strive for, and at the theoretical museological level, to strictly distinguish a clearly defined “typology of museums”.

In this, we can turn also to the theory of science. The Czech philosopher and methodologist of science Břetislav Fajkus correctly points out: “As far as technical artefacts are concerned, they are interpreted either as a simple imitation of nature, or as the mechanical application of theories. However, from the viewpoint of mental handiwork, neither of these is satisfactory, because they disregard aspects of human imagination, inventiveness and creativity”. Referring to the philosopher and logician Ladislav Tondl (1924–2015), Fajkus “… emphasises the need for a social evaluation of science and technology, where importance is assigned to the humanistic aspects of technological artefacts, their meaning for man and his self-realisation” (Fajkus 2005, 267).

Whether we are looking at the earliest evidence of being deliberately surrounded by items for non-utilitarian reasons, or are dealing with entirely contemporary activities, we will not find sharp boundaries between the “disciplines”. Man has extracted items from his universe for a variety of reasons - aesthetic, memorial, for representation of self, and so on, but overwhelmingly for a combination of these reasons. From which “clear” angles is today’s museum (or gallery) worker to view items, or even to differentiate them? Is a Celtic decoration made from a human skull a product of nature (anthropology), archaeology or art? Where is the transition between the academic art which creates a statue and the folk art displayed as flowers on a 19th century chest? We will find many suitable examples breaking up any kind of sharp “museum typology”. Is a kitchen mixer in a museum there as a technical design or as evidence of the aesthetic sense of the period? If the American theoretician of marketing Ted Decker could write “Everything is marketing”, today we can paraphrase his statement as “Everything, or almost everything, is technology”.

A certain hybridity is called for in most cases, even if it impedes an exact definition of the museum, for the needs, say, of the national or international grouping of museums. As an example, we might consider the Technical Museum in Brno as a successful example of this “blending”. The Technical Museum in Brno follows on from its earlier history, when it was a branch of the National Technical Museum in Prague, was then established separately in 1961, and thus is now one of the more recent museums in the country as a whole. The present director, Ing. Ivo Štěpánek (Štěpánek 2021), has been concerned most recently with the museum’s development. The alterations to the social and economic environment since 1989 have without doubt been the most significant change. New concerns arose to go with the joy at the disappearance of the “ideological blanket” which
covered and controlled even apparently apolitical activities such as documenting and presenting technology. In 1996, pursuant to the restitution of ecclesiastical property, the Museum lost its main building and a merger with the Moravian Museum was threatened. But on 5 June 2003 after a difficult period the Museum opened its new building containing 13 expositions and an Experimentarium. The doyen of Czech museology Zbyněk Z. Stránský most aptly called the whole major project a rescued museum (Stránský 2005a). In addition to its “in fondo” exposition, the Technical Museum in Brno operates and with its special programmes brings to life memorial objects “in situ” (mills, a forge, a hammer mill, an ironworks, an exhibition of the Czechoslovak fortifications and the Iron Curtain), scattered across the whole of Moravia. An ambitious project for a further branch of the museum is taking shape this year - A Museum of the Customs Service, at Hatě on the Czech-Austrian border. The Depositaries of Historic Vehicles in Brno-Líšeň are a special “branch” or “exposition”. This is providing access to collections without interpretation (see Dolák 2015, 2020).

Technical museums are, in fact, museums of the history of technology, even though I do not necessarily suggest that they should be renamed.

Closely related to this is a basic question. What staff should technical museums employ? As a matter of fact, there are two basic solutions at hand:

1. Professionals trained in history, yet understanding (or being able to catch up with the knowledge of) issues such as air jet looms or the nature of nanotechnology. Let me say, at this point, that teaching the history of science and technology does not appear to be a strong point of a number of history departments at universities.

2. The other option is to employ professionals with technical training (and pay them accordingly), who will learn the methodology of the historian’s work.

The training of a technical museum staff member should then be a suitable mix of subject knowledge and museology. Here we are pleased to acknowledge that it is at the Technical Museum in Brno that we find among the staff the greatest number of museology graduates in the Czech Republic, even among members of middle and even top management. But not only that. Many of the museum’s employees have long been involved in teaching students of museology and the related disciplines; subjects connected with the conservation and restoration of collection items are provided by the museum itself. The museum thus serves as a kind of “trainer” for professionals just starting out.

The most difficult and responsible task for a museologist is the well-thought-out creation of a collection. Documentation of the rapid development of technology presents technical museums with a difficult task, but not one that is impossible, or incapable of implementation. The issue of contemporary documentation, still sometimes underestimated, is extremely closely related to the creation of the museum’s collection. It is to the credit of the curator of the technical museum that he consciously or even only subconsciously understands that text recording did not stop with the invention of the typewriter, but it is necessary to have a completely contemporary “recording” technique in collections, that the most
modern robots are the successors to simple human helpers. The documentation of the present, in other words the documentation of the continuity of development, is usually better managed in technical museums than in other types of museums. A great number of technical museums are still too fond of documenting the “old”, from steam engines to historic music machines. And rightly so, because such collections do pertain to museums. However, the collection building activities of a museum are closely related to the issues of recording the present time, which is, in my opinion, still largely underestimated. If we are indifferent, what is now easily available at a relatively low price, including the possibility to make comprehensive accompanying documentation, will be difficult and expensive to find for our grandchildren with the passing of decades, and only in fragmentary and relict condition. Documenting the present time is the task for many museums, such as ethnographic museums, as our habits are in a constant and rapid change. This is the task for historical, science and similar types of museums. The fastest changes, in my opinion, are those that take place in technology. Do you also have a number of PC floppy disks at home without having a floppy disk drive on your computer to use them? Do we know that perhaps even the most complicated product made by human hands, the Swiss Large Hadron Corridor in CERN, was made up of products manufactured by Moravian companies?

It is in technical museum management, or rather in its presentation activities, that we perhaps most clearly see the advent of modern technologies and current museum pedagogical procedures. It is often difficult to transfer sometimes complex physical or chemical relationships into a language that the visitor can understand. Evidently each technical museum uses various haptic facilities (“playrooms”) to demonstrate the origins or rather the use of its collection items, thus growing into a combination of museum and science centre. Conversely, almost every science centre has something in its exposition that we can call a collection item without blushing.

Science centres do not usually collect prototypes, as is sometimes wrongly written in would-be museological treatises. In most cases, they have original equipment to demonstrate certain phenomena. If they acquire or invent another device which illustrates or presents the same phenomena in a better way, they are happy to stop using or even dispose of the original “prototype”. So far so good, man is Homo Ludens, a playful creature. Some philosophers think, that this civilization will either be “Ludens” (playful) or will not exist at all. However, do not let us transform the mass museum discourse into a free game without rules, without a goal and, in fact, without a deeper sense. Many other organisations, institutions and facilities have been doing this for us already (Dolák 2012).

The management of the Technical Museum in Brno is well aware that modern museum work cannot be done without knowledge of the situation in other countries and without ties to an international professional forum. The staff of the museum are active not only within the Association of Technical Museums of Central Europe, but also within the ICOM International Council of Museums
and their commissions (let us mention at random ICOFOM, CIMUSET and others). The museum wins domestic and international awards, annually organizes professional meetings of museum workers and publishes scientific, in many cases directly museological, literature, and still has ambitious plans for the future. The Technical Museum proudly subscribes to the legacy of Z. Z. Stránský and organized a representative international museological conference on the 80th anniversary of his birth (Komárková 2008). For several years, the Technical Museum, together with the UNESCO Chair of Museology and World Heritage at Masaryk University in Brno, has organized a series of “Theory and Practice” conferences focused on current topics in museology. The proceedings of the most important meeting with extensive international participation - Museology at the Beginning of the 3rd Millennium - in 2008 became the first Czech entry in the world Web of Science database in the field of museology (Dolák 2009).

The Technical Museum in Brno is well aware that heritage is not a state, but a process. This procedural, and not static approach to everything we do is a basic imperative for the technical museum sphere as well.
16. BIBLIOGRAPHY


Bělohradský, V. 2016: Demokracie jako hrozba? (Democracy as a Threat?) Právo, 30.7.2016, 8.


Beneš, J. 1994: Sbírkový předmět jako muzeologický problém (The Collection Item as a Museological Problem). In the private possession of the author.


Břešťan, R. 2018: Špína se na povrch vyvalí náhle a rychle, říká o antisemitismu v Evropě ředitel Židovského muzea (Dirt comes to the surface suddenly and quickly, says Director of the Jewish Museum, of anti-Semitism in Europe). Hlídací pes, 27 August 2018. Available at: https://hlidacipes.org/spina-se-na-povrch-vyvali-nahle-a-rychle-rika-o-antisemitismu-v-evrope-reditel-zidovskeho-muzea/

Buckingham, W; Burnaham, D; Clive, H; King, J; P. Marenbon, J; Weeks, M; 2013: Kniha filozofie (The Philosophy Book). Praha.


Burke, P. 2011: Co je kulturní historie? (What is Cultural History?) Praha.


Čejpek, J. 2005: Informace, komunikace a myšlení... (Information, communication and thinking...) Praha.


Dolák, J. 2009a: Muzea a památková péče teorie oboru(ů) (Museums and monument care theory of the discipline(s)). In: Tomášek, J. ed., Život a ochrana movitých a nemovitých památek s ohledem na rozvoj historických sídel (The life...
and protection of movable and immovable monuments with regard to the development of historic settlements. Pelhřimov, pp. 9–17.


Dolák, J. 2012: Museology and the technical museums at the beginning of the 21th century. In Technical museums as guardians and educators. Brno, pp. 11–14


Douša, P. 2008: Muzeologická prolegomena (Museological prolegomena). Konstrukce a výklad vybraných problémů muzeologie pro potřeby historických věd (Construction and interpretation of selected problems of museology for the needs of the historical sciences), Opava, Slezská univerzita 2008, abstract of a rigorous thesis.


Drobný, T. 2016: Sbírky relikvií nástrojem reprezentace ideje státnosti Karla IV (Collections of relics as an instrument of representation of the idea of statehood of Charles IV). In Muzeoló gia a kulturné dedičstvo No 1, pp. 41–52.


Folga-Januszewska, D. 2016: Might Museology be a part of Neurosciences?
Museologica Brunensia Vol. 5, No 1, pp. 5–14.
Hempel, C. G. 2015: Filozofie přírodních věd (Philosophy of the Natural Sciences). Ostrava.


Hlobil, I. 1979: K otázce teorie památkové péče (On the Question of the Theory of Monument Care), Umění 27, No 3, pp. 207-214.


Holzbachová, I. 2003: Příspěvky k otázkám filozofie vědy (Contributions to issues of the philosophy of science). Brno.


Jiroutová, J. 2014: Muzejní a galerijní pedagogika pohledem zahraničních odborníků (Museum and gallery pedagogy as seen by foreign experts). Olomouc.
Keller, J. 2016: Jinakost obohacuje (Otherness enriches), Právo, 8 August 2016, p. 6.


Lord, B. 2011: Prostory života a smrti (Spaces of life and death). Muzeum a laboratoř jako způsob doсаžení nesmrtelnosti (The museum and laboratory as a way of achieving immortality). Available at: https://www.advojka.cz/archiv/2011/11/prostoryzivota-a-smrтi


Mensch van, P. 2016a: Metamuseological challenges in the work of Zbyněk Stránský, Museologica Brunensia, No 2, pp. 18–26.


Navarro, Ó. 2012: History and education as bases for museum legitimacy in Latin American museums: Some comments for discussion from a critical museology point of view. Museologica Brunensia, No 1, pp. 28–33.


Osolsobě, I. 2007: Principia parodica: Totiž posbírané papíry převážně o divadle
(Principia parodica: Namely, collected papers mainly about the theatre). Praha.
Parker, H. W. 1963: The museum as a communication system, Curator, č. 6, pp. 350–360.
Patočka, J. – Heřmanová, E. 2008: Lokální a regionální kultura v České republice: kulturní prostor, kulturní politika a kulturní dědictví (Local and regional culture in the Czech Republic: cultural space, cultural policy and cultural heritage). Praha.
Přibáň, J. 2011: Miss Amerika a její (ne)mravnost (Miss America and her (im) morality). Právo, 27.10.2011, Salon, p. 8.
Psstružina, K. 2002: Vědecké metody z pohledu kognitivní vědy (Scientific methods from the point of view of cognitive science). In: Kelemen, J. Kvasnička, V. (eds.) Kognice a umělý život (Cognition and Artificial Life) II. Available at: <ftp://147.175.64.215/pub/vlado/CogSci_AL_Milovy/PSTRUZINA.pdf>.


Rybář, R. 2001: Reflexe kultury postmoderní Evropy (Reflections on the culture of postmodern Europe). In: Perspektivy občanské společnosti v integrující se Evropě (Perspectives for Civil Society in an Integrating Europe), Brno, pp. 158–163.


Sapanža, O. S. 2008: Metodologija teoreticeskogo muzeevedenija. Sankt-Petersburg.


Šteffl, O. 2018: K čemu samé jedničky (What use are top grades)? Praha.


Šuleř, P. 1981: Muzealita – vlastnost, stav či funkce (Museality – property, state or function)? Muzeologické sešity (Museological Notebooks) VIII/81, 1, pp. 41–147.


Třeštík, D. 2001: Dějiny jako dějiny společností nebo jako dějiny kultur? (History as the history of societies or as the history of cultures?) Dějiny a současnost (History and the Present), 4/2001, pp. 29–33.


Walshburn, W. E. 1979: Babičkologie a muzeologie (Grandmaology and Museology). In: Metodický list Moravského muzea (Methodology sheet of the Moravian Museum) 1/1979, pp. 11–22 (translation into Czech from Curator, 10, 1967, No 1, pp. 43–48).

Weischedel, W. 1995: Zadní schodiště filozofie (The back stairs to philosophy). Olomouc


Abstract

Muzeologie je jako univerzitní disciplína pěstována šedesát let, ale kromě jejího nepochybného kvantitativního rozvoje došlo k jejímu částečnému teoretickému rozvolnění. Proto je třeba zkoumat, kam se dostala ve svých metodách, metodologii, tedy ve své teoretické podstatě. Starší i nejnovější proudy muzeologického myšlení byly podrobeny kritické analýze, postaveny do světla současné filozofie, sociologie a kulturologie, byla zkoumána problematika dědictví a paměti. Muzejní předmět byl představen jako věc a fakt ve filozofickém slova smyslu, muzejní sbírka je pojímána jako struktura, zvláštní kapitola je věnována muzejní komunikaci. Komparativní metodou, srovnáním přístupů k muzeologii na všech kontinentech, bylo dosaženo shrnujících výsledků a nových metodologických i terminologických výstupů. Závěr textu je věnován prolnutí muzeologie s praxí, doporučení dalších možných směrů teoretického bádání a případné budoucnosti muzeologie jako vědního oboru.

Résumé

La muséologie comme discipline universitaire est développée depuis soixante ans mais à côté de son expansion quantitave indubitável, une défocalisation théorique partielle peut être observée. Il faut donc se poser la question où elle a avancé dans ses méthodes, sa méthodologie et ses bases théoriques. Les courants antérieurs et récents de la pensée muséologique ont été soumis à une analyse critique, jugés sous la lumière de la philosophie, sociologie et culturologie contemporaines, les questions du patrimoine et de la mémoire ont été traitées. L'objet de musée a été présenté comme objet matériel et fait dans le sense philosophique du mot, la collection de musée est conçue comme structure, un chapitre spécial est consacré à la communication muséale. Par le biais de la comparaison des acceptions de la muséologie sur tous les continents on a abouti aux résultats généraux et conclusions méthodologiques et terminologiques. La partie finale du texte est consacrée à l'interpénétration de la muséologie et de la pratique, aux recommandations des voies possibles de recherche théorique et au futur de la muséologie comme discipline scientifique.

Abstrakt

Museologie als Universitätswissenschaft wird seit sechzig Jahren betrieben, aber neben ihrer unbefrittenen quantitativen Entfaltung wird eine teilweise theoretische Lockerung beobachtet. Daher ist zu fragen, wohin sie in ihren Methoden, Methodologie, also in ihrem theoretischen Wesen gelangte. Ältere sowie jüngere Strömungen im museologischen Denken wurden einer kritischen Analyse unterzogen, ins Licht der gegenwärtigen Philosophie, Soziologie und Kulturologie gestellt, es wurde die Problematik des Kulturerbes und des Gedächtnisses behandelt. Der Museumsgegenstand wurde als Objekt und Fakt im philosophischen Sinne des Wortes vorgestellt, die Museumssammlung als Struktur aufgefasst, ein spezielles Kapitel wurde der Museumskommunikation gewidmet. Mittels des Vergleichs der Museologiekonzeptionen auf allen
Abstract

Museology as an university discipline has been developed for sixty years but besides its indubitable quantitative advance, a partial theoretical loosening may be observed. It is therefore necessary to explore where it got with its methods, methodology, and its theoretical foundation. Both older and more recent streams of museological thinking have been subjected to critical analysis, considered in the light of current philosophy, sociology, and culturology, questions of heritage and memory have been discussed. The museum item has been presented as an object and a fact in philosophical sense of the word, museum collection has been considered a structure, a special chapter has been dedicated to museum communication. Summarizing results and new methodological and terminological outputs have been achieved by means of comparing the approaches to museology on all the continents. The final part of the text is dedicated to blending of museology and practice, recommendations of further possible directions of theoretical research and to the future of museology as a scientific discipline.

Абстракт

Музеология как университетская дисциплина развивалась на протяжении последних 60 лет. Но наряду с таким безусловным экстенсивным успехом, мы можем констатировать и некоторые ее трудности с теоретической точки зрения. Следовательно, необходимо рассмотреть куда и к чему привели ее методы, методология и теоретические основания. И прежние и нынешние направления музеологической мысли подвергнуты критическому анализу, рассматриваясь в свете современной философии, социологии и культурологии, обсуждаются вопросы наследия и памяти. Музейный предмет представлен как объект и факт в философском смысле этого слова, музейная коллекция осмысляется как структура, отдельная глава посвящена музейной коммуникации. Объединение результатов с новыми методологическими и терминологическими достижениями достигнуто посредством сравнения подходов к музеологии на всех континентах. Последняя часть текста посвящена соединению музеологии и практики, рекомендациям относительно дальнейших возможных направлений теоретического исследования и будущего музеологии как научной дисциплины.
# NAME INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>PAGE REFERENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABINGDON, CH, H.</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADORNO, T.</td>
<td>74, 76, 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGREN, P.U.</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHMAS, K.</td>
<td>144, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBRECHT V.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALEXANDER, P.</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMBROSE, T.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN, L.</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANANIEV, V. G.</td>
<td>18, 33, 120, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDREEVA I.</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARDOUIN, C. D.</td>
<td>32, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARENDT, H.</td>
<td>102, 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCHANGELOV, C. A.</td>
<td>166, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARINZE, E.</td>
<td>32, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARISTOTLE</td>
<td>8, 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUCK, H.</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACON, F.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAHN, S.</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACH, M.M.</td>
<td>120, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAŠINKA, M.</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAUDRILLARD, J.</td>
<td>79, 80, 81, 82, 88, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAUER, A.A.</td>
<td>131, 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAUMAN, Z.</td>
<td>130, 136, 149, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAUER, A.:24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAZIN, G.</td>
<td>22, 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BECK, U.</td>
<td>149, 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEDEKAR, V.H.:2</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELL, D.</td>
<td>69, 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BÉLOHRADEK, V.</td>
<td>148, 193, 136, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELTING, H.</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENEDICT XVI:</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENEŠ J.:</td>
<td>34, 35, 41, 51, 114, 123, 147, 153, 166, 193, 197, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENJAMIN, W.:</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENNETT, T.</td>
<td>145, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENOIST, L.:2</td>
<td>20, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BERGER, PL.:</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BERGERON, Y.:</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEZPALAYA, M.</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEZZUBBOVA, O. V.:</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIEBERSTEIN VON, J.R.:2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIEDERMANN, B.:</td>
<td>66, 149, 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELIK, L.:</td>
<td>77, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIRÁ, M.</td>
<td>24, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIRYUKOVA, M.:</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BITUSÍKOVÁ, A.:</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACKMORE, S.:</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOCK-COTE, M.:</td>
<td>127, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BONDY, E.:</td>
<td>153, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BORGE, J.L.:</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOTT, G.:</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOYD, R.:</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOŽENEK, K.:</td>
<td>171, 194, 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOYIN, S.:</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOURDIEU, P.:</td>
<td>88, 90, 91, 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOUVRARD, F.D.B.:</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAGA, C.:</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRÁZDA, R.:</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRNGALOVÁ, L.:</td>
<td>41, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRŮŽA, O.:</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BROWN, K.E.:</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BŘEŠTÁN, R.:</td>
<td>129, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUCKINGHAM, W.:</td>
<td>60, 77, 135, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUDIL, I.T.:</td>
<td>70, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULATOVIČ, Ď.:</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURCAW, G. E.:</td>
<td>23, 26, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURKE, E.:</td>
<td>71, 129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURKE, P.:</td>
<td>9, 40, 69, 72, 128, 135, 149, 158, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURKHART, J.:</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURNAHAM, D.:</td>
<td>60, 77, 135, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALVIN, L.:</td>
<td>186, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMILLO, G.:</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMERON, D.:</td>
<td>27, 122, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMERON, F.:</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPRA, F.:</td>
<td>71, 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARILLO, R.:</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARNAP, R.:</td>
<td>46, 47, 61, 164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDRENIUS, G.:</td>
<td>31, 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEJPEK, J.:</td>
<td>154, 155, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAESSENS, D.:</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLIVE, H.:</td>
<td>60, 77, 135, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLUNAS, C.:</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLEMAN, L.V.:</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLUMBUS, CH.:</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIMP, D.:</td>
<td>38, 88, 140, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSÚTÓRTŐKYOVÁ, D.:</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ČERMÁK, K.:</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ČERNÝ, V.:</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ČISTOTINOVÁ, S.:</td>
<td>17, 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANA, J.C.:</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DARULOVÁ, J.:</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAVALLON, J.:</td>
<td>28, 40, 170, 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAVIS, A.:</td>
<td>193, 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAVIS, P.:</td>
<td>27, 134, 169, 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAWKINS, R.:</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEAN, D.:</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECAROLIS, N.:</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*BIBLIOTHECA XXI* CULTURAE ET SCRIPTORIUM, J. K. VOBRY (ED.), 2014
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEDEČEK, V.</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELOCHÉ, B.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENEEN, P. J.</td>
<td>71, 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DERRIDA, J.</td>
<td>77, 78, 79, 87, 88, 145, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEWDNEY, A.</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIBOSA, D.</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIDEROT, D.</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DILTHEY, W.</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DITE, T.</td>
<td>195, 5, 35, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOUŠA, P.</td>
<td>159, 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROBŇY, T.</td>
<td>9, 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DROUGUET, N.</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUKELSKIJ, V. J.</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUNCAR, C.</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DURMAN, K.</td>
<td>129, 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVOŘÁK, A.</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVOŘÁK, M.</td>
<td>95, 96, 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYROFF, H-D.</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECO, U.</td>
<td>52, 62, 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBREY, P.</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EINSTEIN, A.</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENNENBACH, W.</td>
<td>10, 23, 24, 75, 131, 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÉRI, I.</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FÄGEBORG, E.</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAJKUS, B.</td>
<td>84, 85, 108, 164, 188, 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FALK, J.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEDOROV, N. F.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEYERABEND, P.K.</td>
<td>67, 69, 72, 88, 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISCHEROVÁ, S.</td>
<td>79, 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLAUBERT, G.</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLÜGEL, K.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOLGA-JANUSZEWSKA, D.</td>
<td>154, 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUCAULT, M.</td>
<td>73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 84, 87, 140, 145, 161, 198, 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORD, H.</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROMM, E.</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRYE, N.</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUKAČ, J.</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYFE, G.</td>
<td>26, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GABORA, L.</td>
<td>86, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GADAMER, H.G.</td>
<td>61, 76, 119, 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARJANS, J.</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARFINKEL, H.</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAŽOVÁ, V.</td>
<td>157, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIDDENS, A.</td>
<td>71, 120, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIERE, R.N.</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOB, A.</td>
<td>25, 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOFF LE, J.</td>
<td>101, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOLDING, V.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOJDIĆ, I.</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOGOVÁ, S.</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOODE, G.B.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GORAKHKAR, S.</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOUMAN, B.</td>
<td>69, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAESSE, J.G.T.</td>
<td>13, 14, 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAMSCI, A.</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREGOROVÁ, A.</td>
<td>21, 35, 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIOVIO OF COMO, P.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOETEL, W.</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOETHE VON, J.W.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROF, S.</td>
<td>71, 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROTE, A.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HABERMAS, J.</td>
<td>71, 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAINARD, J.</td>
<td>146, 198, 133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAJKO, D.</td>
<td>59, 94, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALBWACHS, M.</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMBERGER, O.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HANÁKOVÁ, P.</td>
<td>73, 137, 141, 142, 143, 181, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARAWAY, D.J.</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARRIS, J.</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAVEL, V.</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEGEL, G.W.F.</td>
<td>12, 75, 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEIDEGGER, M.</td>
<td>58, 59, 76, 116, 181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELFERT, J.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEMPEL, C.G.</td>
<td>165, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERBST, W.</td>
<td>22, 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERDER, J.G.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEŘMANOVÁ, E.</td>
<td>99, 204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERŤ, J.</td>
<td>67, 86, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HITLER, A.</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLOBIL, I.</td>
<td>98, 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOBBSAWN, E.</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HODGE, J.</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOFMAN, J.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOLST VON, N.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOLZBACHOVÁ, I.</td>
<td>63, 64, 69, 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONNETH, A.</td>
<td>75, 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HÖPPER-GREENHILL, E.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HORKHEIMER, M.</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HORSKÝ, J.</td>
<td>86, 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HORYNA, B.</td>
<td>67, 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HÖSCHL, C.</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOWARD, P.</td>
<td>134, 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUDSON, K.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HÜHNS, E.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMBOLDT VON, A.</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUPKO, D.</td>
<td>35, 197, 205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Studied history, museology and archeology in Brno. First, head of several Czech museums, in 2002–2014 head of the UNESCO Chair of Museology and World Heritage at Masaryk University in Brno, now assistant professor at the Department of Ethnology and Museology, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava. Member of the board of the International Commission for Museology – ICOFOM, member of the editorial boards of scientific journals, organizer of international conferences, frequent lectures at home and abroad. His works have been translated into English, Russian, Chinese, French, Portuguese and German. Former Chairman of the Museums and Galleries Association of the Czech Republic. Focuses in his research on theoretical museology, the collection and presentation activities of museums, the history of museum culture and museum management and marketing.